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ABSTRACT 
Recognizing the power of states to export marriage ceremonies, with whatever legal effect for same-
sex marriages, permits a fresh look at the constitutional considerations affecting state voiding 
powers over same-sex marriages. Using the hypothetical state export of marriage law as a thought 
experiment, this Article argues that any effort to block the exercise by states of a power to offer 
marriage ceremony across jurisdictions, or to render all such ceremonies a nullity, would be 
constitutionally infirm or impractically disruptive of marital repose generally. The experiment 
 
†  Editor’s Note:  Since this Article went into production, the Supreme Court granted certi-
orari in Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 81 U.S.L.W. 3072 (U.S. 
Dec. 7, 2012) (No. 12-144) and Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. 
granted, 81 U.S.L.W. 3116 (U.S. Dec. 7, 2012) (No. 12-307).  While not presenting the is-
sue of states' obligation to recognize same-sex marriages, these cases can allow the Court 
to exercise caution about its institutional competence in marriage law and still to be bold 
by requiring states to respect the constitutional norm of equality. 
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reveals the thinness of state policy interests in voiding gay marriages. 
A vision of Legal Normalcy and State Territorial Control accepts legal variety as a normal 
incident of federalism and choice-of-law principles. Given the status quo, proponents of Legally 
Mandated Uniformity embrace visions of a constitutional ban on same-sex marriage or a rights-
based regime that guarantees a fundamental right to marry in the United States. 
The depth of equality norms as a public value, the expressive effects of marriage ceremony and 
portable marital recognition, and the obsolescence of state voiding authority point to a different 
vision:  a stable legal environment of marital status portable to all states, with reduced conflict 
about the loss of control by states over their normative statements in marriage authorization law. 
Equality Federalism, with the Equal Protection clause in full partnership with federalism, would 
allow for a general embrace of equality as a principle of fairness, respect, and hospitality. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Setting:  California in the near term.  The Law:  Prop 8 still ap-
plies.  Scene:  A happy couple (Bob and Bill) stands on California soil 
and enters a marriage under Vermont law, delivered ceremonially by 
Skype under a distance marriage statute recently enacted by visionary 
Vermont legislators.  Consequence 1:  The couple is married under 
Vermont law and imported the word marriage to their home state of 
California.  Consequence 2:  The couple’s Vermont marriage is im-
mediately entitled to all the incidents of a California marriage, except 
the word marriage.  Consequence 3:  The ban on the word marriage 
ends in California.  Fact:  Words travel, as does law.  Consequence 4:  
The artificiality of state bans on the recognition of “evasive” same-sex 
marriages becomes obvious and the principled, federalist path toward 
marriage equality becomes apparent. 
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The cultural dispute over same-sex marriage oscillates among con-
tested visions of national uniformity and the expectation of a long 
period of legal variety among the states.  The proponents of national 
uniformity embrace mirror visions of a longed-for repose, one 
cleansed of gender-variant legal marriage, or one that assures any 
adult pair the fundamental right to marry anywhere in the United 
States, under the law of every state.  Each side imagines that a nation-
al resolution would end the long simmering dispute and usher in a 
new era of decisive legal consensus.1 
The choices, as imagined today, are between, on one side, Legally 
Mandated Uniformity and, on the other, Legal Normalcy and State Territo-
rial Control, an image of legal variety drawn from conflicts-of-law prin-
ciples that originated in international law.  The result, in the minds 
of same-sex couples, is a marital world of Legal Surprise and Shifting Le-
gal Regimes, accompanied by an all-or-nothing debate about their 
marriage rights.2 
This Article proposes a third vision, one propelled by a pragmatic 
view of the cultural resources for changing an embedded cultural 
practice and by a call for a deeply skeptical view of the state interests 
in non-recognition.  The normative fulcrum is the basic equality 
norm that most Americans accept and even champion.3  The strong-
 
 1 Compare Theodore B. Olson, The Conservative Case for Gay Marriage, NEWSWEEK (Jan. 8, 
2010), available at http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2010/01/08/the-
conservative-case-for-gay-marriage.html (arguing that the Supreme Court should validate 
same-sex marriages based on the valued American principle of equality), with Sherif Gir-
gis et al., What is Marriage?, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 245, 287 (2010) (asserting that 
marriage “should be regulated for the common good” of society and traditional families) 
[hereinafter What Is Marriage].  Opposing views of the capacity of the Court to impose a 
national solution to a moral dispute, and of the role of national solutions in a federalist 
system, can be found in the plurality opinion for the Court and in Justice Scalia’s dissent-
ing opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey.  In their effort to resolve the long-simmering 
abortion wars, the plurality wrote of their role:  “Where, in the performance of its judicial 
duties, the Court decides a case in such a way as to resolve the sort of intensely divisive 
controversy reflected in Roe and those rare, comparable cases, its decision has a dimen-
sion that the resolution of the normal case does not carry.  It is the dimension present 
whenever the Court’s interpretation of the Constitution calls the contending sides of a 
national controversy to end their national division by accepting a common mandate root-
ed in the Constitution.”  Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 866–67 
(1992).  Justice Scalia argued that until the issue of abortion was elevated to a national 
level, “disagreement was being worked out at the state level.”  Id. at 995 (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing). 
 2 The debate in California about enacting a constitutional ban on same-sex marriage has 
been described as using “whetheryoulikeitornot” rhetoric.  Melissa Murray, Marriage 
Rights and Parental Rights:  Parents, the State, and Proposition 8, 5 STAN J. C.R. & C.L. 357, 369 
(2009). 
 3 See POST and other citations infra note 25. 
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est support for equality as a guiding principle derives from notions 
that we are equal in the United States as citizens, wherever we reside.4  
The popular reception of that principle can be placed under pres-
sure by equality mandates from the Supreme Court, particularly inso-
far as the rule of equality seems difficult to constrain as a legal edict if 
it affects an institution5—marriage—about which the Court lacks a 
defining jurisprudence.6  The imposition by the Court of a rights-
based change in marriage law does not mesh well with law as a pro-
cess of accretion, in which principles are slowly developed and em-
bedded in a common, substantially consensual legal culture.7  Yet a 
constitutional amendment restrictively defining marriage to exclude 
same-sex couples is so at odds with the equality norm that its pro-
spects, as a realistic alternative or as a means of ending the cultural 
clash, are weak.  The possible approaches to entire uniformity suffer 
reasonable objections and formidable obstacles. 
 
 4 This principle has less to do with the right to travel than with the right to be treated 
equally once residence is established in a state.  See, e.g., Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999) 
(finding a constitutional right to travel).  The direct connection of equality to the right to 
travel has only Saenz as a precedent.  Saenz did not initiate a newly robust constitutional 
treatment of the status of a new resident of a state as a specific incident of the right to 
travel. 
 5 Robert Post argued in reviewing the 2002 term of the Supreme Court that one possible 
reason, in its Lawrence v. Texas opinion holding a Texas sodomy law unconstitutional, that 
the Court used due process analysis, subtly infused with equal protection concern about 
stigma, was the sensitivity, under rational basis review, of labeling proponents of sodomy 
laws “bigots,” and the problems, under strict scrutiny, of constraining the application of 
the equality principle to other laws affecting gay people.  Using equality logic would re-
quire the Court “to intervene into the national controversy over the status of homosexual-
ity . . . .”  Robert C. Post, The Supreme Court 2002 Term, Foreword:  Fashioning The Legal Con-
stitution, Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 100 (2003).  Due process presents 
the risk of undue court involvement in shaping marriage, with little institutional basis.  See 
Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186 (Minn. 1971) (“The due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment is not a charter for . . . judicial legislation.”). 
 6 See infra Part IV.B. 
 7 State courts deal with deeper law-making functions as compared with the Supreme 
Court’s narrower focus on individual rights.  The Court, by its institutional calling, reduc-
es marriage to the prism of equality norms rather than the broader policies that state 
courts have the capacity and the mandate to shape and develop.  State courts gain their 
competence through their function, not from geography.  When state courts struggle 
with finding a core logic for the evolving facts of marital life as formal gender rules fade 
yet gendered marriage remains, state courts are forced to confront the marriage facts 
brought before them and to solve problems for which neat solutions are not obvious.  See, 
e.g., Katharine K. Baker, Homogenous Rules for Heterogenous Families: The Standardization of 
Family Law When There Is No Standard Family, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 319, 367–68 (2012) (dis-
cussing the need for family law to impose arbitrary solutions on property division, child 
custody, or other “defining” features of families, asserting that advocates for a fundamen-
tal right to marriage “must reckon with how much definitional work we have ceded to the 
state,” and suggesting that recognizing the power of the state to define statuses may 
“strengthen equality claims to family status”). 
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The third path to a workable resolution to national stalemate over 
values is Equality Federalism, which draws upon insights into federalism 
sharpened by a consideration of the constitutional power of states to 
offer their marriage law to non-residents and even to export marriage 
ceremonies.  States may assert their values in their laws, but they may 
not seal themselves off from the legal culture of sister states nor 
should federalism permit states to impose Legal Surprise and Shifting 
Legal Regimes on married same-sex couples.  Valid non-recognition 
rules that protect existing marriages or vulnerable parties to coercive 
or fraudulent marriages could continue.  But, with Equality Federalism, 
rejection of categories of adult couple marriage, where the form is 
widely authorized, would end.  Symbol-laden rejections of marriages 
would no longer be a permitted form of state control over the validity 
of marriages contracted legally in another American state.  A vision of 
states’ exercising a local moral vision over a distinct, stable, local 
population and thus justifiably disrupting legal statuses gained 
through the law of another state is obsolete. 
The suggestion that rules allowing states to void marriages are ob-
solete is not a radical departure from skeptical treatments of the pub-
lic policy exception to interstate recognition of marriages.  Previous 
treatments, however, rely on parsing doctrine and accept that there is 
a basis for states to void an “evasive” marriage, meaning a marriage by 
a couple who travels to enter into a marriage not permitted in the 
couple’s home state and then returns home.8  By contrast, this Article 
provides a broad analytic basis for ending the right of states to void 
same-sex marriages contracted elsewhere.  A previous article9 demon-
strates that states may exercise the authority to export their marriage 
 
 8 See, e.g., Kramer infra note 92, at 1999; Sanders infra note 89.  Many states have rules that 
render evasive marriages void.  See Appendix A for a chart showing the current state-by-
state rules, Appendix A:  Effect of Home State’s Non-Recognition on Validity of Marriage, 
http://www.law.msu.edu/e-marriage/AppendixA.pdf (last visited Nov. 27, 2012).  See in-
fra text accompanying notes 97–100 for a description of the potential effect of such harsh 
voiding rules on the official recognition by a state that performs an evasive marriage. 
 9 Adam Candeub & Mae Kuykendall, Modernizing Marriage, 44 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 735 
(2011).  For additional writings arising from the E-Marriage project and this article, see 
Mae Kuykendall, A Way Out of the Same-Sex Marriage Mess, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2012, at A31; 
Mae Kuykendall, Analyzing the Paths to Marriage Equality, AMERICAN CONST. SOC’Y BLOG 
(June 4, 2012), http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/analyzing-the-paths-to-marriage-equality; 
Mae Kuykendall, Federalism and Same-Sex Marriage in Windsor v. United States: Defusing the 
Power of NO!, AMERICAN CONST. SOC’Y BLOG (July 9, 2012), 
http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/federalism-and-same-sex-marriage-in-windsor-v-united-
states-defusing-the-power-of-no; MAE KUYKENDALL, AMERICAN CONST. SOC’Y FOR L. & POL., 
Issue Brief:  The Converging Logic of Federalism and Equality in Same-Sex Marriage Recognition 
(Sept. 2012), available at http://acslaw.org/publications/issue-briefs/the-converging-
logic-of-federalism-and-equality-in-same-sex-marriage-recognition. 
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law to couples who never visit the state to use its marriage law.  The 
proposal for “E-Marriage” concedes that a same-sex “distance” mar-
riage would not be valid in a non-recognizing state, but demonstrates 
that the procedure is a means of conferring marital status where the 
substance of the marriage is uncontroversial. 
A skeptical view of ingrained assumptions about marriage proce-
dure that require the physical presence of a couple for a state offici-
ant to grant official marriage status directs similarly skeptical atten-
tion to the rules allowing states to void the same-sex marriages of 
their residents. 
After introducing the concept that state laws tying marriage pro-
cedure to geographical presence by a couple are stale and unsup-
portable, this Article proceeds to investigate the constitutional stur-
diness of the hypothetical E-Marriage procedure against attempts by 
other states or the federal government to stop it from occurring.  Ex-
ploring the constitutional strength of state power to export marriage 
ceremony against efforts to prevent it then helps outline the structure 
of an affirmative argument for subjecting the existing canons of 
recognition to a searching scrutiny for their compatibility with consti-
tutional norms.  The recognition canons, as they are applied to void 
same-sex marriages with effects outside a couple’s domiciliary state, 
confront an array of constitutional problems when examined under 
this shift of analytic focus.10  Overturning them in their entirety would 
be a logical extension of overlapping constitutional norms and of our 
history as a nation.11 
In this Article, “E-Marriage” functions as the basis for a thought 
experiment.  Exploring the power of states to offer marriage cere-
monies outside their state demonstrates that the entrenchment of 
geographic lines as the sole location for marriage solemnization au-
thority is more myth than reality.  Similarly, the related vision of state 
power to impose destructive non-recognition rules on marriages con-
tracted elsewhere overstates geographic entrenchment of marriage 
 
 10 See infra Part III.  For an attempt to discern a pattern and describe the “subtle permuta-
tions” in the ad hoc law that arises to resolve issues in “interstate activity,” see Allan Erb-
sen, Horizontal Federalism, 93 MINN. L. REV. 493, 495–96 (2008) (undertaking to give “‘hor-
izontal federalism’ the systemic scrutiny typically reserved for vertical federalism” and 
noting that “parochial efforts by each state to exercise the full scope of its ostensibly insu-
lar powers risk infringing the other states’ autonomy, frustrating the others’ legitimate in-
terests, or burdening the others’ citizens”). 
 11 Grossman has shown that states have typically moved in the direction of recognition.  Jo-
anna L. Grossman, Resurrecting Comity:  Revisiting the Problem of Non-Uniform Marriage Laws, 
84 OR. L. REV. 433, 442–44 (2005). 
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authority.12  For same-sex marriage, the geographic vision is un-
moored from the valid concerns of states to prevent real harms to 
vulnerable marriage partners by policing non-conforming marriages.  
The ready acceptance of geographical control as the sum and sub-
stance of marriage law prevents the creation of a rational blend of va-
riety in local marriage law and uniformity, with attendant predictabil-
ity in marriage recognition.  Local, state, and federal institutions, 
combining their distinctive roles in the constitutional order,13 can 
produce a marriage regime that emphasizes respect for local values 
and allows same-sex couples to enter marriages that exist within a 
prevailing legal clarity, sheltering their marriages from official ca-
price.  The thought experiment sweeps to the side artificially stark 
choices—complete uniformity or chaotic variety and legal surprise—
forced by the tension between territorial control of states over mar-
riage and an overarching constitutional system focused on individual 
rights.  The thought experiment additionally provides a means of at-
taining a helpful agnosticism about the theoretically fraught debates 
over marriage as status or contract; as a critical foundational unit of 
society or a flawed means of distributing resources for caregiving; as a 
noble goal for the gay community or a foolish obsession of the gay 
rights establishment; and as an expression of natural law or a legal 
contract responsive to changing needs.  And it does it without a reli-
ance on either equal protection doctrine or substantive due process 
as stand-alone claims free of the complex arguments embedded in 
 
 12 Part IV.A, infra, argues that Loving v. Virginia is a rejection of a geographic entrenchment 
of control over marriage, as well as a case about the overarching issue of racial justice.  
See Janet Halley, Behind the Law of Marriage (I):  From Status/Contract to the Marriage System, 
6 UNBOUND:  HARV. J. LEGAL LEFT 1, 5 (2010) for an arguably overly robust statement of 
territorial sovereignty over marriage as a status, claiming that the law contract “dissolved 
interjurisdictional boundaries while marriage cemented them.” 
 13 See infra Part IV.  Equality Federalism, by combining equality principles with other constitu-
tional norms, partially duplicates comity principles in federalism but raises it to a higher 
conceptual power.  Comity already contains an equality component, but it lacks the man-
date suggested here to root out violations of equality that are a poor fit with other consti-
tutional values but not well suited to direct supervision of state law-making.  Kramer infra 
note 92.  Justice Blackmun wrote about the strong tie of federalism to other constitution-
al protections:   
Federalism, however, has no inherent normative value:  It does not, as the majority 
appears to assume, blindly protect the interests of States from any incursion by the 
federal courts.  Rather, federalism secures to citizens the liberties that derive from 
the diffusion of sovereign power.  “Federalism is a device for realizing the concepts 
of decency and fairness which are among the fundamental principles of liberty 
and justice lying at the base of all of our civil and political institutions.” 
  Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 759 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting William J. 
Brennan, Jr., Federal Habeas Corpus and State Prisoners:  An Exercise in Federalism, 7 UTAH L. 
REV. 423, 442 (1961)). 
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the state’s control over marriage and family law.  It simply accepts as 
the working materials and the operative legal fact the existence of 
same-sex marriage in the United States.  It also highlights the base-
line values revealed by the constitutional infirmity of a hypothetical 
effort to contain marriage ceremonies within strict limits of place, 
and the possibility of popular support for equality as minimal respect 
for a family’s status given legal form by another state. 
The uniformity vision and the unending variety vision affecting 
valid state-blessed marriages revolve around moral and legal abstrac-
tions and technical doctrines inherited from an international con-
text.  This Article points to a federalist means, combining principle 
with pragmatic awareness of institutional roles, to end the stalemate 
over clashing visions. 
This Article will proceed by reviewing in Part I, Separate Visions, the 
history of the reaction to same-sex marriage, and setting up the the-
matic contrast between visions of uniformity and variety.  Part II, Lov-
ing’s Federalism Meaning, examines the buried meaning of the iconic 
case of Loving v. Virginia, analogizing physical banishment of the Lov-
ings from Virginia to symbolic banishment of all legal effects of same-
sex marriages from a state.  It explores a role for equality values in 
supporting marriage portability, thereby allowing Equality Federalism 
to support constitutional values of free expression and cultural norms 
of fairness.  Part III, Exporting Ceremonial Marriage:  Constitutional Con-
siderations, examines the means by which states or the federal gov-
ernment might try to block all export of marriage ceremony, or to 
render it entirely invalid for all couples.  By using distance marriage 
as a hypothetical vision of marriage geography, Part III thus develops 
by implication a critical analysis of the engrained assumptions about 
canons of marriage recognition within our federalist system.  Part IV, 
Equality Federalism:  Precedent and Institutional Structure, suggests that 
specific precedent (Loving v. Virginia) and federalist structure sup-
port the approach of applying equality to strengthen the norm of 
comity rather than directly encroaching on state supervision of local 
marriage law.  Part V, Conclusion, summarizes the strength of Equality 
Federalism as a means of achieving an institutionally and culturally 
sound resolution to the contested visions of marriage. 
I.  SEPARATE VISIONS 
For one set of advocates regarding the basic gender format of 
marriage, a plausible legal regime is one that that bars same-sex mar-
riage forever.  By contrast, marriage-equality activists and rights liber-
als find legal plausibility in establishing marriage as a fundamental 
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right of citizens (and, presumably, legal residents) that cannot be re-
stricted on the basis of gender.  These advocates for uniformity wish 
to end the legal uncertainty that arises from a patchwork of laws gov-
erning a critical legal status.  The mixed picture of increasing cultural 
and legal acceptance, met by continuing formidable legal and cultur-
al opposition,14 is felt by opposing camps to require final, definitive 
resolution.  The differing visions reflect recurring dispositions about 
rights, social order, and legal variety. 
A.  Legally Mandated Uniformity:  The Lure of Uniformity 
Proponents of uniformity share a common disposition:  the insist-
ence upon a complete resolution, mandated by a legal vehicle capa-
ble of generating, and imposing, one national rule.  Each side enter-
tains the belief that repose is possible to achieve by foreclosing 
variation with legal hardwiring that no longer admits of dispute.  The 
rights story presumes forward movement that is consolidated and al-
ways maintained.  The story of marriage as an essence requiring a re-
stricted constitutional definition presumes that reinstating a core 
meaning protective of society would be a definitive ending to a peri-
od of deviation from basic principles that should guide law and teach 
citizens.15  For one side, a lack of national uniformity deprives indi-
viduals of rights and undermines common citizenship.  For the other 
side, any same-sex marriage in the United States intolerably damages 
 
 14 Abby Goodnough, As Gay Marriage Gains Ground in Nation, New Hampshire May Revoke Its 
Law, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 27, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/28/us/gay-marriage-
law-in-new-hampshire-may-be-revoked.html.  On November 6, 2012, the voters in three 
states refuted the commonplace argument that recites a record of voter rejections of 
same-sex marriage in state referenda that define marriage as the union of one man and 
one woman, and then concludes that "the People" always reject marriage equality when 
they are able to vote.   Voters in Maine, Maryland, and Washington State voted favorably 
on laws passed by their state legislatures authorizing same-sex marriage, and in Minnesota 
voters rejected a constitutional amendment to define marriage as heterosexual.  In 
Maine, the voters reversed a 2009 voter rejection of legislation permitting same-sex mar-
riage.   Ashley Fetters, Same-Sex Marriage Wins on the Ballot for the First Time in American His-
tory, THEATLANTIC.COM (Nov. 7, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/sexes/archive/
2012/11/same-sex-marriage-wins-on-the-ballot-for-the-first-time-in-american-
history/264704/ (listing the wording of each ballot proposal). 
 15 Girgis et al., supra note 1, at 287 (concluding that marriage law necessarily privileges a 
morally controversial claim:  “Marriage understood as the conjugal union of husband and 
wife really serves the good of children, the good of spouses, and the common good of so-
ciety” and, as a result, “ . . . marriage uniquely meets essential needs in . . . a structured 
way [and] should be regulated for the common good . . .”). 
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a core understanding of marriage, and damages the community’s cit-
izenship meaning for which marriage is a critical building block.16 
1.  Uniformity as a Rights-Based Regime 
The standard story of rights is one of gradual expansion of the 
scope of individuals’ fundamental rights against government mis-
treatment and of a wider circle for equality of persons before the law.  
Theodore Olson, a conservative enlistee in the legal cause of a rights-
based uniformity entitling same-sex couples to be married under the 
marriage law of each state, has expressed confidence in the efficacy of 
rights demands to build acceptance, and has cited equality as a basic 
American commitment.  In Olson’s words, “. . . veterans of past civil-
rights battles found that it was the act of insisting on equal rights that 
ultimately sped acceptance of those rights.”17  Olson builds his prag-
matic claim about the path to acceptance and uniformity on the 
“bedrock American principle of equality,” saying that “[l]egalizing 
same-sex marriage would . . . represent the culmination of our na-
tion’s commitment to equal rights.”18 
Appealing to popular sentiment, Olson draws on a convergence of 
constitutional doctrines and popular acceptance of a narrative of his-
torical vindication of core American principles when excluded 
groups demand to be included within constitutional ideals.  In Ol-
son’s telling, gay marriage will take its place in that typical rights sto-
ry; a deep common narrative about American exceptionalism that al-
ways commands eventual acceptance and hence will carry same-sex-
marriage into the national consensus favoring equality for all citizens.  
A common refrain by supporters of the claim to a right to same-sex 
marriage is, “[i]n fifty years, we will wonder why it took so long,”19 or, 
“[h]istory is on our side.”20 
 
 16 The form of the difference is a classic tension between two strands of liberalism:  “moral 
rights and consequentialist analysis . . . .”  Randy E. Barnett, The Moral Foundations of Mod-
ern Libertarianism, in VARIETIES OF CONSERVATISM IN AMERICA 58 (Peter Berkowitz ed., 
2004) (discussing the contrast between a focus on individual dignity and one emphasiz-
ing community interests).  See also MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK:  THE 
IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE (1993).  Glendon critiques the form of Su-
preme Court opinion-writing concerning a rights-based protection for same-sex intimacy 
as wooden and cliché-ridden, sounding in Bowers like “a battle between Yahoos and per-
verts.”  Id. at 154. 
 17 Olson, supra note 1. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Editorial, Let N.Y. Senate Vote on Gay Marriage, NEWSDAY, June 14, 2011, available at 
http://www.newsday.com/opinion/let-n-y-senate-vote-on-gay-marriage-1.2957156 (“Make 
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The equality claim has purchase with conservative and liberal 
scholars, advocates, and citizens.  An early advocate for gay marriage 
as a remedial approach to a lack of public equality for gay people, 
long before marriage seemed culturally possible, is the conservative 
commentator Andrew Sullivan.21  He argued that marriage law, being 
the source of a state-provided good, should treat citizens equally.22  
Sullivan argued that laws banning discrimination by private actors in-
troduce social conflict and litigation but the state must not discrimi-
nate against gay people in administering marriage law.23 
The equality norm was rendered linguistically iconic by Justice 
John Harlan in his Plessy v. Ferguson dissent.  His formulation has 
been amenable since then to conservative adoptions of a neutral 
principle:  “Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor 
tolerates classes among citizens.  In respect of civil rights, all citizens 
are equal before the law.  The humblest is the peer of the most pow-
erful.”24  This sense of equality as a bedrock principle is enshrined 
throughout our constitutional law, both state and federal.25 
 
no mistake:  Gay marriage is coming sooner or later, and someday people will wonder 
why it took so long.”). 
 20 Proclamation No. 8685, 76 Fed. Reg. 32,853 (May 31, 2011) (“While progress has taken 
time, our achievements in advancing the rights of LGBT Americans remind us that histo-
ry is on our side, and that the American people will never stop striving toward liberty and 
justice for all.”). 
 21 ANDREW SULLIVAN, VIRTUALLY NORMAL (1996).  A leading proponent of gay marriage in 
the academy is Professor Dale Carpenter, who has constructed a Burkean argument for 
gay marriage as a natural progression supportive of conservative values.  The result, how-
ever, is one that supports a practice of equality.  See Dale Carpenter, A Traditionalist Case for 
Gay Marriage, 50 S. TEX. L. REV. 93 (2008). 
 22 SULLIVAN, supra note 21, at 216. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also Romer v. Ev-
ans, 517 U.S. 620, 623 (1996) (“One century ago, the first Justice Harlan admonished this 
Court that the Constitution neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.” (quoting 
Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559)). 
 25 Robert Post argues that legal norms of equality are a form of cultural practices that reflect 
cultural understandings.  See ROBERT C. POST ET AL., PREJUDICIAL APPEARANCES:  THE 
LOGIC OF AMERICAN ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW 22–41 (2001).  Section 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides in part:  “No State shall make or enforce 
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; 
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”  U.S. 
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 506 
(1989) (O’Connor, J.) (referring to “the letter and spirit of a constitutional provision 
whose central command is equality”); see also JOHN PAUL STEVENS, FIVE CHIEFS:  A 
SUPREME COURT MEMOIR 99 (2011) (calling the Equal Protection Clause a “clear princi-
ple” and “command of equality”).  “[M]any American state constitutions contain provi-
sions condemning equal protection denials by government.”  Jeffrey A. Parness, American 
State Constitutional Equalities, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 773, 773–74 (2010) (referring to “some 
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The formal equality claim, unlike the claim about the critical role 
that heterosexual marriage plays in the formation of the family and 
social health, requires little elaboration of a moral theory (except the 
deep understanding that each of us is equal as citizens and in the eyes 
of our Creator)26 to support a vision for uniformity.  It requires mere-
ly a strong orientation to rights liberalism and to a view of the Consti-
tution’s bedrock commitment to equality.  Even though the rights 
claim is mediated through a body of doctrine that invites claims 
about state interests, and thus about the impact of gay marriage on 
social health, rights claims are typically subjected to empirical reason-
ing27 rather than the larger moral argumentation of the claims about 
the essence of marriage.28  The factual holdings of the trial court in 
Perry v. Schwarzenegger, largely accepted by the Ninth Circuit,29 are an 
attempt to construct a systematic, evidence-infused model of such 
rights logic, complemented by means of fact-finding that gives mar-
riage a fixed meaning for constitutional law.  On the basis of trial 
 
American state constitutions [that] contain special equality provisions that go beyond 
general equal protection and that have no federal counterparts”).  Parness surveys the 
form of the equality provisions in state constitutions, with specific attention to initiatives 
significant in “replac[ing] stagnant . . . constitutional doctrine that failed to fulfill the dis-
tinctive role of state constitutionalism urged by many.”  Id. at 783–84. 
 26 The Declaration of Independence is more than a statement of political theory in its invo-
cation of self-evident truths.  THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) 
(“We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are en-
dowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights . . . .”). 
 27 See infra text accompanying note 28 (referring to the empirically-based logic of the Su-
preme Court’s marriage jurisprudence). 
 28 Empirically suggestive, logical examination of claims once readily understood as moral is 
a feature of Supreme Court jurisprudence on marriage.  See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 
U.S. 374 (1978) (rejecting a law barring the issuance of marriage licenses to the non-
custodial parent of an indigent child, because the barrier was unlikely to produce more 
resources for the child, with no discussion of the moral disapproval communicated by the 
law).  One could readily explain the bad moral lesson conveyed by an unrestricted right 
to reproduce, to abandon the children, and still enjoy full access to the marital status, 
with the blessing of the state implicated by the issuance of the license.  That claim was in-
compatible with the logic of the Supreme Court’s rights jurisprudence.  For an explicitly 
empirical examination of a wife’s separate rights, see Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 893 (1992), discussing the spousal notification re-
quirement and legitimate reasons why pregnant women may not wish to inform their 
husbands of their decisions to abort their child.  By contrast, state marriage jurisprudence 
has many common law and statutory resources with which to shape moral concepts about 
marriage, insofar as they respect core precepts about individual rights.  The Supreme 
Court, in effect, has only used individual rights logic, for which the Court is institutionally 
responsible.  See GLENDON, supra note 16, at 151–58 (using Bowers to critique the adequa-
cy of Supreme Court rights reasoning). 
 29 Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1053–54 (9th Cir. 2012). 
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court evidence,30 the trial judge rejected all claims to a state interest 
in keeping marriage uniform in its gender format.31 
Some communitarian advocates for same-sex marriage rights val-
orize gay marriage as a site of humane values, good partnerships, 
gender reform, and social resources for communities32 to avoid legal 
argumentation that emphasizes rights and tolerance in a liberal socie-
ty.  Still, the supporting structure for a claim to constitutional mar-
riage rights is rights-based equality logic,33 with some rhetorical flour-
ishes about the good of marriage.  The premise of rights creates a 
strong logic of universality34 and of the right of each individual in 
preference to a theory about the marital unit.35  In the claimed ab-
sence of an evidence-based state interest in restricting marriage to 
opposite-sex couples, there is no conceptual room for any reservation 
of complete rights of individuals to same-sex marriage, to be solem-
nized by every jurisdiction, and every clerical functionary, that is em-
powered to issue marriage licenses. 
The universal reach of rights logic has a weak point in the case for 
marriage as a fundamental right.  It is at odds with state control over 
marriage as a legal institution that the state defines.36  The analytic 
 
 30 Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 953–92 (N.D. Cal 2010), aff’d sub nom. Per-
ry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 31 Id.  Such use of “facts” has been criticized from the left as dangerously using legal fact-
finding to construct “the gay subject,” a category viewed as fraught with risk and infused 
with instability as a predicate for law.  Libby Adler, Just the Facts:  The Perils of Expert Testi-
mony and Findings of Fact in Gay Rights Litigation, 7 UNBOUND:  HARV. J. LEGAL LEFT, 1 
(2011).  Adler also cites conservative scholar Orin Kerr’s suggestion that the type of facts 
found in Perry are “constitutional facts” relating to the widely-understood meaning of 
marriage in the United States and not facts of the sort to which an appellate “would feel 
compelled to defer.”  Id. at 2 n.5.  Insofar as the Supreme Court has been ill-suited to give 
entity meaning to marriage, it would seem unlikely to accept an entity meaning pro-
pounded in a district court by the litigation process. 
 32 JONATHAN RAUCH, GAY MARRIAGE:  WHY IT IS GOOD FOR GAYS, GOOD FOR STRAIGHTS, AND 
GOOD FOR AMERICA (2004) (providing a conservative argument for the societal good of 
gay marriage). 
 33 Linda C. McClain & James E. Fleming, Respecting Freedom and Cultivating Virtues in Justify-
ing Constitutional Rights, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1311, 1320–21 (2011) (reviewing communitarian 
and rights-based arguments, with special attention to the structure of choices for mar-
riage set up by Michael Sandel). 
 34 Joseph Raz, Human Rights in the Emerging World Order, 1 TRANSNAT’L LEGAL THEORY 31, 31 
(2010) (describing human rights as “synchronically universal”). 
 35 For example, the requirement that a husband give his consent to an abortion is unconsti-
tutional because the parties to the marriage have individual rights.  See Planned 
Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 71 (1976) (discussing how no theory 
of healthy marriages can overcome the individual rights focus). 
 36 See Baker, supra note 7, at 367 (suggesting that the primacy of the state’s role in defining 
family status may “weaken and strengthen different constitutional claims to family sta-
tus”). 
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absence of a robust theory of marriage as an entity, valued by com-
munities for practical and foundational symbolic reasons as a particu-
lar and foundational status, is a critical gap in the case for a Supreme 
Court mandate that sustains persuasive force.  Individual rights rea-
soning, the stronghold of constitutional jurisprudence, may fall short 
as a claim that every state has a mandate to shape its marriage author-
ization laws anew in light of the dignitary and practical claims of 
same-sex couples. 
Consider the following:  If the Court should decide that the mar-
riage laws of states are a violation of equal protection or of a funda-
mental right, the Justices must proceed to choose a remedy.  One log-
ical option is to enjoin the issuance of marriage licenses until states 
cure the identified constitutional problem.  Each state could then 
choose either to end state involvement in marriage entirely or to re-
write marriage law in a way that is constitutional. 
Issuing a restraining order would have the merit of avoiding the 
Court’s direct involvement in supervising and effectively rewriting 
state marriage law.  As astonishing as the thought of mandating a 
suspension of the issuance of marriage licenses is, such an action re-
mitting choice to the states would be arguably more cautious than 
ordering that states issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples, 
thereby altering an entity supervised by states that contains residual 
gender patterns.  The realization that halting the issuance of mar-
riage licenses is a modest alternative to a mandate prescribing mar-
riage law helps one see the radical nature of a rights-based direct 
constitutional mandate about marriage law. 
But there may be a role for individual rights equality reasoning to 
attain wide, portable access to marriage—not uniformity, but access.  
Rights reasoning may open a path to protect state-created marital sta-
tus as an equality concern and allow the Supreme Court to sidestep 
the hazards of embracing a view of marriage using the limited legal 
materials at hand.  The Court, if it focuses on access and recognition 
as an equality issue, could spare the institution the task of promulgat-
ing “facts” about marriage purportedly arising from an evidentiary 
process in litigation or embracing a theory of marriage drawn from 
historical assertions and assumptions about marriage.  Because same-
sex marriage is a legal reality in the United States, the Court may rely 
upon that available constitutional fact to fashion a principled, yet 
pragmatic, response to the marriage wars.  The Supreme Court may 
simply annex to its jurisprudence the existing state statuses called 
marriage.  The states have done the theoretical and democratic work 
needed to authorize same-sex marriage.  Bonding the equality norm 
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to an understanding of federalism is a good solution for the Supreme 
Court to meet the demands of individual rights in a federalist system. 
2.  Uniformity by Amendment:  One Invariant Model of Marriage Made 
Constitutional Bedrock 
Since same-sex marriage became a realized social possibility, with 
an emerging claim on legal principles of equality and fundamental 
rights reasoning, there has been an effort to countermand extensions 
into marriage law of individual rights reasoning.37  The tacks taken 
have been, first, dismissive arguments in litigation,38 coupled with 
strong claims that the legislature should control the definition of 
marriage.  Second, once legislatures began to enact gay marriage 
laws,39 claims arose that legislative change to the definition of mar-
riage is a usurpation that must yield to the direct decision of “the 
People.”40  The transition from attacks on courts to attacks on legisla-
tive power drew on rhetoric suggesting that only popular majorities, 
acting directly, should have the say over the definition of marriage.41  
 
 37 For an account of the marriage equality movement since 1993 and efforts to oppose 
same-sex marriage, see generally Michael D. Sant’Ambrogio & Sylvia A. Law, Baehr v. 
Lewin and the Long Road to Marriage Equality, 33 U. HAW. L. REV. 705 (2011).  See also 
GLENDON, supra note 16, at 57, 122–23 (noting and critiquing the expansion of the mari-
tal-privacy protection in Griswold v. Connecticut to an altered protection of individual 
rights without reference to the attachment to marriage).  For a strong dismissal of the 
possibility that gay marriage is “real” marriage, see John Finnis, Marriage:  A Basic and Exi-
gent Good, 91 MONIST 388 (2008).  For a rejection of equality reasoning about marriage 
and other human goods on the grounds that it lays claim to an “equality of esteem” and is 
subject to arbitrary exceptions, see Girgis et al., supra note 1, at 249–52. 
 38 The arguments drew on the stigma inflicted by Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), 
that procreation was a purpose of marriage, and the assumption that tradition was too 
strong to make gay marriage a plausible legal claim.  See Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 
(Iowa 2009); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008) (reviewing 
stigma and citing Bowers’ noting of the state’s tradition argument); Hernandez v. Robles, 
855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2006) (accepting the procreation argument); see also Sant’Ambrogio & 
Law, supra note 37, at 710 (describing how the State of Hawaii unsuccessfully defended 
the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage in 1991 by citing procreation and the 
promotion of heterosexual parenting as the goals of marriage). 
 39 Vermont was the first that did so without pressure from the courts.  See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 
15, § 1201 (2010) (defining and establishing a “civil union” as a relationship in which the 
parties “may receive the benefits and protections and be subject to the responsibilities of 
spouses”). 
 40 Kate Zernike, Christie Wants Voters to Decide on Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2012), 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/25/nyregion/christie-wants-new-jersey-
voters-to-decide-on-gay-marriage.html (discussing the governor’s announcement that the 
voters should decide on the bill legalizing same-sex marriage). 
 41 A supporting argument is that whenever “the People” decide, they reject gay marriage.  
See John Wagner, Same-sex marriage headed to ballot in Md., WASH. POST (June 7, 2012, 6:34 
PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/maryland-politics/post/same-sex-marriage-
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The hierarchy of authority moves to a different level with each ad-
vance of equality arguments in a branch of government.42  The im-
provisational response, always seeking a new redoubt to defend an 
exclusive meaning for marriage, drew on a sense that any gay mar-
riage, even if legal, was a “moral/imaginative crime.”43  Whoever 
commits it must be checked.  The ultimate hierarchy of authority cit-
ed is natural law, used to demonstrate that “equality” is misapplied to 
marital forms not in accord with natural law.44 
The first line of defense was intended to blunt the force of indi-
vidual rights arguments in such a decisive manner that uniformity 
might be maintained by consistent rejections in state courts of claims 
by same-sex couples to a right to marry.  The first set of cases re-
quired confirmation that the legislature intended only opposite-sex 
marriages.45  As the challenges continued and legislatures refined 
their definitions, the argument for deference to the legislature be-
came more elaborate and detailed, with extensive recitations of state 
interests in defining marriage according to long tradition.46  Then, in 
Hawaii, when the state lost the constitutional argument about gender 
equality and hence lost judicial deference, the proponents of main-
taining marriage as exclusively heterosexual pairings quickly undid 
the constitutional holding by means of a referendum restrictively de-
 
headed-to-ballot-in-md/2012/06/07/gJQAVCn3LV_blog.html (“No state has ever ap-
proved a ballot measure allowing same-sex marriage . . . .”).  See Fetters, supra note 14 
(noting recent 2012 elections in Maine, Maryland, and Washington State that approved 
same-sex marriage and in Minnesota that rejected a constitutional narrowing of the 
meaning of marriage). 
 42 The change of the legal strategy of the Obama administration, in which Attorney General 
Eric Holder informed Speaker John Boehner that the Department of Justice would no 
longer defend Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”), resulted in an argu-
ment that the Executive Branch, through the Department of Justice, was not qualified to 
reach that legal conclusion.  See Charlie Savage & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, In Turnabout, U.S. 
Says Marriage Act Blocks Gay Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2011, at A1 (describing fierce con-
servative reaction). 
 43 E-mail from Allison Tait to author (Nov. 14, 2011, 7:18 AM) (describing her work in pro-
gress) (on file with author). 
 44 See supra note 37 and accompanying text (criticizing equality logic in certain moral argu-
mentation). 
 45 See Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186 (Minn. 1971) (prohibiting marriage between 
persons of the same sex and citing the traditional institution of marriage between a man 
and a woman); Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Ky. 1973) (defining the common 
usage of the term marriage and identifying marriage as a custom which was traditionally 
between a man and a woman). 
 46 See Burns v. Burns, 560 S.E.2d 47, 49 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) (citing public policy recognizing 
marriage only between a man and a woman); Hernandez v. Robles, 805 N.Y.S.2d 354, 359 
(N.Y. App. Div. 2005) (recognizing that a tradition of defining marriage between a man 
and a woman is legitimized by public policy supporting procreation, child welfare, and 
social stability). 
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fining marriage, a maneuver that established a template for the fu-
ture.47 
Because the courts delayed the effectiveness of their holding, no 
same-sex marriage occurred in Hawaii.48  For a time, the prospects to 
prevent states’ altering a core gender definition seemed promising.  
Same-sex marriage, it seemed, could be kept entirely out of the Unit-
ed States by persuading state courts to defer to legislators, using ref-
erenda processes to amend state constitutions, and enacting precau-
tionary legislation to block the legal portability of any same-sex 
marriage that might ever occur.  The enactment of the Defense of 
Marriage Act49 afforded a strong national policy statement that 
backed state legislatures in holding the line against same-sex mar-
riage.  It also helped establish a negative legal framework in which 
state courts might be asked to recognize a right to same-sex marriage.  
In New York, the Court of Appeals relied in part on the fact that 
same-sex marriages were not portable from state to state to conclude 
that the benefit of marriage could not be conferred on same-sex cou-
ples by the act of the court.50 
Thus, the combination of judicial deference, legislative inertia, 
and the federal law restricting marriage portability created a holding 
pattern that yielded a temporary, potentially unstable uniformity of 
definition.51  The holding of the Hawaii Supreme Court was a marker 
for the risk that judges might apply a broad legal principle to mar-
riage, without restriction derived from a theory of marriage tying the 
essence of marriage to gender.52  Because the concern about mar-
riage had to do heavily with a deep aversion to the symbolic effect of 
any un-gendered marriage,53 the concern to prevent any legal effec-
 
 47 HAW. CONST. art I, § 23 (originally HB 117) (“The legislature shall have the power to re-
serve marriage to opposite-sex couples.”).  See also David Orgon Coolidge, The Hawai’i 
Marriage Amendment:  Its Origins, Meaning and Fate, 22 U. HAW. L. REV. 19 (2000) (detailing 
the history of the Hawaii marriage amendment); Sant’Ambrogio & Law, supra note 37, at 
720–26 (describing Hawaii as a template for halting state constitutional protection for gay 
marriage). 
 48 Carey Goldberg, Hawaii Judge Ends Gay Marriage Ban, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 1996), available 
at http://www.nytimes.com/1996/12/04/us/hawaii-judge-ends-gay-marriage-ban.html 
(“lawyers for the state quickly sought a stay pending their Supreme Court appeal.”). 
 49 Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2010). 
 50 See Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 5 (N.Y. 2006) (holding that the decision to recog-
nize same sex marriages is “a question to be addressed by the Legislature”). 
 51 Mae Kuykendall, The President, Gay Marriage, and the Constitution:  A Tangled Web, 13 
WIDENER L.J. 799, 818 (2004) (describing the effect of the Defense Of Marriage Act). 
 52 See Finnis, supra note 37, at 396 (“[T]he sex acts of same-sex partners can[not] be more 
than fictionally marital.”). 
 53  I use the phrase "un-gendered" to mean a marriage not predicated on the role division 
suggested by the requirement that the couple be of different sex.  Even with egalitarian 
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tiveness or symbolic importance of any such marriage was strong.54  
While the arguments have developed over time and become nuanced 
in an effort to demonstrate respectful engagement with the reality of 
same-sex love,55 the original reaction was dominated by shock and dis-
taste at the expressive novelty of “purported” marriages and at the 
presumption of judges, untethered by widely shared cultural views of 
marriage.  The revulsion at the idea was expressed in many contexts, 
such as withdrawal of a job offer by the Georgia Attorney General 
from a young attorney who listed a marriage to a woman in her initial 
employee form,56 the inclusion in the “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” regula-
tions of a participation in a “purported” same-sex marriage as a viola-
tion of the conduct prohibition measured by expressive acts,57 and 
the rapid spread of state referenda aimed at creating state constitu-
tional definitions of marriage that tied the hands of local courts and 
created an official expressive symbol in law that blockaded any variant 
meaning of marriage as void and even unthinkable.58 
The large effort was to create bulwarks against the unmistakable 
shift in the openness to same-sex marriage as a performative event 
and a status rooted in law, couple autonomy, or culture.  While some 
claims sounded in arguments about harm to individuals who might 
enter same-sex relationships, with marriage as an accelerator of harm, 
most of the opposition was about the intolerable symbolism of an un-
gendered marriage, one that disrupts the social disapproval of homo-
sexuality, undermines gender roles in marriage, may damage the cul-
tural importance of marriage as the normative site for procreation 
and child-rearing, and ignores the significance of centuries-long tra-
ditions. 
 
norms for marriage, complementarity between the sexes remains an assumption affecting 
visions of marriage. 
 54 MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FROM DISGUST TO HUMANITY:  SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 122–23 (2010) (locating civil marriage in the domain of the ex-
pressive as an explanation for both the resistance to same-sex marriage and the demand 
by same-sex couples for nothing less than marriage). 
 55 See Girgis et al., supra note 1, at 245, 258–59 (“[I]t is not individuals as such who are sin-
gled out—as being less capable of affectionate and responsible parenting, or anything 
else.”). 
 56 Shahar v. Bowers, 120 F.3d 211 (11th Cir. 1997). 
 57 Enlisted Administrative Separations, U.S. Dep’t of Def. Dir. 1332.14 (Dec. 21, 1993). 
 58 Resulting codes include IND. CODE ANN. § 31-11-1-1 (West 1999), LA. CONST. art. XII, 
§ 15, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit 19-A, § 701 (West 1998).  Michigan and other states embed-
ded these prohibitions in their constitutions.  See, e.g., MICH. CONST. art. 1, § 25. 
396 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 15:2 
 
The initial reaction was plainly, in part, astonishment,59 with an 
accompanying sense that a baseline understanding of a constitutive 
element of society was coming undone.  The disruption to a settled, if 
unstated, assumption about marriage was seen as radical and threat-
ening.  Indeed, aside from the debatable concern for how courts 
could create a limiting principle should equality, or fundamental 
rights principles, lead courts to recognize gay marriage,60 intuitive re-
actions saw the breach of a gender format of marriage as so unset-
tling that anything might follow as a cultural meaning of marriage.  
The most vociferous and heightened images of the conceptual chaos 
that might follow often made reference to bestiality.61  This initial re-
sponse was that the meaning of marriage is anchored in male-female 
pairings, mainly for reproduction,62 and any departure from that, 
even without the aid of judges, necessarily created an un-cabined def-
initional madness.  A moral/imaginative crime against marriage,63 
one not literally subject to prosecution but eligible for banishment, 
had to be blocked. 
Even as the opponents of any occurrence of same-sex marriage 
worked to create an inhospitable environment for a breakthrough, 
the inevitable began to occur.  The first state court to require the 
state to institute marriage equality was the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts in 2003.64  Unlike the Vermont Supreme Court, which 
allowed the legislature to devise a solution vindicating equality with-
out invoking the incendiary “marriage” word, a liberal court finally 
took the dreaded step of imposing the legal principles of equality and 
fundamental rights on a state to require same-sex marriage.65  The le-
gal variety in state schemes for direct democracy created the first in-
stance of a court holding that could not be rapidly reversed with a 
 
 59 JOHN BOSWELL, SAME-SEX UNIONS IN PREMODERN EUROPE, at xxv (1994).  The setting for 
a first reaction to the idea of same-sex marriage was a “salient horror of homosexuality 
characteristic of the West since the fourteenth century.”  Id. at xxiii.  An early bromide, 
repeated for many years:  “God made Adam and Eve, not Adam and Steve.” 
 60 Justice Scalia captured the unease about judicial reasoning applied to marriage.  See Law-
rence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 604 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“One of the benefits of 
leaving regulation of this matter to the people rather than to the courts is that the peo-
ple, unlike judges, need not carry things to their logical conclusion.”). 
 61 The most vivid statement of such a response came from former Senator Rick Santorum, 
who made an oft ridiculed and denounced comparison of same-sex sexual contact to 
“man-on-dog sex,” as a reason to maintain criminal prohibitions on same-sex intimacy.  
Excerpt from Santorum Interview, USA TODAY (Apr. 23, 2003, 10:37 AM) 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/2003-04-23-santorum-excerpt_x.htm. 
 62 BOSWELL, supra note 59, at xxv. 
 63 E-mail from Tait to author, supra note 43. 
 64 Goodridge v. Dep’t. of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
 65 Id. 
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constitutional amendment.66  Local efforts in Massachusetts encoun-
tered a sticky process for initiating a voter referendum to amend the 
constitution67 and ended after proponents of a constitutional ban 
were defeated for re-election.  New efforts to restrict marriage rights 
in the U.S. Constitution became visible again.68  Gradually, other state 
courts adopted rights reasoning to mandate marriage equality,69 and a 
state legislature finally passed same-sex marriage without the pressure 
of a court mandate or the obstacle of a veto predicated on voter-
passed statute defining marriage narrowly.70  After dramatic events in 
California, with opponents of gay marriage undertaking a massive, 
successful effort to undo a rights-based Supreme Court holding, 
there was a surprising burst of both court and legislative actions creat-
ing a state right to same-sex marriage in several states.  The current 
state of affairs provides an opening for one uniformity vision—that of 
fundamental rights—to prevail, but potentially creates a backlash 
from adherents of the other vision of uniformity.71 
With the passage of time and the relaxation of overt homophobia 
in the public understanding of same-sex orientation,72 the arguments 
about the critical need to reverse the trend toward state variety were 
increasingly framed with care to show respect for same-sex couples 
 
 66 Pam Belluck, Massachusetts Gay Marriage Referendum is Rejected, N.Y. TIMES (June 14, 
2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/15/world/americas/15iht-15gay-
web.6150169.html. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Legal Threats to Traditional Marriage:  Implications for Public Policy:  Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 1 (2004).  Control 
over the narrative treatment of the marriage-like relationships of gay couples was once 
again contested in the national legislative arena. 
 69 See, e.g., Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 991 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (declaring 
Proposition 8 unconstitutional based on the fundamental right to marry found in the 
Due Process Clause); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008) 
(discussing the fundamental right to marry); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 
2009) (considering various rights involved in allowing same-sex couples to marry). 
 70 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 8 (2009).  The California legislature twice passed a gay marriage 
bill, only to have it vetoed.  See Jill Tucker, Schwarzenegger vetoes same-sex marriage bill again, 
SF GATE (Oct. 13, 2007), http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2007/10/
12/BAT7SPC72.DTL. 
 71 For evidence of the still strong reservoir of opposition to same-sex marriage, see Bob 
Egelko, Santorum backs nullifying existing gay marriages, SF GATE (March 3, 2012), 
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2012/03/03/MN3Q1N9EV9.DTL 
(quoting Family Research Council predicting backlash from “some sort of sweeping deci-
sion . . . which would essentially impose same-sex marriage on every state . . .”). 
 72 See, e.g., Charles J. Butler,  Note, The Defense of Marriage Act:  Congress’s Use of Narrative in the 
Debate Over Same-Sex Marriage, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 841, 860 (1998) (“As the homosexual nar-
rative began prominently featuring gay men and lesbians in relationships similar to het-
erosexual marriage, the various existing laws and practices that marginalized homosexu-
als began to come under more scrutiny.”). 
398 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 15:2 
 
and to demonstrate a stepped-up level of sophistication in argumen-
tation.73  The argument for the danger of severing marriage from bio-
logical reproduction by a pair continues to be emphasized.74  Efforts 
are made to persuade opinion that the assumption of inevitability, at-
tached to same-sex marriage as the most recent manifestation of a 
progressive story about the arc of history toward recognizing and 
consolidating more generous forms of inclusion and rights, is not ac-
curate.  Rather, same-sex marriage is portrayed as a wrong turn, an 
experiment that will cause sufficient harm to community interests to 
bring recognition that marriage must have a uniform, national, gen-
der-based definition.75  The recent voice of opposition seeks to revive 
the first response, in a modulated tone. 
3.  A Federalist Blend? 
Today, visions of uniformity in marriage law necessarily raise the 
question of how well the country can tolerate the existence of mar-
riages authorized by a growing number of American states and treat-
ed by some other states as nonexistent.  If the problem is seen in that 
pragmatic sense, the solution, at this historic moment, might well 
best lie with rules limiting, but not stamping out, variety within a fed-
eralist system.  The recent voices of opposition to same-sex marriage 
seek to revive the first response in a more skilled and sophisticated 
way so as to garner public support.  No longer are claims against mar-
riage equality couched solely in terms of impending moral decay.  Ra-
ther, they hinge on the idea that recent court decisions, on both the 
state and federal levels, are a usurpation of the public’s collective 
right to discuss controversial topics.  Such a change in tone and strat-
egy should encourage marriage equality advocates to use other tools 
to advance their cause in a way that appeals to democratic norms as 
well.  Given the strength of arguments that the Supreme Court 
should not be the ultimate arbiter of our national life, a federalist 
approach, drawing upon democratic processes in states to diffuse 
 
 73 See Finnis, supra note 37, at 15 (linking support for gay marriage to a general loss of cul-
tural understanding “in the modern culture of marriage”); see also PEOPLE FOR THE 
AMERICAN WAY, ANTI-GAY POLITICS AND THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT, 
http://www.pfaw.org/media-center/publications/anti-gay-politics-and-religious-right 
(last visited Oct. 14, 2012) (describing an ad campaign as a reflection of increasing so-
phistication about framing arguments against gay rights as compassionate). 
 74 Stephen Macedo, Homosexuality and the Conservative Mind, 84 GEO. L.J. 261 (1995) (dis-
cussing the link to procreation in the restrictive definition of marriage, which persists in 
current arguments). 
 75 Girgis et al., supra note 1, at 247–48 (arguing that “revisionists” must show what marriage 
is and are unable to give answers justifying same-sex marriage). 
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equality norms into the culture of marriage, merits close considera-
tion. 
The equality norm, applied to marriage directly by federal courts, 
privileges a morally contested marriage meaning and provokes a 
strong reaction.  Equality, nevertheless, has strong work to do in 
achieving a hospitable treatment of a legal status awarded to a cou-
ple, while leaving states free to shape statements of marriage norms. 
B.  Legal Normalcy and State Territorial Control:  The Acceptance of 
Geography for Mapping Love and Marriage 
Doctrinal analysts, content with legal convention and in spiritual 
consort with a realist vision of the possible course of legal change, an-
ticipate a protracted period of legal variety and serendipitous chal-
lenges by couples who encounter disruptive forms of non-
recognition.76  Such pragmatists, parsing traditional doctrines in 
standard treatise-influenced analysis, are equable in their expectation 
of a period of dispute during which states substantially control the 
definition of marriage within their borders.  As authorizing jurisdic-
tions for marriage or as domiciliary jurisdictions for migratory cou-
ples and for couples who leave to marry and return to live, states will 
continue to assert their presumed right to establish marriage policy.  
Working within a conventional framework, pragmatists regard such a 
period as a natural incident of three factors:  the traditional control 
by states over marriage, the rules of choice of law as applied to mar-
riage within the federal system, and the low likelihood, or even the 
imprudence, of a national solution mandated by the Supreme Court 
in favor of same-sex marriage or by a Constitutional amendment 
against it.77  The recent book title, The Geography of Love . . . The Story 
in Maps,78 captures a normal view of legal logic under the control of 
place.  In this doctrinal world, the cartographer’s skills help tell the 
story of marriage.  The extensive rules, gray areas, and fine points of 
 
 76 Andrew Koppelman, The Limits of Strategic Litigation, 17 LAW & SEXUALITY:  A REV. OF 
LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER LEGAL ISSUES 1 (2008) [hereinafter Koppel-
man, Limits of Strategic Litigation]. 
 77 See supra text accompanying notes 1–7. 
 78 PETER NICOLAS & MIKE STRONG, THE GEOGRAPHY OF LOVE:  SAME-SEX MARRIAGE & 
RELATIONSHIP RECOGNITION (THE STORY IN MAPS) (2011).  With the holding in Perry v. 
Brown in February 2012, this fact of accepted variety began to be noted more prominently 
by marriage equality activists and journalistic coverage.  Esmé E. Deprez, State-by-State 
Laws on Gay Marriage Produce Patchwork Quilt, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 9, 2012), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-02-09/state-by-state-decisions-on-gay-marriage-
produce-patchwork-quilt-of-rights.html (referring to rights depending on geography and 
quoting Evan Wolson saying “we are one country, not 50 separate kingdoms”). 
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law might make a parlor game, with colored maps and surprise an-
swers to brain teasers if a player lands on the wrong part of the 
board.79 
Legal Normalcy presumes a period of nominal legal stability, dis-
rupted by accumulating pressures that de-stabilize governing norms 
with challenges at the less defensible edges of rules that arrogate to 
states control over what counts as marriage for their law.80  The analy-
sis is strongly rooted in traditional canonical statements of conflicts-
of-law principles within the federalist arrangement in America, with 
some constitutional law analysis at the margins.  The approach is 
workmanlike and thorough but cautious to a fault.  Geography is a 
given, and its effects on love and marriage81 are a matter for graphs 
with attendant footnotes.  The assumption of geography as determi-
native of lives has roots in literalist views of the authority of place.82  
Significantly, renewed scholarly interest in the treatment of evasive 
marriages unearthed a record of inconsistency and discretion in the 
treatment of evasive marriages,83 which belies the moral authority of 
harsh non-recognition rules. 
 
 79 Legal brainteasers have a history in popular culture as light entertainment.  See, e.g., J. K. 
Newton, You Be the Judge, SATURDAY EVENING POST, Oct. 1979, at 98 (presenting the read-
er with a legal brainteaser).  The internet abounds with FAQs on details for same-sex 
couples about official marriage law, with twists and turns about ground rules for entry, 
status portability, and exit.  See, e.g., Current Laws:  Resources by State/Jurisdiction, ACLU 
LGBT PROJECT, http://gbge.aclu.org/relationships/current-laws-resources-state/
jurisdiction (last visited Jan. 28, 2012). 
 80 Koppelman, supra note 76, at 5 (considering instances in which states that do not other-
wise recognize gay marriage would be compelled to recognize out-of-state marriages to 
avoid bizarre, unfair results). 
 81 The pairing of love with marriage is not true across culture and time, but it is part of con-
temporary understandings and romantic myth.  BOSWELL, supra note 59, at xx. 
 82 The trial court’s recitation in Loving v. Virginia is an iconic claim about geography as des-
tiny:   
Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay and red, and he placed 
them on separate continents.  And but for the interference with his arrangement 
there would be no cause for such marriages.  The fact that he separated the races 
shows that he did not intend for the races to mix.   
  Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 3 (1966).  The Kentucky Constitution was revised in 1849 
to “ba[r] free blacks from entering the state and ba[n] voluntary emancipation unless the 
free slaves were immediately exiled from Kentucky.”  MICHAEL A. ROSS, JUSTICE OF 
SHATTERED DREAMS:  SAMUEL FREEMAN MILLER AND THE SUPREME COURT DURING THE 
CIVIL WAR ERA 16 (2003).  Assumptions about control over place, and geography as regu-
latory destiny, are given a pungent description in relation to regulation of the female 
body.  See B. Jessie Hill, Dangerous Terrain:  Mapping the Female Body in Gonzales v. Carhart, 
19 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 649, 666–68 (2010) (decrying the court’s usage of synecdoche 
and euphemism when talking about a woman’s body). 
 83 Developments in the Law—The Law of Marriage and Family, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1996, 2037 
(2003) (noting court discretions in treatment of evasive marriages, except the case of 
miscegenation); Lewis A. Silverman, Vermont Civil Unions, Full Faith and Credit, and Marital 
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1.  Critiquing Legal Variety in Same-Sex Marriage Rules in the United 
States 
The large picture of marriage law from state to state is a picture of 
repose of married couples.  The expectation drew heavily from the 
image of substantial uniformity in the “Christian world”84 and relied 
until recent years on the long unstated assumption of gender dimor-
phism in all marriages.  The goal of repose had as its background the 
sense that marriage “essentials” were stable in the United States but 
the subject of “great diversity of view” in “different countries.”85  States 
granted repose to marriages contracted elsewhere, while also apply-
ing the norm that states could make such exceptions as they deemed 
necessary to protect their own public policy relating to “Christian” 
marriage. 
At the same time, courts strived for prudence in differentiating 
between a state’s interests in maintaining its own matrimonial law yet 
giving some effect to interests that a foreign marriage might create.86  
The governing vision arose from understandings created for interna-
tional law.  International law canons played a small role in the state-
to-state understandings in the United States relating to simple differ-
ences, such as age requirements and waiting periods after divorce.  
These canons had relatively little work to do, but they became en-
trenched in treatises as truncated statements of a principle of state 
prerogative that sounded more important than the limited function it 
ever fulfilled in marriage procedure.87 
The non-recognition rule had a role in the regime of anti-
miscegenation law, though actual direct applications of it were rare.88  
As states evolved toward substantial similarity, the rule receded into 
relative unimportance within the federalist comity among states, until 
 
Status, 89 KY. L.J. 1075, 1091 (2001) (noting variation by states in treatment of evasive 
marriages in contravention of a post-divorce waiting period); Barbara J. Cox, Same-Sex 
Marriage and the Public Policy Exception In Choice-Of-Law:  Does it Really Exist? 16 QLR 61, 74 
(1996) (noting variant treatment of evasive underage marriages). 
 84 Léon Duguit, Comment, The Concept of Public Service, 32 YALE L.J. 425, 472 (1923). 
 85 Id. at 471. 
 86 Id. at 474–77 (citing authorities and cases that illustrate the refusal of American courts to 
adjudicate divorces of marriages that occurred under laws permitting polygamy, com-
bined with the recognition that property interests created by polygamous marriages 
should not be destroyed or “mischievous results” permitted to arise). 
 87 HENDRIK HARTOG, MAN AND WIFE IN AMERICA:  A HISTORY (2000). 
 88 PEGGY PASCOE, WHAT COMES NATURALLY:  MISCEGENATION LAW AND THE MAKING OF RACE 
IN AMERICA 194–96 (2009). 
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same-sex marriage emerged to undermine a repose in the assump-
tions of national uniformity.89  Internationally, the most obvious large 
difference remained the acceptance by some legal systems of polyga-
my and its entire rejection in the Western world and the United 
States.90  Before the gay rights movement, the canon did no work with 
respect to the unstated element of the marital definition, sexual di-
morphism.91 
The importation of the assumptions about international law has 
been criticized in connection with the treatment of same-sex mar-
riages.92  Indeed, the understanding was casually expressed by early 
commentators that state prerogatives vis-à-vis other states were subject 
to constitutional limitations.93  Such constitutional limitations could 
take various forms, some relating to the “mischievous results” noted 
by treatises on international conflicts of law (today, a due process 
concern),94 and others later posing a bolder challenge to the fit of 
earlier visions of the public policy exception with the Americans as 
“one nation” (a federalism concern).95 
The primary salient exception, arising internally, to uniformity—
miscegenation law—was less a marriage rule than a race rule, and 
hence did not seem as significant for marital uniformity as for a gen-
eral racial program.  Until that racial program was disrupted, the 
 
 89 Steve Sanders, The Constitutional Right to (Keep Your) Same-Sex Marriage, 110 MICH. L. REV. 
1421, 1441 (2012) (mentioning modern statutes and amendments to state constitutions). 
 90 The entire rejection was subject to the prudential caveat that some incidents of a mar-
riage contracted under matrimonial law permitting polygamy should be respected.  
Duguit, supra note 84, at 474.  Koppelman has written extensively on the breathtakingly 
broad sweep of the DOMA, the history of recognizing some incidents of disapproved 
marriages, and the types of overbroad applications of DOMAs that can be challenged.  
See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, Against Blanket Interstate Nonrecognition of Same-Sex Marriage, 
17 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 205, 208–17 (2005) (discussing the constitutionality of federal 
DOMA and its interplay with state DOMAs). 
 91 BOSWELL, supra note 59, at xxv (treating heterosexuality as a suppressed parameter of 
common marriage definition). 
 92 Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the Unconstitutional Public Policy Excep-
tion, 106 YALE L.J. 1965 (1997) (contending that public policy doctrine fails to save mar-
riage inequality from constitutional scrutiny). 
 93 Duguit, supra note 84, at 473 n.16 (“The power of the individual states in this country is 
limited, of course, by the federal constitution.”). 
 94 SANDERS, supra note 89, at 1441 (constructing a due process argument to require states to 
recognize the same-sex marriages of new domiciliaries who were married in their previ-
ous state of domicile). 
 95 Kramer, supra note 92, at 1989–90.  The founding era assumed greater independence 
among states, with distinct marriage cultures based on religious differences and with the 
factor of race creating differences.  See also Ann Laquer Estin, Family Law Federalism:  Di-
vorce and the Constitution, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 381, 383–89 (2007) (discussing di-
vorce jurisdiction and the Full Faith and Credit Clause). 
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marriage rule was an expression of a relatively uniform willingness of 
states to tolerate rules reinforcing Southern Jim Crow laws.  It was 
more about race bias than it was a manifestation of a standard treat-
ment of marital repose.  Despite some arguments that the rule of 
heterosexual-only marriage is a form of maintaining gender suprem-
acy,96 it differs in origin from a race rule.  Race trumped the intuitive, 
settled expectations of gender dimorphism marriage. 
Thus, with the development of a legal regime in the United States 
of same-sex marriage, the assumption of uniformity has experienced 
a challenge somewhat unlike any previous vision governing marriage 
portability.  Most marriages of couples whose marriage did not pre-
sent a symbolic challenge to gender conformity were not policed, 
whatever the nominal law.97  Refusal to recognize same-sex marriages 
arises from a lingering astonishment at changes in gender roles as 
well as the Western legacy of revulsion at homosexuality.98  Despite 
the differing origin, the result becomes similar to the race rule:  the 
law functions as a symbolic regime that disrupts the massive repose 
most marriages enjoy by using canons of permitting non-recognition 
nominally aimed at heterosexual couples but little used.99 
Today, the understanding of the laws by those who apply them, 
those who may be affected, and states that offer same-sex marriage is 
weak.  Appendix A, previously noted, is a compilation of statutes and 
case law that apply for each state, including those that offer same-sex 
marriage.  Several states that allow marriage tourism by same-sex 
couples have recognition norms that would treat the marriages of gay 
couples from states that void evasive same-sex marriage as void at the 
moment the ceremony is completed.100  Statutes of this kind are 
called “reverse evasion statutes.”  The liberality in permitting same-
sex marriage tourism is not always supported by a clear understand-
 
 96 Andrew Koppelman, Defending the Sex Discrimination Argument for Lesbian and Gay Rights:  A 
Reply to Edward Stein, 49 UCLA L. REV. 519 (2001) (analogizing sex discrimination and an-
tigay discrimination). 
 97 HARTOG, supra note 87, at 1–5 (characterizing improvisations of judges and couples in a 
“changing legal scene”). 
 98 BOSWELL, supra note 59, at xxiii (describing that view of homosexuality as a “salient hor-
ror”). 
 99 PASCOE, supra note 88, at 1–3 (treating miscegenation law as part of a system of racial su-
premacy and privileging white couples).  Sanders, supra note 89, at 1436 (suggesting be-
fore the advent of same-sex marriage, the policy exception was rarely used to invalidate a 
migratory marriage). 
100 See Appendix A:  Effect of Home State’s Non-Recognition on Validity of Marriage, 
http://www.law.msu.edu/e-marriage/AppendixA.pdf (last visited Nov. 27, 2012), and su-
pra text accompanying notes 97–102 (describing harsh effects of non-recognition rules in 
certain states). 
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ing of what the state is offering.  Vermont, again a model for citizen 
law-makers, explicitly repealed its statute according deference to the 
voiding by a home state of an evasive marriage.101  New Hampshire, 
on the other hand, retains a reverse evasion statute.102 
2.  Visions of Variety and State-Level Uniformity in American Federalism 
Today 
The application of abstractions about the public policy exception 
within the United States presents an image of legal stability and uni-
formity within cohesive cultural silos bounded by the territorial juris-
diction of American states.  Such an image portrays continuity in 
practices that help anchor marriage law to the values of places with a 
stable population with shared commitments to a basic vision of mar-
riage.103  There is local control with local effects. 
The basic fact that the image confronts is that, instead of uni-
formity maintained by sovereign bodies that control the legal rela-
tions of their citizens in a simple way that clarifies legal relations, we 
have multiple and shifting legal regimes controlling marriages that 
have come into formal legal existence under a state’s law.  Under 
current law, couples married under the laws of seven American juris-
dictions, with some emerging exceptions,104 are treated by the federal 
government as legal strangers to one another.  When they file taxes, 
they must file a dummy return for the federal government to allow 
 
101 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 6 (relating to marriages void in state of residence) repealed by VT. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 12 (2009).  See also MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 207 § 11 (relating to 
the voiding of marriages in Massachusetts between non-residents that are contrary to the 
laws of the state of domicile), repealed by MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 216 § 1 (2009). 
102 N.H. REV. STAT. § 457:44 (“No marriage shall be contracted in this state by a party resid-
ing and intending to continue to reside in another jurisdiction if such marriage would be 
void if contracted in such other jurisdiction, and every marriage contracted in this state in 
violation hereof shall be null and void.”). 
103 Mae Kuykendall & Adam Candeub, Symposium Overview:  Perspectives on Innovative Marriage 
Procedure, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1 (2011) (presenting the concept of cross-border “E-
Marriage”).  See also Estin, supra note 95, at 382 (describing the association of “family” 
with “local” as untenable, as well as the family’s identification “with specific geographic 
territories for regulatory purposes”). 
104 Four federal courts have recently found Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act uncon-
stitutional.  Massachusetts v. U.S. Dept. Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 
2012); Windsor v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Pedersen v. U.S. 
Off. Pers. Mgmt. v. Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the U.S. H.R., No. 3:10-CV-1750, 
2012 WL 3113883 (D. Conn. 2012); Golinski v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 781 F. Supp. 
2d (N.D. Cal. 2011).  See also In re Balas & Morales, 449 B.R. 567 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2011) 
(finding an as-applied insufficiency of governmental interest to enforce the Defense of 
Marriage Act in a bankruptcy proceeding); supra note 9 (discussing these cases). 
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them to report income in the form that other married couples file.105  
When they move to a new state, the marriage that existed in their 
previous domicile is deemed void.  If they travel to marry, the most 
extreme canons of non-recognition void their marriage ab initio, 
even in the place of celebration.106  The commonplace intuition of 
couples—that they are legally married in the state that purported to 
marry them—is in fact subject to uncertain and shifting views on the 
status of an “evasive” marriage, a term created to cover interracial and 
underage marriages, or remarriages prior to the expiration of a wait-
ing period.107 
This state of affairs is viewed by legal pragmatists as a routine inci-
dent of the norms of marriage creation and recognition.  States con-
trol the marriage law for their territory.  The simple idea is for the 
state to define the contours of marriage and protect those contours 
from invasions that alter their form or harm the interests of parties to 
specific marriages.108  It is a vision of traditional uniformity anchored 
by the states as culturally distinct entities but also as under the threat 
of entry into their territory of mobile marriages, so utterly foreign, 
that the incidents of marriage status could not be enforced without 
violence to the core family law and the Christian culture of a state.109  
Before same-sex marriage became a legal fact in the United States, 
the states enjoyed sufficient uniformity to attract little comment.  The 
sense of an undisturbed uniformity receded once same-sex marriage 
became a reality.  At the same time, the divide between state status 
 
105 For review of DOMA’s effect on tax policy, see Patricia A. Cain, DOMA and the Internal 
Revenue Code, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 481, 498 (2009) (analyzing Section 3 of DOMA and 
concluding that “the refusal to recognize same-sex married couples as married for tax 
purposes is simply irrational”). 
106 See Appendix A:  Effect of Home State’s Non-Recognition on Validity of Marriage, 
http://www.law.msu.edu/e-marriage/AppendixA.pdf (last visited Nov. 27, 2012), and su-
pra text accompanying notes 97–102 (describing harsh effects of non-recognition rules in 
certain states). 
107 “Trying to state accurately what law states really use to determine validity of a mar-
riage . . . is a more challenging endeavor than might at first appear.”  Stanley E. Cox, Nine 
Questions About Same-Sex Marriage Conflicts, 40 NEW ENG. L. REV. 361, 375 (2006).  For a 
critical “legal realist” treatment of territorial assertiveness and other features of pluralism 
determining the legal effects of marriage, see Halley, supra note 12, at 26 (asserting that 
“marriage is not a steady beam shining in all directions across space and through time:  
instead it flickers”). 
108 States claim to have interests in using procedure to aid, not to hinder, marriage, except 
insofar as procedure poses a problem of substance, such as evading a waiting period after 
a divorce.  Lanham v. Lanham, 117 N.W. 787 (Wis. 1908) (holding a marriage invalid for 
evading the one-year waiting period after a divorce because the law expressed public poli-
cy concerns).  And, of course, American states will not enforce a man’s rights under po-
lygamous law to restrain a wife.  Duguit, supra note 84, at 474–75. 
109 Id. 
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and federal treatment is seen as a form of uniformity, in that no 
same-sex marriage is recognized by the federal government.110  Thus, 
there is a uniform federal treatment of marriage and a rule allowing 
states to carve out public policy exceptions to refuse recognition to 
some marriages, of which the salient example today is same-sex mar-
riage authorized in the United States.  The states that authorize same-
sex marriage are seen as a further example of a normal rule of state 
sovereignty, with the legal frailty of the marriages they authorize rele-
gated to a procedurally complex and obscure footnote. 
Even though the standard doctrinal approach may advance argu-
ments against the robust use of the public policy exception, and re-
mark on its unique use against same-sex marriage, the fundamental 
approach is one of accepting as normal a marital regime that is heavi-
ly uniform in its core assumptions about the portability of marriage 
and respectful of “the policy interests” of states in policing portability.  
Marriage is basically portable, but with exceptions imagined as rou-
tine, embedded in standard law, and applicable to a variety of mar-
riages.  I have called this a vision of Legal Normalcy and State Territorial 
Uniformity.  Except for polygamy and race, however, no other exam-
ple of variant marriages occupying a distinctive substratum of the 
population has occurred.  Selective application of generic prohibi-
tions, as in incest or underage marriage, may target disfavored reli-
gions, but there is no taxonomy of other wholesale exclusions from 
marriage by means of definitional excision. 
By contrast with routine legal normalcy, same-sex married couples 
confront a picture of Legal Surprise and Shifting Legal Regimes.  As not-
ed, when same-sex couples travel to marry, they do not know whether 
the marriage has any legal status anywhere, even at the moment of 
formalization.  States welcome them to participate in marriage cere-
monies yet do not emphasize to them any aspect of the likely legal re-
sult, which could turn on how harsh the non-recognition rules are in 
their home state and how much respect the state of celebration gives 
to the non-recognition rules of the domicile state.111  Those who allow 
 
110 William Baude, Beyond DOMA:  Choice of State Law in Federal Statutes, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1371 
(2012) (exploring the choices presented by the ending of DOMA for visions of uniformi-
ty because after DOMA’s repeal the federal government will no longer define marriage as 
between a woman and man). 
111 Websites providing information about New Hampshire marriage rules disclose both that 
non-residents may marry in a state and that same-sex marriages are permitted.  See, e.g., 
Manchester, New Hampshire, U.S. MARRIAGE LAWS, http://www.usmarriagelaws.com/
search/united_states/new_hampshire/marriage_licenses/manchester/ (last visited Mar. 
10, 2012) (summarizing the marriage laws in Manchester, New Hampshire, that allow 
non-residents and same-sex couples to marry). 
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the ceremonies for out-of-state couples do not coordinate with the 
judges who apply existing canons of recognition.112  If the states were 
selling securities instead of marriage licenses and a marriage tourist 
welcome, they could face liability for omitting facts necessary to avoid 
deception.113  In a transaction bordering on legal theater of the ab-
surd, the District of Columbia cancelled a same-sex couple’s marriage 
certificate upon learning of publicity about their ceremony, which 
was presided over by an officiant in D.C. through a large-screen con-
nection to their wedding gathering in Dallas.114  In the letter cancel-
ling the marriage certificate, the District encouraged them to return 
to D.C. to repeat the ceremony,115 an invitation to an action that ar-
guably results in the same legal nullity that D.C. asserted was the legal 
outcome of their distance ceremony.  In effect, the District informed 
them that they had conducted a legally futile ceremony the wrong 
way and urged them to repeat it for a more effective memorialization 
of a void marriage.  At the same time that this couple was rebuked for 
their innovative ceremony, traditional couples engaged in similar im-
provisation and faced no official sanction.  Rather, they received 
happy human interest coverage of the novelty of the way they over-
came a barrier of distance, or jailhouse walls, to marry at a distance.116 
Most couples who travel to marry and then return home must be-
lieve that there is some official result that arises from the legal mo-
ment in another state.  Even if their own state declines to afford 
recognition to their marriage, they surely believe it has some exist-
ence somewhere.  Indeed, one of the problems that arises from mod-
ern-day “evasive” same-sex marriages is the couples’ subsequent ina-
bility to divorce.  In the world of Legal Surprise and Shifting Legal 
Regimes, gay couples might be informed in one context that their 
marriage has no existence at all and never did, and may discover in 
another that they have a legal tie that they cannot sever without relo-
cating for the requisite year to a state that is willing to provide the di-
 
112 Appendix A provides a picture of the complexity, which requires matching the rules of 
the domiciliary state with the rule of the authorizing state.  See Appendix A:  Effect of Home 
State’s Non-Recognition on Validity of Marriage, http://www.law.msu.edu/e-
marriage/AppendixA.pdf (last visited Nov. 27, 2012). 
 
113 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1942). 
114 Gay men fight on after court deems Skype marriage invalid, CNN U.S. (Dec. 4, 2010), 
http://articles.cnn.com/2010-12-04/us/dc.gay.marriage_1_gay-marriage-marriage-
statutes-skype. 
115 Letter from the Deputy Clerk of the Marriage Bureau, D.C. Superior Court, to Mark 
Reed-Walkup (Nov. 22, 2010) (on file with author). 
116 Amy Buckingham, Dad Stands in For Soldier Son at Wedding, OMAHA WORLD HERALD, Mar. 
8, 1991, at 44. 
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vorce adjudication.117  And yet it would be possible, on a strict reading 
of marriage recognition law, for a state court in a state that recogniz-
es same-sex marriage to rule that there is no marriage, because the 
marriage was void from the beginning in the domiciliary state, and 
hence there is no basis to enter a divorce decree.  Logical consistency 
might mandate such a result to a judge who reads the law strictly.118 
In effect, same-sex couples, and hence individuals who enter 
same-sex marriages, are located in a world of legal brain teasers that 
tax the capacity of the best lawyers and lead to differing conclusions 
about basic legal rights and obligations.  For same-sex couples, uni-
formity, in which their legal status has the same effect in one place as 
another, is an elusive quest into the minds and varying views of law-
yers and judges relying on a set of wooden legal doctrines and sup-
posedly embedded norms of state “policy” as a protectable interest, 
all ideas developed for an earlier time and place and form of variety. 
In some respects, the only vision of variety and uniformity that al-
lows its proponents to be content with the current state of uniformity 
is that of the legal specialists in conflicts of law.  Such specialists, per-
suaded by the portrait in the common law of the capacity of legal 
rules to change with new facts, accept a period of slow evolution pow-
ered by the accretive effects of litigation challenging the most ex-
treme effects of non-recognition.119  Some of the “realists” do not be-
lieve any total solution will occur, either to suppress all same-sex 
marriage or to impose a genderless marriage regime through judicial 
review by the Supreme Court. 
One question that arises with any suggestion of forcing the evolu-
tion in marriage law to accommodate same-sex pairs is to what degree 
forward movement would precipitate backlash.  The present level of 
penetration of same-sex marriage into the national consciousness and 
the legal regime has not created a powerful reaction since the first 
revelation that a state might one day institute same-sex marriage.  
The Defense of Marriage Act of 1996 was the culmination of a strong 
backlash to the first suggestion of a significant challenge to the set-
tled assumption that marriage was, in its essence, a pairing of a man 
and a woman for reproduction.120  Since then, there has been success 
 
117 Courtney G. Joslin, Modernizing Divorce Jurisdiction:  Same-Sex Couples and Minimum Contacts, 
91 B.U. L. REV. 1669, 1672–73 (2011) (explaining that in actions to terminate a marital 
relationship, courts apply their own divorce law). 
118 See supra Part II.B.1 for a discussion of the non-recognition norms that are still on the 
books in some states that provide for gay marriage. 
119 Koppelman, Limits of Strategic Litigation, supra note 76, at 1–2. 
120 See supra Part I.A.2. 
Nov. 2012] EQUALITY FEDERALISM 409 
 
in referenda in states to ban same-sex marriage, often in the provi-
sions of the state constitution, but there has been no national move-
ment comparable to the force of the movement to enact a statute re-
strictively defining marriage for federal law and buttressing the right 
of states to deny recognition to marriages authorized by the law of 
another American state.121 
Thus, one prudential question, empirical in import, is how same-
sex marriage might make progress in its legal diffusion throughout 
the United States without triggering a heavily reinvigorated backlash.  
The question frames the problem of resolving differing ideas of an 
ideal legal regime governing marriage, including how legal change 
that upsets long-standing and deeply held views on critical social 
building blocks can proceed without a legal eruption that alters the 
background rules of federalism and the family. 
C.  Summarizing the Problematic:  A History of Repose and Certainty for Most 
Marriages, with Limited Exceptions 
For traditional couples, rules on marriage recognition have little 
contemporary relevance.  Couples marry with little thought to state 
policies or care with formal rules; they travel to marry, if they please, 
and return home assured of their status.  The canons of procedure 
for marriage protect their marriages with strong presumptions favor-
ing validity, even where the couple errs in some detail.122  Traditional 
couples marry and move about with their status in tow.  The right of 
states to apply local policy to decide anew where their marriage fits in 
 
121 The conflict has shifted to referenda aimed at overturning or blocking a judicial or legis-
lative decision legalizing gay marriage.  See id. 
122 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283 (1971) (protecting the justified ex-
pectations of the parties).  In a desperate, revealing, and sadly amusing attempt to find a 
means for the Supreme Court to avoid the need for the Court to address a recognition is-
sue involving a cross-racial couple, Justice Burton attempted to seize upon an extreme 
geographic literalism that had a mild intuitive appeal to the Justice but which was entirely 
lacking in credibility to Justices who nonetheless chose an avoidance that was also without 
a legal leg to stand on.  The case was Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749 (Va. 1955), a case in 
which an Asian man who married a white woman in North Carolina to evade Virginia’s 
anti-miscegenation law, appealed Virginia’s ruling, on his wife’s petition for an annul-
ment, that the marriage was void for its violation of the Virginia’s marital race law.  The 
Court did not want to decide the case immediately after Brown v. Board of Education, 347 
U.S. 483 (1954), for fear of a massive backlash and greater resistance to the Court’s hold-
ing that schools must desegregate.  Justice Burton suggested that the Court “could dismiss 
the case on the independent state ground that Virginia required residents to marry with-
in the state—a plainly erroneous reading of Virginia law.”  MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM 
JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS:  THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL 
EQUALITY 322 (2004). 
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the views of the state on marriage is an abstraction unknown to most 
couples. 
Yet doctrine abounds asserting the capacity of states to apply their 
policies on marriage to render disapproved marriages void.  For the 
gay marriage case, the doctrine, useless for most purposes in the 
modern day, fills volumes with treatise-style parsing of a doctrine in 
relative disuse until gay marriage began to be enacted in some states.  
The discussion assumes a high degree of stasis in the background as-
sumptions of marriage recognition law, with grave concerns by states 
guarding their public policy prerogative.  Yet with the exception of 
gay marriage and polygamy, the doctrines address a virtual null set of 
real-world state concerns.  Many of them were aimed at protecting 
vulnerable young women or protecting vulnerable spouses from ab-
sconding spouses who would marry elsewhere.  Such paternalistic 
concerns have faded from the work done by marriage law at the entry 
point and are mainly the carriers of an abstraction rather than a part 
of states’ concrete legal reality in the administration of marriage law. 
The idea of state policies that may permit states to reject marriag-
es of their residents as invalid has its source in conflicts of law princi-
ples drawn from international law and, to be sure, from early Ameri-
can racial divides and the early sense that states had sovereign 
dignity.123  These principles fall on a point between the general prin-
ciples of granting repose to marriages contracted pursuant to law 
where the “operative facts” occur124 and the claim to a prerogative of a 
sovereign to administer law in accordance with its fundamental poli-
cies.125  They seek a balance between the importance of repose for 
marriage and the concern of sovereigns to maintain a basic uniformi-
ty in its marriage law, with specific reference in much of the writing 
to the Christian world’s rejection of polygamy.  They nonetheless ex-
plain that treating a legal relation created in another country as en-
tirely nonexistent for all purposes is not good policy.126 
In simple terms then, the source of conflicts principles in mar-
riage law is an idea of uniformity derived from a deep difference in 
fundamental marital regimes between Western countries and coun-
 
123 Kramer, supra note 92, at 1967.  See also Estin, supra note 95, at 384–89 (explaining that 
the cultural clash between the North and South, specifically over divorce as a legal op-
tion, led to the decision to entrust family law to the states); Duguit, supra note 84, at 471–
73 (describing the competing theories for explaining the ground rules for nations to as-
sert public policy limitations on giving effect to marriages contracted in conformity with 
the law of another nation). 
124 Duguit, supra note 84, at 473. 
125 Id.; see also Barnett, supra note 16; Glendon, supra note 16, at 154; Halley, supra note 12. 
126 Duguit, supra note 84, at 474–75. 
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tries that authorize polygamy.  The sense of a difference in kind is so 
deep that courts even refused to give effect to the marriage of one 
man to one woman, where the marriage occurred within a regime of 
legal polygamy.127  At the same time, treatise writers maintained the 
caveat that property interests and the like that incidentally derived 
from a foreign marriage regime deemed incompatible with the West-
ern world should be honored.128 
So, the international conflicts-of-law vision of marriage uniformity 
and variety had as its fulcrum a fundamental and stark contrast be-
tween the deep tradition of Western countries and other countries 
that tolerated polygamy.129  The principle was applied within the 
United States to articulate the same kind of sovereign claim over a 
fundamental marriage regime.  Its most salient application was to 
miscegenation law, a matter perceived as a corollary of a regime of 
racial supremacy. 
The vision of variety and uniformity, in the context of race, was 
not about the form of marriage but about race purity and separation.  
Nonetheless, the vision of uniformity that racial separation encour-
aged in marriage law became implanted in the within-U.S. recitations 
of conflicts principles for marriage.  The abstract statement gained 
application to certain real concerns, such as minimum age for mar-
riages and waiting periods for remarriage, but were treated with dis-
cretion and variation in strictness.130  Such policies, measured by ap-
plication, have had a relatively small role in regulating interstate 
marital uniformity.131  For miscegenation law, couples had the option 
of avoiding detection and eluding a confrontation with a symbolic 
 
127 Id. at 475. 
128 Id. at 475–76. 
129 It has been noted that the divide between polygamous regimes and the standard couple 
marriage is not in fact between Western and non-Western countries, as polygamy has oc-
curred in the United States and even has Biblical examples.  Thom Brooks, The Problem 
with Polygamy, 37 PHIL. TOPICS 109, 109 (2007).  Nonetheless, the perception at the time 
the public policy exception was created and maintained was that it served as a bulwark 
against a form of marriage that offended Western or “Christian” sensibilities.  And, it re-
mains the case that Western countries, even the most liberal and tolerant, continue to re-
ject polygamy, thus giving it no cultural roots within the federalist system in the United 
States.  See Reference re:  Section 293 of the Criminal Code of Canada (2011) BCSC 1588 
(Can B.C.S.C.) (holding Canada’s law criminalizing polygamy constitutional). 
130 Lanham v. Lanham, 117 N.W. 787 (Wis. 1908).  It was noted by commentators that the 
Constitution limited the powers of states in the United States.  See Duguit, supra note 84, 
at 473 n.16. 
131 Sanders, supra note 89. 
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policy statement by the state in which they resided.132  In the nine-
teenth century, moreover, states often simply ignored the marriage 
laws of other states, enabling males to abandon families and remarry 
without legal check.133  In the nineteenth century before the Six-
teenth Amendment, the critical economic concern of intact couples 
today regarding their marriages—recognition for federal tax pur-
pose—had no meaning.  The collateral effects of non-recognition in 
a less complex society were of far less import. 
Thus, the rhetoric of marriage conflicts law became a symbolic 
statement of uniformity and a formal claim that states were supervis-
ing a coherent and even prudent body of marital law.  The truth was 
one of variety and play in the joints among states, one that couples in 
the nineteenth century negotiated to achieve their private prefer-
ences and beliefs.134  Today, the legacy of this symbolic claim about a 
coherent body of law that protects “sovereign” interests in a uniform 
body of law invades the expectations about the rights of states to re-
ject same-sex marriages contracted outside the state.  Conflicts-of-law 
principles are applied as a form of traditional and normal enforce-
ment of the uniformity vision of marriage regimes in nations and, by 
extension, in American states.  Yet the principles draw their core 
claims from a small set of real applications in the past and from pri-
mary concerns with perceived fundamental differences in the con-
ception of marriage between Western countries and other countries, 
and a legacy in the United States of a regime of racial separation.  At 
the same time, as one scholar has shown, most aspects at the margins 
of marriage law, such as waiting periods after divorce and age limits, 
have moved toward relative conformity from state to state.135 
Marriage non-recognition rules, and the attendant rhetoric, draw 
their claim to authority from a forgotten past for which the rules and 
rhetoric were made, in which they played a marginal role, and in 
which the main in terrorem effect was enforcing race supremacy. 
 
132 More notably, courts tended to side with a woman accused of marrying a white man by 
concealing her race.  Bela August Walker, Fractured Bonds:  Policing Whiteness and Woman-
hood through Race-Based Marriage Annulments, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 4–10 (2008). 
133 HARTOG, supra note 87, at 36–37. 
134 Id. at 1–5. 
135 See Grossman, supra note 11, at 442–43. 
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II.  LOVING’S FEDERALISM MEANING:  BRINGING MARRIAGE  EXILES 
HOME 
Bans on marriages based merely on a socially constructed classifi-
cation of persons (race and/or sex) are problematic in similar ways.  
For marriage authorization, they grant marriage bureau clerks an un-
seemly mandate to launch and resolve an intrusive inquiry into theo-
ries of race and gender that are prone to abuse and which diminish 
the dignity of citizens.136  For marriage recognition, the ability of cou-
ples to avoid such indignities by travel (or by E-Marriage, if it comes 
into existence) is undermined by the transfer of such an inquiry to 
the domicile state when the couple seeks recognition of their mar-
riage. 
A.  Denying the Lovings’s Marriage, Claiming States’ Rights 
The story of Richard and Mildred Loving provides a vivid image of 
the effects of a ban on recognition, an image that can be viewed in a 
new lens across time and space.  Notably, race is not a neat, fixed cat-
egory into which all people fit,137 and neither is sex.138  In the iconic 
race and marriage case of Loving v. Virginia, the Supreme Court ac-
cepted the invitation to make a sweeping invalidation of all racial 
classification in marriage law.  Yet the case concerned a recognition 
issue and the Lovings were a couple whose legal assignment to a 
fixed, ascribed category was far from neat.  The couple got married in 
Washington, D.C. and lived in Virginia, which not only refused to 
provide a ceremonial marriage to them under Virginia law, but went 
so far as to criminalize their presence in Virginia.  Because the Lov-
ings left Virginia to marry in Washington D.C. and returned to Vir-
ginia after a short period, the marriage was “evasive” but otherwise 
unexceptionable as a marriage of two people of childbearing age.  
While the overriding principle of the Court’s holding in Loving was 
racial equality, thus requiring a sweeping mandate on the basis of in-
dividual rights of all persons in the United States, its subtext was nec-
essarily federalism.  Its racial meaning overwhelmed its meaning for 
marriage federalism. 
 
136 In her landmark book, Peggy Pascoe published a photograph of a clerk ruling, across a 
counter, that Harry Bridges and Niriko Sawada could not receive licenses to marry be-
cause though born in the United States, Ms. Sawada was of Asian descent and Bridges was 
white.  PASCOE, supra note 88, at 236. 
137 Walker, supra note 132, at 5. 
138 Much scholarly literature addresses the social construction of race and gender. 
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In Loving, the Commonwealth of Virginia began to learn that it 
could not draw a deep trench between Virginia and the outside 
world’s cultural change.  Even when that cultural change was repre-
sented by the presence of a marriage Virginia disallowed, Virginia 
could not draw upon its then culture and race views to maintain its 
traditional policies affecting marriage and associated hierarchies.  
Virginia had reason to see its traditional control over marriage as a 
matter separate from the principles emanating from the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  The Virginia Supreme Court made this argument with 
force and without apology in Naim v. Naim, accepting Brown v. Board 
of Education as law, but coming to rest with confidence on the deep 
constitutional tradition of state control over all aspects of marriage 
law.139  The court asserted that the Fourteenth Amendment did not 
dislodge the principles of the Tenth Amendment in the “regulation 
of the marriage relation.”140  The right of the states to remain insular 
as to the form that marriage might take within its borders was one 
“safeguarded by that bastion of States’ rights, somewhat battered 
perhaps but still a sturdy fortress in our fundamental law, the tenth 
section of the Bill of Rights.”141 
B.  Imagining Interracial Marriage, 1958 Caroline County, Virginia 
Imagine transposing in time, place, gender format, and race the 
opening scene of this Article, in which Bob and Bill marry one an-
other on California soil using Vermont law.  Consider instead a cer-
emony in Caroline County, Virginia, in 1958, between Mildred Jeter 
and Richard Loving, before family and friends, provided by a liberal-
ized marriage procedure made available by another state.  One’s im-
agination, informed by our racial history and by a scent of danger 
then of such a scene, for all involved, presents a bleak portrait of fear.  
What kind of emotion might you imagine Mildred and Richard and 
their friends experiencing in the midst of the marriage celebration in 
Caroline County?  One imagines rank fear of state power aimed at 
their expression of a legal meaning and at the symbolic moment in 
which it becomes legal fact.  The total control asserted by state mar-
riage bans on formation, ceremonial expression, and legal portability 
is understood, with this gaze into the past, in its assertion of cultural 
power backed by legal force.  The Lovings could have sought a mo-
ment of joy and recognition at home in 1958, but the determination 
 
139 Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E. 2d 749, 756 (Va. 1955), vacated, 350 U.S. 891 (1955). 
140 Naim, 87 S.E. 2d at 756. 
141 Id. 
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of Virginia to use marriage as one site for cultural suppression would 
have asserted a power of complete erasure.  The categorical bans, 
now and in 1958, on an identity constituting couple autonomy, with 
physical banishment in 1958 re-enforcing the illegality of a state cer-
emonial blessing in the miscegenation regime, attack the portability 
of marriage ceremony and status.  The attack is on the visibility and 
publicity that are core purposes of marriage procedures,142 goals con-
sistent with norms of free expression,143 and with the federalism prec-
edent buried in Loving. 
Moreover, the decree of legal non-existence for same-sex couples 
is the radical legal equivalent of the Lovings’s physical banishment 
from Virginia; both are acts intended to inflict a form of civil death.  
Indeed, one obvious solution to the voiding of a marriage legal else-
where is for a couple to leave Virginia, or another voiding jurisdic-
tion, to live in a state that does not undertake a modern form of ban-
ishment but rather welcomes gay married couples.  Ironically, a 
married gay couple in Virginia—in Caroline County, indeed—might 
retrace the Lovings’s trek to live, perhaps unhappily, in Washington, 
D.C., as marriage exiles.  Modern-day efforts at legal extinguishment of 
coupled citizens’ critical, personal, and legal affiliation, implant a 
burden of anachronistic custom in modern culture or law.  Nor is the 
difference between travel histories, implicated in the distinction be-
tween an evasive or migratory marriage of sufficient moral signifi-
cance to bear the weight of an effort to void one marriage and recog-
nize another. 
The hypothetical enactment of banned official marriage ceremo-
nies in a state that bars same-sex marriage would challenge the as-
sumptions of the Virginia culture in 1958 and in 2012.  In both years, 
Virginia claimed the ability to extinguish unwanted symbols and to 
excise couples by using a legal wand that makes them strangers to 
Virginia law and to one another—and unwelcome in Virginia. 
Imagining the practical significance today of imported ceremony 
into Virginia is a useful window into legal banishment of both cere-
mony and status from a state.  Today, a hypothetical imported same-
sex marriage ceremony would likely move opinion away from such 
extravagant conceits and provide concrete benefits.  Imported cere-
 
142 Ernest G. Lorenzen, Marriage by Proxy and the Conflict of Laws, 32 HARV. L. REV. 473, 476–
77 (1919) (noting publicity as a goal of early civil marriage laws). 
143 For an examination of the manner in which expression creates positive externalities, see 
Brett M. Frischmann, Speech, Spillovers, and the First Amendment, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 301 
(2008).  For a treatment of marriage as an expressive right, see Cass R. Sunstein, The Right 
to Marry, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 2081, 2098 (2005). 
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monies would have a symbolic impact on the local community that 
resists the idea of marriage between two people of the same gender 
and would potentially overcome the revival of an attempt to draw a 
trench between a state and marriages widely accepted as valid. 
They also would have a psychological effect on couples who partic-
ipate in a ceremony at home, before friends and family, and who in-
sist upon public recognition.144  Further, the procedure would confer 
visibility on same-sex marriages of couples who live in states that bar 
same-sex marriage and allow couples to enjoy a ceremony in their 
home state before family and friends—as the Lovings never were able 
to do.145  In some states that do not confer marriage, the marriage 
could nonetheless be recognized upon legal solemnization by anoth-
er state.146  Finally, imported ceremonies would provide the occasion 
for a greater legal pressure on the artificiality of the flat marriage 
recognition bars that purport to treat certain marriages as entirely 
nonexistent.  For states such as California that convert marriages into 
civil unions with the legal rights of marriage,147 imported ceremonies 
 
144 June Carbone, Marriage as a State of Mind:  Federalism, Contract, and the Expressive Interest in 
Family Law, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 49, 54 (2011). 
145 Id.; CAL. FAM. CODE § 308 (c). 
146 Several states do recognize same-sex marriages from other states, even while maintaining 
the barrier in their own marriage law.  A reliable count is not easily obtained, as states 
have a variety of sources of interpretation of their probable treatment of such marriages.  
The current easily verified list is Rhode Island, Maryland, and Wyoming, with possible 
openness indicated by the New Mexico Attorney General.  See Appendix A:  Effect of Home 
State’s Non-Recognition on Validity of Marriage, http://www.law.msu.edu/e-marriage/
AppendixA.pdf (last visited Nov. 27, 2012).   
  Until their legislatures enacted same-sex marriage, Washington D.C., Maryland, and New 
York recognized same-sex marriages contracted elsewhere.  For a usefully compact and 
visually accessible compilation of the patterns of authorization and recognition, with spe-
cific treatment of the states that do not authorize same-sex marriages, but recognize those 
made in another state, see NICOLAS & STRONG, supra note 78, at 9–13. 
147 CAL. FAM. CODE §308(c) (West 2004 & Supp. 2012) (“Notwithstanding any other provi-
sion of law, two persons of the same sex who contracted a marriage on or after November 
5, 2008, that would be valid by the laws of the jurisdiction in which the marriage was con-
tracted shall have the same rights, protections, and benefits, and shall be subject to the 
same responsibilities, obligations, and duties under law, whether they derive from the 
California Constitution, the United States Constitution, statutes, administrative regula-
tions, court rules, government policies, common law, or any other provisions or sources 
of law, as are granted to and imposed upon spouses with the sole exception of the desig-
nation of ‘marriage.’”).  If California used the rule that an evasive same-sex marriage is 
void at inception, which it does not, it would be a legal absurdity.  In a state that allows 
civil unions, in which the right to a same-sex marriage was held to be fundamental by the 
Supreme Court of the state, and in which the voters inserted a constitutional amendment 
by a four percentage point margin, such a result would press the idea of state interests to 
their most fanciful abstraction in the face of facts about a state’s legal and local culture.  
In 1998, Koppelman listed thirteen states (and the District of Columbia) as having mar-
riage evasion statutes that render marriages contracted out of state to evade an in-state re-
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have the potential to reimport the word marriage despite the nomi-
nal bar on the word.148  If one state enacted distance marriage availa-
ble to gay couples and the artificiality of the (partial) voiding of its 
legal status in California were recognized and removed, the pressure 
for a mandate about California’s reservation about the word “mar-
riage” would fade away.  The potential ability to import a word into a 
state is among the simplest gifts of federalism. 
In the contest over a word, the logic of a federalist solution for 
California is strong,149 just as the logic of a mandate for Loving and 
Virginia was strong.  The effect on the Lovings of Virginia’s will to 
preserve a symbol of Virginia culture was so massive and so infected 
by racism that only a mandate could answer.  Yet the larger meaning 
applies to California and other states that imagine a similar need to 
preserve a culture against being touched by real life married couples.  
The cure need not be identical to that in Loving, but can, and should, 
draw on Loving’s federalism lesson.  In part because of Loving’s stat-
ure as a case about race, the repose granted to the received canons of 
marriage recognition is more firm within our federalist system than 
should be the case in our contemporary common life as a nation, and 
less contested than it should be as legal analysis.  The background as-
sumptions about states as insular cultural groupings are not empiri-
cally valid today, and they have eroded with the application of consti-
tutional norms to family law.150  Pretending that the Lovings were 
foreign to Virginia culture was false; Caroline County had a tradition 
of connection between the races, and the Lovings reflected more 
than they defied local culture.151  Today, it is false for states to label 
 
striction void at inception.  Andrew Koppelman, Same-Sex Marriage, Choice of Law, and Pub-
lic Policy, 76 TEX. L. REV. 921, 923 n.2 (1998). 
148 CAL. FAM. CODE § 308(c) (West 2004 & Supp. 2012). 
149 The hope for a federalist answer in California is reflected in the approach in Perry v. 
Brown of reaching a narrow holding that only applies to California.  Perry v. Brown, 671 
F.3d 1052, 1096 (9th Cir. 2012).  Many commentators have expressed the hope that the 
case can be confined to California, and not be nationalized.  See, e.g., Will Oremus, A Los-
ing Proposition:  Why Gay-Rights Leaders Don’t Want Their Big Prop 8 Victory to Go To the Su-
preme Court, SLATE (Feb. 9, 2012, 1:03 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and
_politics/jurisprudence/2012/02/prop_8_vs_doma_which_is_the_better_gay_rights_case
_for_the_ supreme_court_.single.html. 
150 For a strong statement of the Civil War as fundamentally transformative of the Union, 
with a nationalizing effect, see 1 G. EDWARD WHITE, LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY:  FROM 
THE COLONIAL YEARS THROUGH THE CIVIL WAR 478–83 (2012).  For a nuanced view of the 
effect on family law of constitutional norms, see Estin, supra note 95, at 382–83 (indicat-
ing that local control of family law is in tension with national citizenship and that the re-
sult has been an “extensive infusion of constitutional principles into family law”). 
151 Steven Boone, The Loving Story:  A Romantic Interracial Landmark, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES 
(Feb. 13, 2012), http://blogs.suntimes.com/demand/2012/02/the_loving_story_a_ 
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same-sex married couples as foreign to their culture.  In all regions of 
the United States, local cultures produce and support same-sex mar-
ried couples.152 
C.  The Meaning of Loving for Equality Federalism Today 
The overriding question now, for marriage, is the means by which 
the cultural change that is part of the American way of life might 
spread in connection with same-sex marriage.  The approach laid out 
below blends principled constitutional claims with ideas about practi-
cality, institutional capacity, and core understandings within the citi-
zenry about the equal treatment of and respect for citizens.  In par-
ticular, the claim is that Americans will more readily accept the 
principle of fairness if it is presented in the context of respecting 
newcomers to a state, and hence respecting their existing legal ties, 
than if it is presented as a basis for controlling how their state awards 
the marriage designation under its own marriage law.  The step of al-
so respecting the status gained by fellow citizens through the com-
mon middle class ritual of a “destination wedding” is not so large as 
one might assume.  The notion that a state is entitled to insularity in 
its marriage law, which is reflected in much that is accepted as hard-
wired, reasonable policy variation, has lost the tenacious roots it had 
when the Virginia Supreme Court spoke with such confidence about 
our fundamental law.  The Virginia views on its marriage licensing 
law and on both migratory and evasive marriages that violated its mis-
cegenation law lost persuasive legal and cultural power in the United 
States in the years that followed Naim v. Naim.153  More significant for 
today’s efforts by states to seal themselves off from the realities of 
same-sex marriage in the United States, so were Virginia’s views on 
the work that the Tenth Amendment could do to preserve a distinc-
tive Virginia culture grounded in a complete control over the law of 
marriage.  The moral meaning of race classifications swept away the 
 
landmark_interracial_romance.html (describing Richard Loving’s claim that Caroline 
County had long had interracial couples).  “There’s just a few people in this community,” 
Richard says.  “There’s a few white and a few colored, and as we grew up and they grew 
up, we all helped one another.  It was all mixed together from the start, so it just kept go-
ing that way.”  Id. 
152 See Baker, supra note 7, at 368 (suggesting that “social norms are not fixed by either time 
or geography” and hence marriage may be best protected across regions using equality 
principles). 
153 See KLARMAN, supra note 122, at 321–468 (describing the Supreme Court’s dread of decid-
ing a miscegenation case shortly after deciding Brown v. Board of Education and analyzing 
the evolution of racial attitudes, backlash in the South, and the changes leading to a ra-
cial reform movement in the United States). 
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power of Virginia to write its own marriage authorization laws with a 
racial component.  But the claim to preserving state culture by reject-
ing disapproved marriages, valid in another state, was also part and 
parcel of the claim about the need to insulate Virginia from the 
meaning of racially mixed marriages.  Virginia not only yielded to the 
imperative of the Equal Protection clause for racial laws, it also re-
joined the Union one more time with the holding of Loving that a 
D.C. marriage was valid in Virginia. 
Lawyers who attacked miscegenation laws starting in the mid-
1950s made a tactical decision not to argue about comity but instead 
to press forward on the Fourteenth Amendment and the Due Process 
Clause.  The race category held such conceptual power and timely 
pride of place that it was the stronger line,154 despite the stakes impli-
cated in seeking a universal mandate for all states to permit previous-
ly forbidden marriages.  As a result, rules of comity in the area of 
marriage were not subjected to the merciless glare of their applica-
tion to interracial marriages.  Not being directly confronted, states’ 
rights rhetoric rode through the judicial disruption of miscegenation 
law untouched and unchallenged as a general principle.  The same 
bromides recited in support of the right of a state to be insular, back-
stopped in Virginia by criminalization of out-of-state interracial mar-
riages of couples residing in Virginia survived for service in a new cul-
ture war.  Some of the very declarations of state insularity used as a 
standard refrain in the state miscegenation briefs continue to attract 
recitation today in connection with state prerogative in marriage law.  
These declarations, permitting non-recognition of same-sex marriag-
es, continue to undergird the acceptance of state marriage policy by 
contemporary scholars and advocates as a given of marriage law and 
procedure.155 
That acceptance deserves to be challenged as a remnant of anoth-
er time, lacking a contemporary purpose.  The acceptance paradoxi-
cally creates pressure for a resolution that mandates that all states 
both authorize and recognize same-sex marriages.  The assumed futil-
ity of a moderated approach in a time of cultural change animates 
 
154 In the 1950s, both the ACLU and the JACL, groups involved in the legal attacks on mis-
cegenation law, “believe[d] that a decision from the U.S. Supreme Court would provide 
the most authoritative, the most efficient, and the most economical method of overturn-
ing miscegenation laws.”  PASCOE, supra note 88, at 231. 
155 The minority of scholars who are otherwise bold in their challenge to conflicts of laws 
rules as now applied to marriage in the United States accept the rule that permits states 
to void “evasive” marriages, that is, those marriages that a couple enters into by traveling 
to avoid a limitation of their home state, and then returning to their home state.  See, e.g., 
Kramer, supra note 92, at 1999; Sanders, supra note 89, at 1479. 
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and sustains a more deeply charged cultural clash than a basic, and 
even bold, re-examination of the fit of marriage recognition conven-
tions with a federalist system.  The canons of marriage recognition, as 
deployed against same-sex marriages, are a fugitive from justice, ob-
scuring a middle path to resolving a cultural clash and helping propel 
continued conflict. 
Zablocki v. Redhail, a case constitutionalizing a feature of state mar-
riage law, is a prime example of the pressure non-recognition of eva-
sive marriages has placed on the federal courts to venture into mar-
riage jurisprudence.156  In a non-race context, the premise that a state 
marriage rule governed the entire marriage eligibility of a state resi-
dent, though he could marry in other states, pushed the Court to 
make a rule limiting the range of local marriage law options for mor-
al instruction.157  Thus, the rule allowing states to apply their “policy 
interests” to migratory and evasive marriages actually creates pressure 
for a top-down national mandate on state marriage authorization law 
and increases the constitutionalizing of marriage law.  The perverse, 
unintended, and counter-intuitive effect is to create a basis to limit 
state flexibility to infuse local marriage law with moral content reflec-
tive of sentiment in the state.158 
III.  EXPORTING CEREMONIAL MARRIAGE:  CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONSIDERATIONS 
Analyzing the possibility of states’ expanding the access to their 
marriage laws using modern technology, and anticipating how other 
states might attempt to limit the practical value or even availability to 
their residents of such access, directs attention to the constitutional 
import of marriage procedure.  The legal conventions by which states 
accord ready recognition to the marriage procedure of other states 
and hence to the marriages that jurisdictions throughout the world 
solemnize are due for examination using the magnifying lens of state 
power to “sell” their law to non-residents.159  The constitutional con-
siderations surrounding the exercise of such authority in marriage al-
low for a view of our national marital landscape through a novel and 
 
156 “Appellee . . . is unable to enter into a lawful marriage in Wisconsin or elsewhere so long 
as he maintains his Wisconsin residency.”  Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 377 (1978). 
157 Id. at 387 (disallowing Wisconsin’s effort to condition marriage eligibility on party’s fi-
nancial responsibility to non-custodial offspring). 
158 Carbone, supra note 144, at 54.  In our article, Adam Candeub and I maintain that states 
should be encouraged to compete to offer desirable marriage law and procedure.  Can-
deub & Kuykendall, supra note 9, at 738. 
159 See supra text accompanying notes 32–38. 
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panoramic window on our federalist structure in a world of mobility 
and technology.  This glimpse of the landscape foregrounds constitu-
tional values that inform the analysis of transactions and technologies 
that challenge territorial logic.160  Even sophisticated scholars can be 
momentarily perplexed by the novelty of a proposal to bend territori-
al assumptions about the physicality and location in time and space of 
a ceremony.161 
Four types of opposition intended to prevent distance ceremonies 
from occurring or having any effect at all as a valid procedure could 
be offered if a state, especially one with same-sex marriage, should 
enact a distance marriage statute.  The forms might be: 
• No Power Claims:  attacking “distance” marriage statutes as an invalid 
exercise of state power; 
• State Bans on E-Marriage Ceremonies:  passing state laws against holding 
such ceremonies in a state hostile to either the E-Marriage model gener-
ally or the substance of particular marriages, or regulating them in a fash-
ion that imposes local burdens; 
• Partial Federal Preemption of State Power:  enacting a federal law barring 
E-Marriage entirely or restricting its recognition; or 
• Flat Refusals to Recognize Any E-Marriage:  using state power to refuse 
recognition to marriages from another state, based on offense to a 
claimed state policy on marriage procedure. 
Each of these approaches to preventing the operation of an 
emerging regime of E-Marriage faces serious constitutional barriers.  
For clarity, the distance-marriage concept, unencumbered by its im-
plicit mission in aid of same-sex marriage, is merely a procedure by 
which states can confer marriage formalization on couples with no 
necessary link to the substance of the marriage.  A statute permitting 
remote marriage ceremonies would challenge assumptions about lo-
cal control, physical presence, tradition, and ceremonial substance; 
proposed changes, even without disputes over the export of ceremo-
nies for disapproved marriages, would likely face resistance.162  The 
 
160 See e.g., James E. Gaylord, State Regulatory Jurisdiction and the Internet:  Letting the Dormant 
Commerce Clause Lie, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1095, 1097 (1999) (discussing the varied “textual lo-
cales” of Supreme Court jurisprudence on state legislation with extraterritorial effect, 
such as efforts to regulate the Internet, with specific reference to the Contracts Clause, 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the Due Process Clause, and the Dormant Commerce 
Clause).  See also id. at 1096 (analyzing the threat state regulation of the Internet might 
pose to the framework of federalism and national coherence). 
161 For a full discussion of the legal logic of E-Marriage, see Candeub & Kuykendall, supra 
note 9. 
162 For an example of resistance to internet versions of important ceremonies, see comments 
to a piece by Laura M. Holson, For Funerals Too Far, Mourners Gather on the Web, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 24, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/25/fashion/25death.html (illustrat-
ing the almost atavistically negative response to the migration of critical life events into 
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likely instinct to block distance marriage from occurring at all, even if 
the legal effect is null for same-sex marriages, and the constitutional 
problems with any such suppressive effort, presents a clarifying view 
of the interests that support the non-recognition rules that affect gay 
marriages.  Efforts, though hypothetical here, at pure suppression of 
a legal ceremony reveal the poor fit of claims about state interests 
with the exercise of voiding powers over marriages  valid in other U.S. 
states.  The incompatibility of such marriage with local law is abstract 
at best.  Legal measures to impose either local or nation-wide embar-
goes on E-Marriage are constitutionally tenuous and in tension with 
constitutional bedrocks of federalism, freedom of expression, and in-
dividual rights.163  Exploration of the reasons provides a base for con-
structing an affirmative argument for Equality Federalism.  The ne-
glected but lurking constitutional dimension of marriage procedure, 
with aggressive claims asserting state insularity from marriage trends, 
is due for a constitutionally-norm-sensitive scrutiny.164 
An examination in turn of each hypothetical blocking maneuver 
to stop the export of marriage ceremony, or all effectiveness for any 
exported official marriage solemnization, brings to the surface consti-
tutional norms that limit the rejectionist reach of geography-based 
policy control over the symbolic, officially sanctioned presence in a 
state of a legal marriage moment that the state wishes to expel. 
A.  Argument One:  Lack of State Power, or Geography Rules! 
The understanding that states offer their license for local use only 
is widespread.  All fifty states have websites that assert that the license 
may only be used within state.165  Even in Arizona, in which marriage 
licensing is governed by an appellate court opinion that states that 
Arizona licenses can be used anywhere, clerks recite the standard 
view.166  An attorney general’s opinion in Alabama makes the asser-
 
the venue of distance communication, especially where the internet is the medium).  
One commenter exclaims:  “We are hardly human anymore!  What are we becoming?”  
Id. at comment 8. 
163 For a discussion of each of these constitutional bedrocks, see infra Part III. A–C. 
164 Sanders, supra note 89. 
165 See Appendix B:  Marriage License Validity in Other States, http://www.law.msu.edu/e-
marriage/AppendixB.pdf (last visited Nov. 27, 2012).  A phone survey of clerks’ offices 
unearthed a universal response that the license can only be used within the state. 
166 Candeub & Kuykendall, supra note 9, at 753 n.76. 
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tion that states lack “any authority” to license out-of-state activities, of 
which a ceremonial marriage using a license is one.167 
Using modern audio-visual internet technology to export an offi-
cial marriage ceremony, even if there is no legal effect, challenges in-
itial comprehension.  One must underline that the proposal is to ex-
port the ceremony and the legal effects—no less and no more—that 
an official state marriage would have if it took place within the au-
thorizing jurisdiction.168 
States respect the marriage procedure of other states.  If states 
were to begin looking behind other states’ procedures to issue mar-
riage licenses and perfect them ceremonially, the whole structure of 
comity and of marriage portability would be disrupted.169  Despite 
common retention of certain archaic rules, such as the “website law” 
noted above, marriage really does not demand “legal magic” or spe-
cial incantations or uniform practices for states to confer a portable 
status. 
1.  Literalist Views of Power 
Nonetheless, the literalism that infects state statutes as drafted—
with either explicit statements or glancing assumptions that the mar-
riage license may only be used in state—has affected some official 
statements.  The most literal of the literal readings by officials was is-
sued by the Attorney General of Alabama in reply to a query by a 
judge concerned because a license he issued was used in an out-of-
state church ceremony.  The Alabama statute does not explicitly state 
that the license may only be used in Alabama.  As is common, it lists 
among those eligible to preside in ceremonial marriages “licensed 
minister[s] of the gospel” in the “Christian church or society of which 
the minister is a member.”170  Notably, early scholarly treatments of 
absentee marriage, where not explicitly authorized by statute, noted 
 
167 Letter from Bill Pryor, Attorney General of Alabama, to Frank Riddick, Probate Judge 
(Mar. 19, 1999), available at http://www.ago.alabama.gov/pdfopinions/99-00144.pdf 
[hereinafter Pryor Letter]. 
168 The effect is to create a marriage under the law of the state making it official as well as 
under the law of any other jurisdiction that does not have a public policy against the sub-
stance of the marriage thereby given official status, and which also would not defer en-
tirely to the domicile of the couple, if the domicile is not in the granting jurisdiction.  See 
Goldberg, supra note 48 (noting the lack of certainty in recognition rules for marriages). 
169 Today, just one state is said to raise a cloud over the validity of proxy marriages.  It is not 
certain how serious the quibble is.  Candeub & Kuykendall, supra note 9, at 757 n.96.  For 
a discussion of the possible constitutional import of wholesale disruption of a marriage 
procedure that states authorize, see infra Part III.C. 
170 ALA. CODE § 30-1-7(a) (1975). 
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that the states as a rule did not specify a requirement of presence by 
the couple in the state or together.171  The learning in these articles 
has not been consulted by opinion-givers such as Attorney Generals, 
however. 
The Alabama Attorney General’s opinion provides a firm answer 
to the question whether the Alabama officials may license marriages 
that take place outside of the state: 
From your letter, it appears that the license was applied for and is-
sued as required by law and that the minister was qualified to perform 
the ceremony as required by law, except that his church is in another 
state.  Since Alabama lacks any authority to license activities that occur outside 
her borders, this ceremony performed in Tennessee was not a valid solem-
nization under Alabama law.172 
Likewise, Tennessee law provides that “[b]efore being joined in mar-
riage, the parties shall present to the minister or officer a license under 
the hand of a county clerk in this state, directed to such minister or officer, 
authorizing the solemnization of a marriage between the parties.”173  This 
marriage was, thus, also not a valid marriage under Tennessee law.174 
The opinion is a model of logic in explaining why a marriage sol-
emnized using an Alabama license in Tennessee is not a ceremonial 
marriage at all, because:  1) “Alabama lacks authority to license activi-
ties that occur outside her borders . . .” and 2) Tennessee would not 
accept a license from Alabama to complete the formalities of a cere-
monial marriage.  By simple logic, it cannot be either an Alabama or 
a Tennessee marriage.  Alabama lacks authority, and Tennessee did 
not purport to act. 
The logic loses some force, however, because the claim that Ala-
bama lacks authority to license activities that occur outside its borders 
is entirely unsupported.  An argument of “no state power” is belied by 
specific statutes and case law of other states respecting ceremonial 
marriage.  Further, the boldness of the formalistic logic is softened by 
the availability of a savings doctrine in Alabama—the opinion ex-
plains that the marriage at issue meets the Alabama requirements for 
a common law marriage.175  This expedient common law shelter for 
the vindication of couple intent and ministerial blessing leaves the At-
torney General free to engage in conceptual niceties that demand a 
territorial anchor for state authority over formal marriage. 
 
171 Candeub & Kuykendall, supra note 9, at 784–89. 
172 Pryor Letter, supra note 167 (emphasis added). 
173 TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-103(a) (1955) (emphasis added), cited in Pryor Letter, supra note 
167. 
174 Pryor Letter, supra note 167. 
175 Id. 
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Despite the licensing nomenclature, state power over marriage is 
expansive for facilitating couple affiliation but limited in destructive 
power based on territory.  A marriage “license” is categorically differ-
ent from use licenses, as it creates an instantly portable status.  It is 
nothing like a license to engage in regulated activities that affect the 
territory of an issuing authority.  The complete inaptness for a “mar-
riage” of a state’s requiring it to be registered in the state in which 
“it” is located reveals that marriage is an “entity” not really apart from 
individuals.  Foreign corporations register in states as foreign corpo-
rations.  Marriages simply are.  Marriages “travel” as an association of 
individuals with continuing individual personhood that transcends 
local regulatory claims over their combined status or its communica-
tive impact.  The banishing of a couple from residence in a state be-
cause of their disapproved entity status, or lack of “registration,” is 
contrary to simple understandings about marriage and individual 
rights.  The effort of Virginia to banish the Lovings resonated with 
race history, not really with marriage history. 
It is unclear whether the commonly understood jurisdictional lim-
itation of marriage licenses emerges from a distinct legislative deci-
sion to limit state authority by territory or the belief that there is 
some constitutional limitation.  It seems probable that the statements 
arise from an ingrained assumption about “licenses” or marriage, and 
not from a careful inspection of the statutes.  Likewise, the assumed 
geographic limitation could simply reflect the pattern of colonial 
laws, which in turn, improvised variations on Anglican ecclesiastical 
law.176  As such, geographic limitations on licensing authority may ex-
ist as a mindless repetition of legal form, enacted as the standard 
procedure by legislatures, strengthened in some minds as a strong 
rule that might even prevent correction of mistakes by couples,177 and 
reinforced even further by an occasional belief by an official that 
there must be some limit on state power over marriage creation out-
side a state’s borders.178  Putting aside such hesitations, the availability 
 
176 Candeub & Kuykendall, supra note 9, at 772–74. 
177 Meekins v. Meekins, 275 S.W. 337, 338 (Ark. 1925). 
178 When Montana had a system of double proxy marriage statute freely available to all com-
ers, state officials developed a sense of unease about state power, leading to a statutory re-
vision.  Candeub & Kuykendall, supra note 9, at 761 n.114 (citing Maurice Possley, Mar-
riage by Proxy Booming in Montana, MONT. LAW., June–July 2007, at 32 (“The purpose of 
the bill was for the military, and there was a fear that it was being abused.  The intention 
was to modify the law without shutting the door to its highest intentions.  Inquiries have 
come from all [over] the world. . . . There were hundreds and hundreds of requests for 
information.  We decided the law needed to be amended to make it clear and eliminate 
ambiguity, although I am not sure how Montana has the authority to issue marriage li-
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of proxy marriage in five states179 suggests a reasonably accessible legal 
understanding that states may license, authorize, or validate a mar-
riage out of state, mixed with a degree of unease, caution, and uncer-
tainty about the source of the authority and, especially, the propriety 
or prudence of building it into statutes for prospective use by cou-
ples. 
2.  Evidence of Power:  Logic, Practicality, Practices 
States do show some signs of taking charge of the task of writing 
laws for clarity, thus claiming their authority and recognizing the 
need to provide guidelines and savings doctrines to protect couples’ 
interest in valid marriages. 
a.  Statutory Leniency 
One form of evidence that states have the authority to license an 
out-of-state marriage are state statutes that explicitly acknowledge the 
validity of a ceremonial marriage conducted out of state with a li-
cense issued by the authorizing state.  Virginia and Tennessee have 
statutory fixes for marriages solemnized outside the state using a li-
cense issued within-state.  The statutes avoid a locution saying affirm-
atively that the licenses may be used outside the state, or, more bold-
ly, anywhere.  The Tennessee statute states:  “If a license issued by a 
county clerk in Tennessee is used to solemnize a marriage outside 
Tennessee, such marriage and parties, their property and their chil-
dren shall have the same status as if the marriage were solemnized in 
this state.”180  This conferral by the statute of “constructive” presence 
in Tennessee supports a robust legal treatment of state authority. 
Virginia has a similar savings statute looking backward to save 
marriages in the limited instances where the plan for an out-of-state 
wedding was entered on the Virginia license.  There is no forward-
 
censes for an entirely foreign jurisdiction.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Dan 
Barry, Trading Vows in Montana, No Couple Required, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2008, at A11 
(“‘We were getting calls from Turkey and the Middle East,’ recalls Peg Allison, the toler-
ant district court clerk here in Flathead County.  ‘From people who were definitely not 
citizens of the United States, and had nothing to do with the military.’”)). 
179 Candeub & Kuykendall, supra note 9, at n.25. 
180 TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 36-3-103(c)(1)-(2) (1955) (validating all marriages “occurring prior 
to May 2, 1989” using Tennessee licenses outside the Commonwealth).  See also VA. CODE 
ANN. § 20-37.1 (1950) (describing the validation of certain marriages solemnized outside 
of the Commonwealth). 
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looking forgiveness in the Virginia statute, like that in the Tennessee 
statute.181 
The Virginia and Tennessee statutes demonstrate that states have 
explicitly placed in statutes a power for licenses issued by the state to 
be used out of state to create marriages under the marriage laws of 
the license-issuing states.  Both statutes, however, avoid writing simple 
statutory designs to facilitate the use of marriage licenses out of state.  
Rather, in the case of Tennessee, the statute uses a locution affording 
recognition to the marriages, yet avoiding the creation of an affirma-
tive regime for use of the licenses out of state.  The statute simultane-
ously draws upon a theory of a legal moment within Tennessee, thus 
retaining the fiction that the direct conferral of the status is for mar-
riages solemnized within Tennessee, and promulgates a theory by 
which the state can treat out-of-state ceremonies as having the same 
effect as a ceremony in Tennessee.  In effect, Tennessee asserts that 
the “legal moment” when a marriage is solemnized under a Tennes-
see statute occurs constructively in Tennessee, no matter its actual lo-
cation, if it is done pursuant to the authority of a Tennessee license. 
Massachusetts takes a slightly different tack, setting up a method 
for recording foreign ceremonial marriages under Massachusetts 
provisions for marriage recordation.182  One can marry outside of 
Massachusetts but receive the benefit of Massachusetts record-
keeping for marriages that occur within Massachusetts.  In some re-
spects, the provision echoes the ability to “domesticate” a foreign 
corporation by moving its incorporation to the state of residence.  
The consequences are different, but the impulse to allow a refor-
mation of an official record of a status created by state law bears some 
resemblance to moving the incorporation of a business to the state of 
its main operations.183  More importantly, it emphasizes the flexibility 
states have over the creation and official recordation of the legal sta-
tus of marriage.  Recordation of a marriage that occurred elsewhere 
projects Massachusetts’ power over marriage creation to “domesti-
cate” it for records as a marriage that originated in Massachusetts.184 
 
181 VA. CODE ANN. § 20-37.1 (1950) (“All marriages heretofore solemnized outside this 
Commonwealth by a minister authorized to celebrate the rites of marriage in this Com-
monwealth, under a license issued in this Commonwealth, and showing on the applica-
tion therefor the place out of this Commonwealth where said marriage is to be per-
formed, shall be valid as if such marriage had been performed in this Commonwealth.” 
(emphasis added)). 
182 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 46, § 17D (2010). 
183 See generally P. John Kozyris, Corporate Wars and Choice of Law, 1985 DUKE L.J. 1 (1985) (an-
alyzing the legal components of corporate conflict). 
184 See supra text accompanying notes 174–75. 
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The Virginia and Tennessee statutes support the power of states to 
confer marriage status on persons outside their jurisdiction, but also 
confirm that the standard reading of the statutes is that the license 
must be used within the state that issued it.  They display a reluctance 
to design licensing statutes for flexible use.  Other statutes leave the 
matter vague or explicitly provide that the license may only be used 
in state.  The current state of statutes is general neglect of the ques-
tion, some affirmative statements limiting the use of licenses any-
where except in state, and two statutes that provide a cautious per-
mission for the state to recognize marriage solemnizations that used 
the license out of state.185 
b.  Proxy Marriage 
One way that several states have innovated to allow more ready ac-
cess to marriage is the proxy marriage arrangement.  Five states have 
such a statute.  California’s statute is distinctive in being written for 
the benefit of members of the military who are on active service in an 
active combat zone.186  Again, the proxy marriage statutes betray a de-
gree of unease by states.  Even as they exercise their power to author-
ize marriages of persons not physically present in the state, they nar-
rowly confine the eligible beneficiaries.  Delaware offers proxy 
marriage to a dying person, where imminent death is attested to by a 
physician.187  Texas permits proxy marriage for the military and for 
prisoners.188  When California enacted a proxy marriage statute in 
connection with the Iraq War, the legislative recital emphasized the 
emergency character of the provision.189 
The narrow categories to whom the privilege is extended, indicate 
a timidity by states about their authority, or worries about propriety, 
with little concern for the equality principle.  Why, for example, 
should prisoners receive aid not offered to someone unable to travel 
to Texas because of indigency or another obstacle to complete a mar-
riage, perhaps after a long partnership, but permit it for a prisoner?  
Perhaps the idea is that the state cannot prevent a prisoner from ex-
ercising a fundamental right to marry under a governing Supreme 
 
185 Tennessee and Virginia Statutes:  VA. CODE ANN. §20-37.1 (West, Westlaw through End of 
2012 Reg. Sess. and End of 2012 Sp. Sess. I.); T.C.A. § 36-3-103(c)(i) (West, Westlaw 
through end of 2012 Second Reg. Sess.). 
186 See Candeub & Kuykendall, supra note 9, at 742 n.25. 
187 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 120 (2010). 
188 TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.006(c)(1)–(2) (2009). 
189 CAL. FAM. CODE § 420(b) (2008). 
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Court holding,190 and the state prefers for security reasons to make 
the marriage available by proxy rather than personal presence in the 
prison of the prisoner’s marriage partner.191  Yet the need by a couple 
of long standing, not in prison but unable to overcome physical sepa-
ration for an in-person ceremony at critical juncture in their life, is 
just as great, and the appeal of such a couple as an object of statutori-
ly rendered equitable protection may be far greater than that of the 
pairing of two prisoners or a prisoner and a person wishing to marry 
the prisoner.192  Perhaps the Supreme Court would say that someone 
in the “free world,”193 meaning not in prison, is not being restrained 
by the state from being married and thus has no rights that a lack of 
access to distance marriage impairs.  There is no formal constitution-
al violation if those not physically restrained by the state have the 
formal option to marry, though not the means of being physically 
present together to meet the formal requirements of state marriage 
laws.194  Indeed, because of a deeply ingrained jurisprudential prefer-
ence, the Supreme Court rejects the notion that a right is impaired if 
means to exercise it are not provided by the state, or available to one 
wishing to exercise it.195 
Thus, Texas may have been moved by an imperative imposed by 
the combined analysis of the Court’s jurisprudence regarding the 
fundamental right to marry, applicable to a prisoner, and other 
Court jurisprudence that treats losses resulting from failure of the 
state to offer help where it could help (but chooses not to) as outside 
the enforceable norms of the Constitution.196  Perhaps Texas imagi-
nes that its state power to confer marital status on those not present 
in the jurisdiction grows where the alternative would be, in the pris-
oner case, to impair another Court-recognized constitutional right, 
or, in the military cases, to fail to support the needs of troops at war.  
But, if Texas is unsure of its power to confer marital status on those 
 
190 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987). 
191 Id. at 98. 
192 TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.006(c)(1)!(2) (2009). 
193 Deshaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 201 (1989). 
194 The failure of imagination relating to marriage recognition creates similar results. 
195 In a series of abortion funding cases, the Court rejected any requirement of public fund-
ing for abortions.  See, e.g. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (holding States partici-
pating in Medicaid to be free from a requirement to fund abortions); Beal v. Doe, 432 
U.S. 438 (1977) (upholding a Pennsylvania statute restricting the federal funding of abor-
tion clinics); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (allowing the Connecticut Welfare De-
partment to limit Medicaid contributions for abortions); Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 
(1977) (upholding the city of St. Louis’s decision to publicly fund childbirth services 
without providing similar funding for abortions). 
196 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
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not present in Texas or able to be physically present for a joint cere-
mony, it can allocate money for sufficient security to permit an in-
prison marriage ceremony.  If Texas is concerned for the military, it 
has the option to budget for, and fund, travel for marriage by Texas 
soldiers.  But the military has been the long-standing exception to a 
lack of energy in extending marriage law to those unable to be pre-
sent together for a ceremonial marriage.  There is a record of statutes 
passed during World War II to provide for liberalized solemnization 
procedures197 and, recently, special treatment in California providing 
relief for the military.198  The Texas “double proxy” marriage statute 
provides relief for members of the military who are both on active du-
ty and for couples where both members are in prison.199  The Califor-
nia law was passed as an “urgency measure,” which took effect imme-
diately.200  These statutes demonstrate that states have the power to 
confer the status of marriage on parties not present in the state nor 
able to be physically in one another’s presence during the ceremony. 
Writers on proxy marriage generally assumed the authority of 
states within the federal system to create marriages involving a party 
to the marriage who was outside their jurisdiction, raising only pru-
dential concerns about the advisability of extending the “utility of ab-
sentee marriage” to peacetime, when it might be used to evade “po-
lice restrictions.”201  The assumed power arising under common law 
was in need, one writer suggested, of legislative intervention to pare it 
back.202  The notion of police restrictions in respect of marriage has 
faded considerably, leaving few reasons for states to shrink from a 
vigorous but carefully designed statutory development of their powers 
to confer marital status on parties not present in the state.  Plainly, 
reasons to come to the aid of a subset of the population to make mar-
riage accessible does not create power.  Rather, such reasons provide 
the motive and “provide the occasion.”  Then, the state draws on ex-
isting power. 
Contemporary proxy marriage statutes demonstrate the power of 
a state to create the marital status for those not present in the state.  
Their selective availability highlights the flaw in state marriage proce-
 
197 Id. at 6 n.4. 
198 CAL. FAM. CODE § 420(b) (2008). 
199 TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.006 (2009). 
200 Id. 
201 Note, The Validity of Absentee Marriage of Servicemen, 55 YALE L.J. 735, 753 (1946). 
202 Id. 
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dures that needlessly impairs the right to marry for some and fail to 
treat citizens with equal concern and dignity.203 
c.  Case Law 
Case law contains more plainly marked road signs and fueling sta-
tions for the power of states to validate marriages that occurred out-
side their jurisdiction.  Case law even tends to affirm statutory intent 
to authorize the use of licenses outside the marriage-granting state, at 
least if done in honest error.204  At the same time, some cases draw a 
line in the sand, strictly limiting any forgiveness for an erring couple, 
or a member of a couple, who seeks, for some later reason, judicial 
declaration that a marriage took place.205  These cases are a tiny, liter-
alist minority.  The reasons for courts to opine are not common.206  
Being married is not generally a matter of daily affirmations by offi-
cials that call for judicial opinion.207  Cases come up where heirs wish 
to cut out a surviving partner from inheritance, or in a divorce action, 
one party denies that a marriage exists.208 
The majority of case law on the point validates ceremonial mar-
riages solemnized in the “wrong” state.209  Except for the rare formal-
 
203 Candeub & Kuykendall, supra note 9, at 762; Lillian M. Gordon, Marriage by Proxy:  The 
Need for Certainty and Equality in the Laws of the American States, 20 SOC. SERVICE REV. 29, 32 
(1946) (lamenting “arbitrary injustice” created by uncertainty and a patchwork of laws).  
The recent litigation over voting accommodations extended by Ohio only to military per-
sonnel explores this very problem of disparate treatment favoring the military over all 
others in the exercise of a basic right.  Obama for America v. Husted, No. 2:12-CV-00636 
(Oct. 5, 2012) (rejecting state interest in enforcing an earlier deadline for voting by non-
military personnel compared with military voters and explaining that, “While there is a 
compelling reason to provide more opportunities for military voters to cast their ballots, 
there is no corresponding satisfactory reason to prevent non-military voters from casting 
their ballots as well”).  See also infra note 270; O’Brien v. Skinner 414 U.S. 524 (1974) 
(finding a constitutional violation where some but not all pre-trial detainees received ab-
sentee ballots). 
204 See infra note 213 and text accompanying notes 208–10. 
205 Id. 
206 Answering a divorce filing with a denial there was ever a marriage is one context. See supra 
text accompanying notes 203–04. 
207 Koppelman makes a related point in his short note discussing the serendipitous way that 
attacks on mini-DOMA laws may arise.  See Koppelman, Limits of Strategic Litigation, supra 
note 76, at 4.  See also Halley, supra note 12, at 26 (“the existence of most marriages is 
never adjudicated”). 
208 The military often has had occasion to decide the matter for benefits.  Gordon, supra 
note 203, at 29–32. 
209 Treatises confirm the pattern.  See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAW § 283i 
(1988) ("Upholding the validity of a marriage is, as stated in Comment b, a basic policy in 
all states.  The fact that a marriage does not comply with the requirements of the state 
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istic proof by a court that no marriage ever arose because of a mistake 
by the couple,210 most courts, at least, see no constitutional problem 
in validating marriages contracted under one state’s laws while the 
couple is in another state.  They also do not dwell on the notion that 
there is legislative intent to limit their state’s authority to license mar-
riages to ceremonies within the state, or to insist upon the procedur-
ally critical importance of the geographic line.  Strikingly, in an effort 
to save a marriage, an Arizona court misread its state marriage eva-
sion code section, issuing an opinion holding that an Arizona license 
may be used outside of Arizona.211 
A couple had traveled to Puerto Rico and engaged in a wedding 
presided over by a minister, who was qualified by the Arizona law to 
marry a couple.  The license that the couple used in Puerto Rico had 
been issued in Arizona.  The court found that the couple had intend-
ed in good faith to marry pursuant to Arizona law, and also that they 
had fully complied with the statutory requirements for a ceremonial 
marriage conducted under Arizona law.212 
The opinion combines a misreading of a marriage evasion provi-
sion of the licensing section with cases fashioned to rescue a marriage 
threatened by a ceremonial defect, where the challenge comes from a 
third party, such as a pension board or heirs after a long marriage.  
The cases cited support a result, based on vindicating the intent of 
the parties against efforts to disrupt these expectations.  Construing 
the statute with a broad meaning, the court reached what was most 
likely a fair outcome for the case at hand. 
Despite its flaws in reasoning, the case shows that a commonplace 
understanding by most people who enter marriages—that one ob-
tains the license and marries in the same state—is not so firmly root-
ed in judicial understanding.  The court used precedents about state 
power to confer marriage status on distant couples, who acted in 
good faith but erred, to construe a statute well beyond its limited 
purpose as a marriage evasion provision.  Thus, a sophisticated court 
concluded that not only did Arizona have the power, but that it had 
exercised it capaciously, to issue marriage licenses valid for use any-
where in the world.  The court transformed the presumption used by 
courts in favor of a marriage’s validity to make the post hoc exception 
 
where it was contracted should not therefore inevitably lead to the conclusion that the 
marriage is invalid."). 
210 Meekins v. Meekins, 275 S.W. 337 (Ark. 1925). 
211 Barbosa-Johnson v. Johnson, 851 P.2d 866 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993). 
212 Id. 
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into an ex ante rule, or to transform a type of forgiveness extended to 
mistakes by couples into expected routine. 
Judicial treatments that protect marriages from ceremonial glitch-
es emphasize party agreement as the core of the marital undertak-
ing.213  It is reasonable for the state to help the parties, or one of them 
where no countervailing factor other than ceremonial niceties exists, 
cure any errors in completing the ceremony for legal recordation. 
Doing so affirms state power.  Judges who provide the help apply a 
liberal principle within an existing framework of state power.  Com-
mon law presumptions in aid of marriage validity assume a degree of 
territorial fluidity within which courts may shop for a rationale to 
hold a marriage valid, without concern for issues of state power.  Ge-
ography can yield to marital facts. 
A New York case took a bold step conceptually, treating the geo-
graphic location of a wedding ceremony as lacking conceptual signif-
icance because the marriage was, jurisdictionally, a New York marital 
ceremony.214  The court overcame formidable facts that would halt an 
Alabama formalist:  the marriage ceremony took place in New Jersey, 
without a license from any state at all.  The court held that a religious 
ceremony held in New Jersey without a license was a marriage validly 
solemnized under the laws of New York for the creation of marriages.  
Critically, the court reasoned that New York has made the “public 
policy decision to favor the validation of marriage over the enforce-
ment of technical requirements.”215  Blending that reading with the 
Restatement rule allowing for the state with the greatest interest in 
the marriage to govern the marriage, the court readily concluded 
that the couple had entered a New York ceremonial marriage.  The 
court suspended disbelief as to geography:  a marriage ceremony 
conducted in New Jersey without a license was really an authorized 
New York ceremonial marriage.  The court chose to avoid literalisms 
and to treat the movement of the two individuals in and around the 
New York area and into New Jersey and back to New York,216 and re-
ports of consummation, as details lacking legal importance.  In effect, 
the court declined an offer to delve into “canonical” theories of a 
marriage’s physical essence, geographic or biological.  The court had 
 
213 Carabetta v. Carabetta, 438 A.2d 109 (Conn. 1980) (refusing to invalidate a duly solem-
nized marriage though the couple did not obtain a marriage license). 
214 In re Matter of Farraj, No. 4803/07 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 14, 2009). 
215 Id. 
216 E-mail from Barbara Bean to author (June 2, 2009, 1:00 PM) (on file with author) (de-
scribing an earlier New York wedding ceremony performed in a helicopter that may have 
strayed into New Jersey). 
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an affinity for a theory of the penetration of law across borders and 
none for corporeal images of critical crossings. 
The court presumably saw, at a high conceptual level, party au-
tonomy and a state role as that of facilitator, not regulator, of party-
controlled formalities.  To the extent that some state role in accurate 
records plays a continuing and useful role in marriage procedure, the 
New York court’s approach may be less than ideal as a template for 
marital formalities.  It is a good lesson, however, in the non-territorial 
nature of state power over ceremonial marriage validation, the im-
portance of the state as a facilitator of party intent, and the overdue 
revision of statutes to pre-authorize flexibility rather than to find a 
post hoc basis to approve it. 
Other cases do not base marriage-validating decisions on the spe-
cific law of the state but on general principles favoring the validation 
of marriages despite errors in solemnization.217  Hence, courts share 
in common a willingness to look past the confines of geography to 
see marriages being created under their state law on the soil of an-
other state.  The Arizona court’s statutory analysis is questionable, 
and the New York court’s analysis is bold, but the impulse by both 
courts that marriage ceremonies licensed by one state are exportable 
to the soil of another state for purposes of solemnization pursuant to 
that state’s authority is right.  The court’s “reformation” of the Arizo-
na statute points to the future of marriage procedure in the modern 
world. 
3.  Conclusion:  The Power is Plenary and Uncontroversial 
Extensive precedent in the area of marriage and other exercises 
by states of their sovereignty contradict any suggestion of a lack of 
power.218  Further, the power of states to effect legal results for inter-
ests outside the state is generally uncontested in corporate law.  Fed-
eralism awards states general powers so long as they do not interfere 
with commerce, attack a federal law that preempts state law, or run 
afoul of specific prohibitions of Article 1, Section 10. 
Though states limit their use of the power they have, their use of 
that power in selected cases demonstrates that they possess the pow-
er.  Such usage raises fairness issues:  sound policy should benefit any 
 
217 Candeub & Kuykendall, supra note 9, at 756 n.90 (providing a string cite to cases where 
state courts evoked savings doctrines to uphold marriages that did not follow all the statu-
tory requisites). 
218 Michael E. Solimine, Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage, The Public Policy Exception, 
and Clear Statements of Extraterritorial Effect, 41 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 105, 125 (2010). 
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couple facing a burden on their access to marriage.  Constitutional 
norms, and good policy, support a state initiative to modernize the 
marriage laws and use their power to create statutes that provide for 
distance marriage. 
In simple terms, the power of a state to create statuses outside its 
borders is a feature of the sovereignty retained by states.  That sover-
eignty is exercised in the typical case immediately inside a state’s bor-
ders but projected into federal law and into other states as couples 
move or have legal interests in other states.219  The unqualified nature 
of state sovereignty to award marital status can be seen in the invali-
dation of DOMA by two district courts of differential treatment under 
federal law of traditional marriages and same-sex marriages.220  The 
effort under federal law to block the legal incidents of selected mar-
riages awarded by the sovereign power of Massachusetts was held to 
violate the sovereignty of Massachusetts where Massachusetts was 
forced to treat a state married same-sex couple worse than a state 
married different-sex couple.221 
DOMA begins its legal negation by implicitly acknowledging the 
marital status of couples conferred by a state, and then narrowing the 
meaning of marriage for all federal purposes.222  State sovereignty was 
sufficient to create a marriage that was portable—even for federal 
purposes of definitional negation.  Congress did not attempt to undo 
the legal status or assert a claim that the marriage was a legal nullity, 
but merely to deny it equal treatment with other marriages under 
federal law, using the convention of a “defined term,” as used in stat-
utes to fix a meaning that varies from meanings outside the statute 
itself.223 
In the context of the affirmative existence of state power, the sig-
nificant point is that a core assumption of the analysis of DOMA in 
Massachusetts v. Department of Health and Human Services, by Judge Tau-
ro, and Congress, is the simple fact of state sovereignty to authorize 
an official marriage as a legal status, by the means created by state law 
 
219 Koppelman, Limits of Strategic Litigation, supra note 76, at 3 (referring to a 1948 Mississippi 
case involving land owned there by a black woman in Illinois and going to her white hus-
band by intestacy despite the Mississippi anti-miscegenation law). 
220 Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t. of Health & Human Servs., 698 F. Supp. 2d 234 (D. Mass. 
2010).  See also Golinski v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 781 F. Supp. 2d 967 (N.D. Cal. 
2011). 
221 See Massachusetts, 698 F. Supp. 2d at 234. 
222 Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006). 
223 Mae Kuykendall, An Essay On Defined Terms and Cultural Consensus, 13 J.L. & POL. 199 
(1997) [hereinafter Kuykendall, Defined Terms and Cultural Consensus]. 
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for conferring the status under its law.  States have a power to solem-
nize marriages by the means they select. 
B.  Argument Two:  State Bans (Individual Rights, State Comity) 
Some states might seek to make participating in a remote mar-
riage ceremony on their soil illegal, particularly if the participants are 
of the same sex.  Some jurisdictions have purported to enjoin same-
sex ceremonies224 or to penalize anyone who presides, and, as noted, 
various state marriage statutes contain criminal penalties for viola-
tions of their marriage statutes, such as presiding without a license, 
failing to record a marriage, or presiding over a marriage which the 
parties are not eligible to enter.225 
The preliminary attempt at prosecution of the mayor in New 
Paltz, New York, who presided over an unauthorized same-sex mar-
riage ceremony, demonstrated that the criminal law has at least audi-
tioned for a minor role in preventing “rogue” ceremonies in states 
that do not recognize same-sex marriage.226  The abandonment of the 
prosecution also demonstrates the shallow rooting in our legal cul-
ture for any such use of criminal law.227  One can imagine fears about 
the potential for the performance in a state of legally authorized cer-
emonies that may give social sanction to practices odious under 
American law, such as abusive types of polygamy originating from 
abroad and damaging the life chances of women immigrants living in 
American states.228  States might contemplate such a protective con-
cern to justify enacting unnecessary laws to prevent marriage cere-
monies where the State disapproves, as a matter of public policy, of 
the marriage. 
Such laws confront formidable constitutional impediments.  Some 
existing laws do impose criminal penalties for presiding improperly, 
such as presiding over a forbidden marriage or without full compli-
 
224 People v. Greenleaf, 780 N.Y.S.2d 899, 900 (N.Y. J. Ct. 2004) (involving a statute that 
criminalized the performance of same-sex marriage ceremonies). 
225 National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Uniform Marriage & 
Marriage License Act (1911). 
226 Thomas J. Lueck, Police Charge New Paltz Mayor For Marrying Same-Sex Couples, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 3, 2004, at B4 (regarding a New York mayor who was criminally charged with a mis-
demeanor for performing a wedding ceremony for gay couples in violation of state law). 
227 Jennifer Medina, Charges Dropped Against Mayor Who Performed Gay Weddings, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 13, 2005, at B5 (detailing the subsequent dropping of charges against mayor in pre-
ceding footnote). 
228 Nina Bernstein, Polygamy, Practiced in Secrecy, Follows Africans to New York, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
25, 2007, at A1 (regarding the stories of African women who entered into polygamous 
marriages before immigrating to the United States). 
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ance with recording or venue obligations and the like.229  Some of 
these laws are presumably valid, though surely unenforced and overly 
emphatic in tone.  One catches a whiff of obsolescence.  The criminal 
law lacks a fit with the regulation of ceremonial marriage.  Such laws 
are statutory hyperbole:  admonitions to officials to follow their duties 
or to individuals not to create forbidden marital relationships.230  
They date to the early twentieth century model act231 and are hence 
both hangovers from a first drafting effort and, in addition, inapt for 
application against a marriage ceremony that draws upon, and com-
plies with, the marriage laws of an American state.  Bedrock constitu-
tional principles would be violated by a statute purporting to render a 
legal marriage ceremony a crime. 
Nonetheless, a hypothetical effort to use criminal law to bar re-
mote marriage ceremonies from a state tends to elude the statement 
of simple constitutional principles that would bar it.  Such a law 
would implicitly attack the exercise by another state of a traditional 
sovereign power by attempting to make criminal the use by a person 
present in the banning state of the laws of a sister state.  No clean 
doctrine of constitutional law addresses the state comity question di-
rectly, but constitutional common sense, of the sort to which the Su-
preme Court turns on occasion, suggests that such a law is foreign to 
our traditions.232  With polygamy, with one striking exception, the 
prosecutions are directly for coerced marriages to minors.233 
Since Loving v. Virginia ended a strong state claim of authority to 
enforce a local ideology of marriage on those in residence, no state 
would attempt to make it criminal to travel to another state to enter a 
legal marriage, and return, unless the conduct upon returning to the 
state was itself capable of being made criminal.  A marriage to some-
one of tender years, below the legal age of consent in a state, would 
invite prosecution upon the return of the couple to reside in a state 
that makes sex between them a crime.234  Today, same-sex marriages 
 
229 See, e.g., Kuykendall, Defined Terms and Cultural Consensus, supra note 233; People v. Green-
leaf, 780 N.Y.S.2d 899, 900 (N.Y. J. Ct. 2004) (involving a law that made performance of a 
marriage without being presented with a marriage license a misdemeanor). 
230 Ann Laquer Estin, Unofficial Family Law, 94 IOWA L. REV. 449, 476–77 nn.137–38 (2009). 
231 National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Uniform Marriage & 
Marriage License Act (1911). 
232 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631–32 (1996) (explaining that a law may not “impos[e] a 
broad and undifferentiated disability on a single named group,” and that such a law may 
not be “inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it affects”). 
233 Allison Tait, Polygamy, Publicity, and Locality:  The Place of the Public in Marriage Practice, 2011 
MICH. ST. L. REV. 173 (2011) (regarding a Utah prosecution for bigamy). 
234 Estin, supra note 230 at 476; supra note 28. 
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are legal in several states, and individuals openly travel to the states 
that authorize them in order to marry and then return home to a 
state that denies recognition.  Despite the widespread non-
recognition, no attempt to prosecute the couples is likely.235 
It should be noted, though, that state statutes do purport to crim-
inalize living in a state after contracting a prohibited marriage in an-
other state.  Delaware, for example, imposes a penalty of $100 or thir-
ty days in prison for entering into a prohibited marriage,236 which 
includes both incestuous marriages and marriages “between persons 
of the same gender.”237  If a legal resident of Delaware enters into a 
prohibited marriage in another state and returns to live and cohabit 
as spouses in Delaware, they are to be punished as though the mar-
riage had been contracted in the state.238  The form of the statute re-
sembles the Virginia miscegenation statute rendered invalid by the 
Supreme Court in the 1960s.  The statutes seem at best half-hearted.  
While incest is still disapproved, it is not a social concern over which 
states exercise vigilance,239 unless a minor is involved—and then the 
 
235 The assurance is not absolute in the minds of some couples.  See, e.g., Stacy Forster, Wis-
consin Gay Couples Who Marry Outside State Could Face Penalty, JSONLINE (July 3, 2008), 
http://www.jsonline.com/news/wisconsin/29412299.html (describing gay couples who 
are concerned about an obscure criminal law against leaving Wisconsin to enter a forbid-
den marriage, and returning).  The potential sensitivity of a state’s sending its marriage 
law outside the state to a same-sex couple who never enters the state is interestingly 
demonstrated by the recent prosecution in Iowa of a court clerk who falsely assured a 
Florida couple that they could legally marry one another in Iowa without coming to the 
state for the ceremony.  It appears that her motive was financial:  she had been ordained 
online to perform marriages, told the men she could handle their marriage without their 
being in Iowa, and filed a forged marriage certificate for an Iowa marriage ceremony.  
Ryan J. Foley, Iowa court official accused of forging gay marriage certificate, ESTHERVILLE DAILY 
NEWS (Oct. 19 2012), http://www.esthervilledailynews.com/page/content.detail/id/
259193/Iowa-court-official-accused-of-forging-gay-marriage-certificate.html?isap
=1&nav=5012.  The charges against her are two counts of fraud and one count of forgery, 
which are felonies.  Id.  The heavy charges can be rationalized as a result of her decep-
tion, but they also appear to reflect the nervousness of a state such as Iowa about export-
ing a gay marriage.  The clerk, to her partial credit, was attempting fill a gap in access to 
the market for Iowa marriage law, and to meet a need.  Her lawyer comments that the 
case is one of first impression and has indicated she will plead not guilty. 
236 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13 § 102 (West 2010). 
237 Id. at § 101. 
238 Id. at § 102. 
239 Marriages of first cousins are forbidden in many states, so cousins travel to marry and 
then return to the state where they were unable to marry.  “The couple—she is a second-
grade teacher and he builds furniture—held their wedding last summer on a lake near 
this tiny town in central Pennsylvania.  But their official marriage took place a month ear-
lier in Maryland, at Annapolis City Hall, because marriage between first cousins is illegal 
in Pennsylvania—and in 24 other states, according to the National Conference of State 
Legislatures—under laws enacted mostly in the 19th century.”  Sarah Kershaw, Shaking off 
 
Nov. 2012] EQUALITY FEDERALISM 439 
 
concern is sexual abuse rather than marital status.240  States that ban 
marriages of same-sex couples do not seem motivated to penalize 
married same-sex couples, but only to treat their legal union as a nul-
lity.  The attempted prosecution of the mayor of New Paltz for presid-
ing over the marriage of a couple ineligible to marry under New York 
law was based on the idea of an improper use of authority granted to 
him by his office.241  Despite the footing of the idea of a penalty in the 
concept of official duties to which an official may be subject, the 
prosecution was abandoned.242 
In Loving v. Virginia, discussed above, the Commonwealth of Vir-
ginia prosecuted a couple for residing in Virginia after entering an 
interracial marriage in D.C.; the Supreme Court disposed of the law 
in one surgical strike that rendered unconstitutional all prohibitions 
of interracial marriage, meaning that states not only could not make 
the marriages a crime, but had to issue licenses for interracial couples 
to marry.243  With same-sex marriage, the Court has taken an initial 
step that makes it impossible to prosecute married same-sex couples 
for their marital conduct.244  Even if the Court were not prepared to 
 
the Shame:  But even if Science and State Law Approve, Married Cousins Still Face Rebuke, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 25, 2009, at D1. 
240 In an earlier era, the concern about underage marriage had heavily to do with consum-
mation.  A predatory male might gain sexual access to a naïve girl by taking her to a 
Gretna Green town that tolerated obvious perjury about the parties’ qualifications to en-
ter a marriage, gain a license, marry her, and repair immediately to a hotel room.  See 
MARY E. RICHMOND & FRED S. HALL, MARRIAGE AND THE STATE 126–27 (1929).  Today, 
sexual access to minors is unfortunately available without the bother of seduction by mar-
riage. 
241 Supra note 226. 
242 Supra note 227. 
243 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (“Under our Constitution, the freedom to marry, 
or not marry, a person of another race resides with the individual and cannot be in-
fringed by the State.”). 
244 Lawrence found that the joint opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey articulated a theory of 
liberty that was broad enough to incorporate same-sex intimacy:   
In explaining the respect the Constitution demands for the autonomy of the per-
son in making [private] choices, [Casey] stated as follows: “These matters, involv-
ing the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, 
choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty pro-
tected by the Fourteenth Amendment.  At the heart of liberty is the right to define 
one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of 
human life.  Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of person-
hood were they formed under compulsion of the State.”  Persons in a homosexual 
relationship may seek autonomy for these purposes, just as heterosexual persons 
do.  The decision in Bowers would deny them this right.   
  Lawrence v. Texas, 529 U.S. 558 (2003) (Kennedy, J.).  See id. at 575 (“When homosexual 
conduct is made criminal by the law of the State, that declaration in and of itself is an in-
vitation to subject homosexual persons to discrimination both in the public and in the 
private spheres.”). 
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apply Loving v. Virginia in full and require states to license same-sex 
marriages, it is difficult—in truth, impossible—to imagine that the 
Court would accept a law criminalizing the status of being a couple 
residing in a state after having been married under the laws of anoth-
er state. 
It is thus also difficult to imagine that the Court would accept a 
law criminalizing the same couple’s participating in a remote mar-
riage ceremony held within the disapproving state.  For that matter, it 
is difficult to imagine a state attempting to criminalize a ceremony 
that is legal in another state, but, as noted, states do still have on the 
books statutes that, in form, criminalize returning to the state and 
“living and cohabiting” as spouses after marrying out of state.  Hence, 
the issue has a breath of life.  Given the continuing ferocity of opposi-
tion to same-sex marriage, any breath of life can spring into the lungs 
of some opponents.245 
Besides common sense constitutional precepts of relative sanity, 
the First Amendment provides the most directly instructive constitu-
tional barrier to a law criminalizing state-authorized but locally dis-
approved ceremonies within a state.  The analysis is as follows:  Same-
sex marriage is legal in some states of the United States.  The conduct 
associated with same-sex marriage has constitutional protection.  A 
ceremony celebrating a couple’s legal commitment to one another is 
an expressive act.  Therefore, a marriage ceremony, where it does not 
facilitate criminal activity, is a purely expressive act protected by the 
First Amendment.  The fact that another state affords recognition to 
the ceremony has no negative effect at all in the state in which it oc-
curs.246  The fact of its legal recognition elsewhere does not alter the 
 
245 A.G. Sulzberger, Voters Moving to Oust Judges Over Decisions, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2010, at 
A1 (describing the transformation of merit retention elections into expensive ouster 
campaigns, with specific reference to the campaign to oust the three judges up for reten-
tion in 2010 who voted with a unanimous Iowa Supreme Court to mandate same-sex mar-
riage in Iowa).  In Iowa, there has been a call to have voters act on their every-ten-years 
opportunity to call a constitutional convention, with the purpose of amending the consti-
tution to overturn the unanimous decision of the Iowa Supreme Court.  The issue is not 
on the ballot.  Steve Williams, Iowa GOP Won’t Push Gay Marriage Repeal in Next Session, 
THE LGBT RIGHTS CAUSE (Nov. 30, 2011), http://www.care2.com/causes/iowa-gop-wont-
push-gay-marriage-repeal-in-next-session.html. 
246 This aspect of E-Marriage illustrates that the concession made by Dean Kramer in 1997 
may concede more than is needed in 2012.  Dean Kramer suggests that, if every state were 
required to recognize same-sex marriages, just one state (in 1997, Hawaii was the con-
cern) could determine the rules for all states.  Kramer, supra note 92, at 1999 (explaining 
how a state cannot fail to comply with its ordinary choice-of-law rules just because it disa-
grees with the policy of another state).  With E-Marriage, we see that marriage expression 
can travel and achieve visibility, and that numerous constitutional precepts protect that 
expression.  Further, the export of corporate law governing internal corporate affairs 
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fact that the ceremony is core First Amendment expression rather 
than a form of conduct. 
Indeed, the fact that it is an official legal act emanating from an-
other state deepens its First Amendment protected status.  No in-state 
conduct associated with the ceremony or the marriage can be made 
criminal.  Thus, the First Amendment fully protects the right of a 
couple to enter into a marriage while in one state, pursuant to the 
marriage laws of another state.247  This conclusion presumes that no 
state would authorize a ceremony that facilitates criminal activity, say, 
a father-marries-underage-daughter ceremony.  Indeed, a state with 
E-Marriage might prudently require the couple to affirm that no as-
pect of their intended union violates criminal law in their current lo-
cations.  One state legislator has already commented that the state 
would adopt the most conservative age limitation in the states, if E-
Marriage were actually adopted.248 
Reviewing black letter First Amendment doctrine is worthwhile, 
because the heat associated with opposition to same-sex marriage has 
heavily to do with a desire to suppress expressive ceremonial acts, and 
with residual shock at the use of the word marriage to describe the 
unions of same-sex couples.249  The bans on gay marriage are de-
signed to prevent the expressive meaning of gay marriage from gain-
 
gives a state the ability to liberalize the rules by which a corporation operates in states 
away from that state.  So, while it is not an inevitable conclusion that states must recog-
nize same-sex marriages, it is nonetheless apparent that the state interest in refusing 
recognition is weak.  The fact of a marriage’s existence in a state is little more intrusive on 
policy interests of the state than is an imported marriage ceremony. 
247 This Article does not opine on measures an American state may take to protect its citizens 
from participating in marriage ceremonies emanating from a foreign jurisdiction, where 
the marriage was in deep opposition to accepted norms here that are seen as protective 
of vulnerable persons.  It seems likely that abusive practices are the concern in the United 
States, not a validation provided by a ceremony emanating from abroad.  There has been 
coverage of the practice of polygamy as a factor in the New York area.  The weight of cul-
tural norms brought with emigrating groups seems sufficient to sustain the practice, and 
legal action would be taken under the usual idea of state power to protect citizens from 
harm, measured by conduct rather than expression.  Further, it would seem likely that 
purely religious ceremonies of marriage, such as polygamous marriage, would enjoy First 
Amendment protection under the Free Exercise clause. 
248 Representative Bill Lippert, Chair of the Vermont House Judiciary Committee, 
Roundtable discussion at the MSU College of Law symposium on E-Marriage (Nov. 2010) 
(explaining that any such enactment would take the most conservative approach to age 
eligibility). 
249 Mae Kuykendall, Resistance to Same-Sex Marriage as a Story about Language:  Linguistic Failure 
and the Priority of a Living Language, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 385 (1999) (“The [move-
ment against gay marriage] is one of de-authorization of a subset of marriage speech that 
a significant number of citizens deploy for self-description and that a significant number 
of their citizens respect and adopt.”). 
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ing currency in a state.  The Constitution provides no overt protec-
tion through the First Amendment for the right of anyone to marry.  
But exporting the ceremony of gay marriage does allow for the issue 
of free expression to be engaged:  states can “ban” gay marriage in 
the sense of refusing to give it legal recognition, but the export of 
ceremony helps to demonstrate that they may not, in truth, “ban” gay 
marriage.  Reactions that the import of official ceremonies author-
ized by another state “undermines” local law, even when the marriage 
still lacks local recognition, would expose the illiberal impulse ani-
mating the mini-DOMA laws and the misuse of the “banning” word-
ing.250  The export of marriage ceremonies by states that permit same-
sex marriage would be a means for states to enhance expressive free-
doms, using federalism as a teaching device about marriage expres-
sion and cultural change as “un-bannable.” 
C.  Argument Three:  Partial Preemption (Limits on Congressional Power over 
Marriage Laws in a Federalist System) 
Finally, one can hypothesize federal legislation to restrict state 
sovereignty over the authorization of marriage.  Congress could be 
urged to prohibit states from conferring marital status on couples not 
physically present in the authorizing state.  Calls to prohibit states 
from using “absentee marriage” statutes for the purpose of spreading 
same-sex marriage across jurisdictions could be made. 
The same federalism reasons that stopped Congress from enact-
ing legislation to render same-sex marriages entirely void within the 
states that authorize them251 stand in the path of federal intervention 
to control the form of marriage solemnization statutes.  The excep-
tion might be federal legislation vindicating a federal interest in con-
trolling immigration policy.  Even in that instance, the mechanism 
most compatible with principles of federalism would simply be to ex-
 
250 The hypothetical response to E-Marriage is not entirely hypothetical.  News coverage of 
the E-Marriage idea led to responses by anti-gay-marriage proponents.  See, e.g., Rick Hag-
lund, Will you e-marry me?  Law professors propose sweeping changes in state marital statutes, 
LEGALNEWS.COM (Feb. 17, 2010), http://www.legalnews.com/detroit/651400/ (quoting 
American Family Association of Michigan President Gary Glenn:  “It seems a not very 
cleverly or well-disguised scheme to establish the legal and emotional fiction of so-called 
homosexual ‘marriage’ in states which truthfully define and legally recognize marriage as 
only between one man and one woman”).  For a full sampling of the blogging and media 
treatment of the proposal, see also E-Marriage Project:  Michigan State University College of 
Law, MICH. STATE UNIV. COLLEGE OF LAW, http://www.law.msu.edu/e-marriage/ (last vis-
ited Mar. 9, 2012) (providing links to blogs and news coverage of E-Marriage). 
251 See infra notes 244–46. 
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tend the current practice of treating “proxy marriages” differently for 
purposes of federal immigration law.252 
There is a strong policy accepted by the Supreme Court to regu-
late the use of family ties as a path to citizenship.253  Given the policy 
preference by Congress and constitutional approval by the Court, 
some sort of limitation on the immigration consequences of marriage 
by non-resident aliens to U.S. citizens, solemnized by using a remote 
marriage statute, is surely constitutional.  However, such limitations 
by Congress, in regulating an immigration-sensitive state practice, 
would be constrained by other constitutional principles.  There may 
be no adequate federal interest to justify limitations on the use of 
remote marriage statutes by resident aliens,254 or even by non-resident 
aliens, given the ability of the government to limit the way such mar-
riages can be used for immigration. 
Outside of the immigration context, there is no federal interest in 
the design of state marriage procedures.  A law restricting remote 
marriage in some way would be the procedural analog to DOMA.  
Such a law could take three different forms.  Specifically, the law 
could, like Section 1738 of the Defense of Marriage Act, authorize 
states to deny recognition to remote marriages.255  Or, in an analog to 
Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act, the law might have a provi-
sion withholding federal recognition to remote marriages.  The Sec-
tion 3 provision is now being litigated in a lawsuit against the federal 
government by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, discussed supra, 
and has been ruled unconstitutional by the First Circuit.256  Most radi-
cally, the law could ban states from using marriage procedures that 
allow couples not physically present in the state to marry pursuant to 
their ceremonial marriage laws.  Arguably, Congress could legislate 
more narrowly on any of these, restricting remote marriage proce-
dures only as to same-sex couples.  The latter seems quite unlikely in 
light of the increasingly tolerant view of gay marriage.  While repeal 
 
252 Candeub & Kuykendall, supra note 9, at 747. 
253 Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 59 (2001) (listing the conditions under which a child born 
out of wedlock to a citizen father and alien mother may acquire citizenship). 
254 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371 (1971) (explaining that resident aliens are cov-
ered by the words of the Equal Protection clause as persons; while the federal govern-
ment has power to regulate immigration, these powers reach their limit if there is no fed-
eral interest). 
255 See supra note 244. 
256 Massachusetts v. U.S. Dept. Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012). 
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of anti-gay legislation is difficult to achieve,257 so might new anti-gay 
legislation be difficult to enact. 
As to the last and most aggressive (but unlikely) possibility, Con-
gress lacks the power to regulate the manner in which a state may ex-
ercise its sovereign function of creating marriages.  The form taken 
by the 1996 anti-gay marriage federal legislation demonstrates that 
Congress has already determined that it lacks such power.  The rec-
ord of the Congressional hearings concerning DOMA reflects a de-
termination to “protect” traditional marriage from the threat posed 
by official recognition of gay marriage.  Much of the Congressional 
rhetoric cites the importance of preserving traditional marriage by 
preventing the recognition of gay marriage.  This determination is 
reflected in the portion of the eventual law that defines marriage for 
all purposes of federal law as being restricted to a union of a man and 
woman.258 
DOMA as enacted purports to advance federalism by simply af-
firming, under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, what some argue the 
clause already provides:  the ability of states, acting on a strong public 
policy, to refuse to recognize an out-of-state marriage that violates the 
state’s public policy.259  Yet the form of the affirmation was criticized 
as exceeding Congressional power.  Professor Laurence Tribe wrote a 
letter of opinion citing the text of the Tenth Amendment and United 
States v. Lopez.260  He suggested that the principles of Lopez pointed to 
a serious Constitutional barrier to the form of DOMA:  Congress 
would violate the Tenth Amendment if it legislated on a matter not 
delegated to it in any provision of the Constitution.261 
However that might be, the long tradition of state control over li-
censing procedures, as well as a limited federal interest in preventing 
 
257 David M. Herszenhorn, Move to End ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ Stalls in Senate, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 
21, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/22/us/politics/22cong.html (reporting on 
a failed attempt in September 2010 by Democrats to overcome a filibuster that would 
bring a vote to end “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” to the Senate floor). 
258 Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006) (“[T]he word ‘marriage’ means 
only a legal union between one man and one woman as a husband and wife, and the 
word ‘spouse’ refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.”). 
259 28 U.S.C. § 1738(c) (2010) (showing that § 3 of DOMA reaffirmed the principle that 
states did not have to recognize out-of-state marriages that violated public policy:  “No 
State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe, shall be required to 
give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other State, territory, 
possession, or tribe respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex that is 
treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State”). 
260 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).  See also, 142 Cong. Rec. S5931-33 (daily ed. 
June 6, 1996) (letter of Prof. Laurence Tribe). 
261 H.R. Rep. No. 104-664, at 29 (1996). 
Nov. 2012] EQUALITY FEDERALISM 445 
 
innovation in marriage ceremonies by states,262 argues against the 
constitutional prudence of federal legislation imposing a regulatory 
patina over state marriage licensing.  Not only would such a law be 
overreaching or redundant, it would unsettle deeply rooted marriage 
law and procedure.  A federal law placing a Section 1738-style cloud 
over the need for states to recognize remote marriages would throw 
into doubt marriages that courts now validate applying received con-
ventions about conflicts of law and the primacy of party intent in 
marriage, and its critical importance to couples.  While the current 
DOMA, which provides that states need not recognize gay marriages, 
is seen as redundant of the existing Full Faith and Credit Clause and 
conflict-of-laws interpretations of it,263 and to that degree potentially 
congruent with constitutional values, negative legislation about the 
form marriage solemnization takes would introduce a new factor into 
the liberal construction of marriage validity and, most critically, 
would destabilize the lex loci celebrationis rule. 
Today, most heterosexual marriages that are valid in the state un-
der whose laws they were solemnized are recognized without dispute 
in other jurisdictions.264  Any Congressional provision that destabi-
lized that norm would be both unwise and, as with a law to ban re-
mote marriage laws entirely, likely unconstitutional.265  If Congress 
enacted any legislation affecting state marriage procedures, such a 
federal statute would more usefully provide support for state flexibil-
ity in enacting marriage laws, by funding the development of mod-
ernized model legislation, consortiums for state collaboration, and 
public/private partnerships to modernize the administration of mar-
riage formalities and the collection of statistics.  Any Congressional 
role in marriage law would best take the form of aiding federalist col-
laboration, not erecting new barriers to modernizing marriage pro-
cedure. 
 
262 See Candeub & Kuykendall, supra note 9, at 751. 
263 Kramer, supra note 92, at 1975–76 (arguing that the public policy exception in the con-
flict of laws doctrine allows state courts to rule same-sex marriages as invalid without reli-
ance upon DOMA:  “With or without explicit authorization from Congress or state legisla-
tures, courts are relatively free to make an exception to the place of celebration rule for 
same-sex marriages”). 
264 UNIFORM MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 210, 9A U.L.A. 194 (1998); Joanna L. Grossman, 
Resurrecting Comity:  Revisiting the Problem of Non-Uniform Marriage Laws, 84 OR. L. REV. 433, 
442–44 (2005) (explaining the uniformity of marriage laws throughout the country in 
1995 in the absence of a national marriage policy). 
265 See supra text accompanying notes 246–48 (showing an array of viewpoints, statutes, and 
cases supporting the idea that Congress ought not to destabilize the norm with regard to 
state reciprocity of marriages). 
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IV.  EQUALITY FEDERALISM:  PRECEDENT AND INSTITUTIONAL 
STRUCTURE 
Equality Federalism is a timely, sound answer to the unduly stark 
contested visions of the same-sex marriage question.  The thought 
experiment of imagining the adoption of E-Marriage by a state with 
same-sex marriage demonstrates the fit of Equality Federalism with key 
components of our constitutional structure and values.  Equality Fed-
eralism encourages federal courts to protect constitutional rights by 
restricting both the federal government and states from denying ef-
fect to legal statuses awarded by the law of a state.  Federalism offers a 
complex state sovereignty that allows states to offer laws to outsiders 
while maintaining their own state messages about marriage as an en-
tity by withholding (or granting) ceremonial blessings for certain 
marriages.  With federal courts finding unconstitutional the with-
holding by DOMA of federal recognition of a state-created legal sta-
tus,266 the loop comes close to closing on revealing the federalist logic 
to a third, federalist path to abating the culture clash over same-sex 
marriage, while protecting individual rights, norms of free expres-
sion, and state sovereignty over the creation of portable legal statuses.  
If the federal government must recognize state marriages and may 
not deem them nonexistent, the stage is set for recognizing that nei-
ther may the states operate a regime that allows for odd sortings of 
marriages by wooden and largely forgotten legal canons.  If the fed-
eral government may no longer deem a Vermont marriage by Ver-
mont residents nonexistent, neither should it respect any voiding267 
norms that any state asserts over a same-sex marriage, on any state of 
facts.  The legal path to knowing which marriages the federal gov-
ernment could deem nonexistent,268 by parsing murky and poorly 
understood recognition rules in each domicile state of a couple who 
traveled to marry and the reverse evasion rules of the authorizing 
state, is not one that fits our federalism.  If Congress may not by stat-
ute define marriages out of existence for federal law, the states 
should not function as the mechanism for the federal government to 
do indirectly what it cannot do directly. 
 
266 In re Balas 449 B.R. 567, 579 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2011) (“In the end, the court finds that 
DOMA violates the equal protection rights of the Debtors as recognized under the Fifth 
Amendment.”); Golinski v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 781 F. Supp. 2d 967, 975 (N.D. 
Cal. 2011). 
267 See Appendix A:  Effect of Home State’s Non-Recognition on Validity of Marriage, 
http://www.law.msu.edu/e-marriage/AppendixA.pdf (last visited Nov. 27, 2012).   
268 This assumes an ending of the restrictive definition of marriage in DOMA. 
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A counter-intuitive aspect of the right of states to reject “evasive” 
same-sex marriages, while treating as valid migratory marriages into 
the state, is that it poses an upside-down Equal Protection problem.  
A diverse treatment of evasive marriages compared with migratory 
marriages sorts state citizens who enter same-sex marriages into two 
classes of citizenship, linked to their travel history.  State rules that 
penalize residents for having a shorter duration of citizenship than 
comparable others in the state have been held to violate the Citizen-
ship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment:  “That Clause does not 
provide for, and does not allow for, degrees of citizenship based on 
length of residence.”269  Oddly, the distinction between migratory and 
evasive marriages creates two classes of same-sex couples, married 
under the law of another state, whose rights vary, to long-term resi-
dents’ disadvantage, by length of residence in state.  The equality 
principle and the citizenship definition converge in the Fourteenth 
Amendment to cast a cloud over treating married couples, who are 
identical in the format of their marriage, differently based on length 
of residence in the state, with long residency mandating, in a perverse 
turn, worse treatment.270  It seems likely that the practice favors 
wealthier couples, such as couples who are transferred from one state 
to another by a corporation, and tends to disadvantage less mobile, 
less wealthy couples.  A rural couple would be less likely to benefit 
from a more favorable treatment of migratory marriages, compared 
with evasive marriages, than a couple who moves from one city to an-
other for business reasons. 
At least two other scholars have noted this anomaly.  In 2005, To-
bias Wolff noted the differential treatment and suggested that states 
 
269 Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 69 (1982). 
270 Concededly, there is an argument that an “evasive” marriage is a form of bad faith and 
hence can be penalized differently from a good faith migratory marriage.  But the differ-
ences between a couple who marries in State A, knowing that relocation could disrupt the 
legal status of a marriage, and one who travels to marry in a state that grants the ceremo-
ny and confers the status and who also know there is a hovering cloud but not its size or 
power, is thin.  The difference exists in an abstract world of legal brain teasers, not in the 
real world occupied by couples who aspire to avail themselves of a legal status available in 
the United States.  It is a difference that has a tinge of rationality but not much relation 
to real world decisions by same-sex couples who marry.  Hence, it bears a slight resem-
blance to the practice, found unconstitutional, of providing absentee ballots to pre-trial 
detainees held outside their home county but not within it—another instance of residents 
penalized for staying close to home.  O’Brien v. Skinner, 414 U.S. 524, 530 (1974).  
Moreover, state judges in the past embraced the argument that the purpose of evading 
the laws of [a domiciliary state] is not a motive that invalidates a marriage.  In re Perez, 
219 P.2d 35, 36 (Cal. Dist. Ct., App. 1950).  See supra note 203, Obama for America v. 
Husted, No. 2:12-CV-00636 (Oct. 5, 2012) (finding legal protection violations in Ohio 
early voting rules that accommodated only military voters). 
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could choose in litigation to support the better treatment of migrato-
ry marriages, or in his words, “recent arrivals,” as compared with long-
term domiciliaries, who may not marry in-state or leave the state 
briefly and return with a marriage recognized within the state.  States 
could thus let go of a voiding rule on migratory marriages, while 
maintaining that the state has an interest in voiding evasive marriag-
es.271  Wolff urges great care in pulling apart the now-illegitimate rea-
sons for applying non-recognition to migratory marriages, such as 
dissuading people from moving to the state, and concedes that eva-
sive marriages might be more readily justified on the basis of a tradi-
tional disfavor toward such marriages because they manifest “disre-
spect for forum policies.”272  By comparison, the approach of elevating 
the equality principle as the partner doctrine for federalism implants 
equality reasoning directly into the treatment of any same-sex mar-
riage entered into within an American state.  In Wolff’s treatment, 
pure equality is off point, either because the state is willing to aban-
don the differential treatment by refusing recognition to all same-sex 
marriages and thereby claim a concern for evenhanded treatment of 
same-sex couples, or because the lack of a fundamental right to marry 
implies a secondary role for equality in federalist reasoning about 
marriage. 
Mark Strasser has also noticed the same discrepancy in treatment 
of two couples domiciled in the same state but with a different histor-
ical relationship to the state that married them.273  Strasser solves the 
difference in treatment by emphasizing the “good faith belief and 
reasonable expectations” of the couple who unexpectedly migrated 
from the state that married them.  The flaw in the analysis is that any 
same-sex couple is reasonably on notice that the marriage may not be 
portable.  Hence, again, a deeper presence of equality principles in 
marriage federalism, with particular reference to the distinctive case 
of same-sex marriage, is the doctrinally sound solution to permitting 
states to express a normative preference in marriage licensing law but 
accede to equality norms as well.  Equality Federalism blows the whistle 
on differential treatment of similar same-sex couples as lacking suffi-
cient basis when federalism and equality are blended to give protec-
tion to a legal status held by couples who fundamentally do not differ.  
 
271 Tobias Barrington Wolff, Interest Analysis in Interjurisdictional Marriage Disputes, 153 U. PA. 
L. REV. 2215, 2238–40 (2005). 
272 Id. at 2237. 
273 Mark Strasser, The Privilege of National Citizenship:  On Saenz, Same-Sex Couples, and the Right 
to Travel, 52 RUTGERS L. REV. 554, 573–74 (2000) (highlighting the discrepancies in how a 
state may treat two couples with different historical relationships to that state). 
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“Federalism secures to citizens the liberties that derive from the diffu-
sion of sovereign power,”274 and its similar infusion with equality prin-
ciples allows for the weeding out from marriage law of rank illogic. 
Precedent and institutional competence combine to form a basis 
for Equality Federalism in same-sex marriage.  Supreme Court institu-
tional competence is not challenged by interventions to discipline 
unequal results from antiquated state practices that treat identical 
couples differently based on their travel history.  The Supreme Court 
may draw upon a rich blend of constitutional structure, logic, and 
principle to eradicate the constructed difference between couples 
who are identical except for their travel history.  Similarly, there is in-
stitutional competence for the Supreme Court to eradicate different 
treatment of mobile married couples who are identical except for the 
sex composition of the pair. 
Lawrence v. Texas275 does not create a useful precedent for the 
Court to mandate full equality in all state marriage licensing law.  Us-
ing equality principles to stop the illiberal use of criminal law against 
the intimate lives of citizens has a firmer basis in a conception of the 
Court’s role in the constitutional order than does a holding by the 
Court that the equality norm mandates re-writing marriage licensing 
law in each state.  On the other hand, a strong opinion by the Court 
arguing that the equality norm has no relevance to marriage law 
would be unfortunate.  Ideally, the form that Court deference would 
take is to federalism (and not to a un-modulated rights-disrespecting 
majoritarianism), emphasizing gradual but energized change and a 
modest role for the Court infusing process with constitutional disci-
pline.  Equality Federalism is an effective path to mutual respect among 
the states. 
A.  Loving v. Virginia:  Equality Federalism on Steroids 
Loving v. Virginia limits a state’s ability to mandate strict local rules 
defining its culture as distinctive and entitled to maintain its “purity” 
from contamination by people and citizens from outside the state.  
Loving is a death knell for local control sufficient to veto a consensual 
union, against a norm of equality, on the basis of a state “way of life” 
 
274 Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 719, 759 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing William J. 
Brennan, Federal Habeas Corpus and State Prisoners:  An Exercise in Federalism, 7 UTAH L. REV. 
423, 442 (1961)). 
275 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
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infused with traditional cultural encodings.276  It erects a fortress 
against deeply disruptive forms of voiding marriages, including “eva-
sive” marriages.  Loving was a glimpse at minimally fair federalist 
treatment of the common practice of travel to exercise a couple’s au-
tonomous preference for marriage.  The Lovings had the benefit of 
knowing the extent of the hostility to them embedded in Virginia law 
and being assured that D.C. would respect their “evasionary” mar-
riage ceremony.  Today, same-sex couples face greater ambiguities 
about the system of marriage law across jurisdictions.  States offer 
marriage tourists their ceremony, even as laws remain on their books 
that void the marriages ab initio.277  If the assumption that the voiding 
of evasive marriages by domicile states is an embedded and legally 
uncontroversial practice, there is no assurance that an Iowa judge, af-
ter the recent non-retention of three Supreme Court justices, would 
not apply a cautious reading of the law,278 were the matter to arise in 
Iowa. 
In its brief to the Supreme Court in Loving, Virginia presented a 
pre-Civil War conception of federalism as a basis for defending twen-
tieth century insistence on social hierarchy and state insulation.279  
The brief presents a colloquy in Congress concerning the meaning of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1866, as the forerunner to the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Fear was expressed in 1866 in Congress that if marriage 
is a “right,” it is a civil right, and the military power, under provisions 
of the seventh section of the bill, could be used to enforce a black 
man’s right to marry a white woman “without respect to the prohibi-
tion of the local law.”280  Such a vision of a world undone, in this in-
stance by a physical incursion of alien law through military presence, 
bears a resemblance to the enactment of an E-Marriage between two 
 
276 Stephanie McCurry, The Soldier’s Wife:  White Women, the State, and the Politics of Protection in 
the Confederacy, in WOMEN AND THE UNSTABLE STATE IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 
18–20 (Alison M. Parker & Stephanie Cole eds., 2000) (describing the way that the advo-
cates of secession “skillfully evoked the propertied and spatial arrangements of master-
hood as yeoman farmers and planters alike understood them in the South”). 
277 Iowa law is silent on the matter.  Case law indicates that Iowa recognizes any marriage 
that is legal in the state contracted, but that general rule for incoming marriages might 
not preclude an Iowa judge from applying the logic of a reverse evasion statute.  See In re 
Marriage of Reed’s, 226 N.W.2d 795, 796 (Iowa 1975) (“I. Under the traditional conflict 
of laws rule long followed in Iowa, the validity of a marriage is determined by the law of 
the state in which it was contracted.”). 
278 A.G. Sulzberger, Ouster of Iowa Judges Sends Signal to Bench, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2010, at 1 
(reporting on the successful vote to remove judges who voted in favor of same-sex mar-
riage). 
279 Brief and Appendix on Behalf of the Appellee, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (No. 
395) [hereinafter Appellee’s Brief]. 
280 Id. 
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men on the soil of Texas, which met with angry reactions in 2010.281  
In 1866, the tactic of the bill’s proponent was first to use the standard 
argument—still current in 1967—that if the penalty for intermarriage 
were the same for a black person and a white person, there would be 
no “discriminations in punishments on account of color.”282  But the 
proponent also muddied the issues by refuting the suggestion that 
marriage was a civil right.  Rather, Representative Moulton of Illinois 
said, “Marriage is a contract between individuals competent to con-
tract it . . . . No one man has a right to marry any woman he pleas-
es.”283  The colloquy was presented by Virginia in 1967 as a means of 
proving the intent of the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, but 
in a reading today, it shows an atmosphere somewhat like that in 
1996 at the passage of DOMA.  There was anxiety about a type of so-
cial change that upset existing assumptions about inclusion and ex-
clusion.  The anxiety went so far as to require the bill’s proponent to 
explain that a black man would not be empowered to force a white 
woman to marry him. 
The advocates for black equality, and for the liberation of gay 
people, stood on similarly perilous cultural ground, seeking to deflect 
the most volatile social confrontations and to buy time for cultural 
change.284  The proponents of the Civil Rights Act, themselves im-
mersed in a culture that held ambivalent attitudes about race yet 
sought to advance racial justice over time, used shifting locutions 
about the possible meaning of a right “to make and enforce con-
tracts.”285  Even while giving some explicit assurance that there was no 
discrimination in anti-miscegenation laws so long as they had even-
handed penalties for the races, the proponents smuggled into the 
legislative record language about the right of individuals to make 
contracts of marriage and even said that marriage “is a matter of mu-
tual taste, contract, and understanding between the parties.”286  In 
1967, Virginia’s combination of anxiety and certitude led it to include 
the colloquy in its brief, failing to recognize its Clintonesque charac-
ter of fine distinctions that preserved in the legislative history a 
statement that marriage is a matter of contract and mutual taste, 
 
281 See Haglund, supra note 250. 
282 Appellee’s Brief, supra note 279. 
283 Id. 
284 Thus, a liberal President, himself not yet comfortable with same-sex marriage, signed a 
bill that gave cultural reassurance to the intensely fervent opponents of the change they 
feared was coming.  President Clinton signed the bill after having pledged support to gay 
causes.  Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996). 
285 See infra text accompanying notes 264–65. 
286 Appellee’s Brief, supra note 279. 
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while buying time for the logic of the Fourteenth Amendment, social 
change in a single nation bound in a federalist understanding, and 
the high regard for contract freedom to prevail.287 
The time for the colloquy’s meaning came in 1967.  Because race 
was involved, Loving imposed a standard national solution288 rather 
than relying on federalism to require Virginia to recognize a mar-
riage contracted elsewhere “as a matter of mutual taste, contract, and 
understanding between the parties.”289  Indeed, except for race, ac-
cording to one author, the case is wrongly decided, since Virginia had 
made clear its intention of invalidating a marriage contracted else-
where and Virginia policy on recognition allowed for no doubt about 
its policy.290  The Lovings were a pure case of evasive marriage intend-
ed to avoid a clear local rule.  The better view, considering the logic 
of federalism, may be that even without race the case is rightly decid-
ed—requiring Virginia to validate an evasive marriage where the ra-
tionale for Virginia’s policy was to enforce an arbitrary stipulation 
about marriage in order to preserve its pre-Civil War culture invio-
late.  The “Virginia Way” had to give way in a diverse country commit-
ted to personal autonomy, free expression, and physical mobility. 
Today, without race as a factor, Loving can serve as a precedent for 
invalidating destructive non-recognition rules for same-sex marriages. 
Race dominates in Loving twice, first in leading the Court to impose a 
national solution, and, second, in obscuring its precedential meaning 
for federalism. 
B.  Institutional Competence Arguments:  Allocating Responsibility 
In a recent symposium, Dean Erwin Chemerinsky perceived an 
“inherently limited” ability of state courts to protect constitutional 
rights.291  On the basis of institutional competency, he concluded 
“[i]n every area where I would like to see state constitutional rights 
develop, I would much prefer to see it accomplished under the Unit-
ed States Constitution, if possible.”292  This argument for institutional 
 
287 Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 591 (1897) (upholding freedom of contract between 
citizens in one state and a company in another state). 
288 See Loving, 388 U.S. at 12 (“Under our Constitution, the freedom to marry, or not marry, 
a person of another race resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by the 
State.”). 
289 Appellee’s Brief, supra note 279. 
290 Solimine, supra note 218, at 125 n.65 (“embarrassingly” concluding that Loving was 
wrongfully decided based on the facts of the case). 
291 Erwin Chemerinsky, Two Cheers for State Constitutional Law, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1695, 1697 
(2010). 
292 Id. at 1697. 
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competency differs from the legal process arguments that once were 
prominent, which counseled for caution by the Supreme Court on 
the basis of prudential judgments about the capacity of the Court to 
alter political facts on the ground, particularly those relating to 
strong cultural norms.293  The fear was that judicial legitimacy could 
be a fragile commodity and should not be subjected to risks that 
would be created by an overly robust role in advancing principles of 
law.  Such arguments were heavily criticized, on the grounds that the 
primary calling of the federal judiciary is to uphold principles and 
leave concerns about backlash to the political branches.294  For nu-
merous reasons, the institutional competency claim about limiting 
the reach of federal judicial power faded over time, to be replaced by 
ideas about forms of restraint that could be seen as derived from 
principle.295 
In the context in which this Article advances a claim about institu-
tional competency, the claim is not so much about conserving legiti-
macy but rather about applying principle in the correct domain for 
federal judicial intervention.  The recent federal court rejections of 
Section 3 of DOMA are principled decisions that attack the infringe-
ments DOMA imposes on federalism and on the core concept of 
equality.296  The Ninth Circuit’s effort in Perry v. Brown to avoid reach-
ing a broad conclusion that disallows limitations on marriage eligibil-
ity in all states, though a product of a pragmatic concern to preserve 
the decision from unfavorable review, also accords with the judicial 
 
293 Laura Kalman, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 13–59 (1996) (providing his-
torical examples of instances in which the Court refused to make legal decisions based on 
cultural trends). 
294 Id. (explaining that in this view pragmatic calculations about how to manage change 
weaken the judiciary); Equality Federalism, by contrast with the gradualism critiqued in 
connection with the Court’s cautious approach in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 
483 (1954), argues that the Court has the ability to require our federalist structure afford 
full respect to overlapping constitutional norms.  Equality norms have rendered the mar-
riage-voiding rules inapt, and thus unconstitutional, for a form of marriage that has estab-
lished roots in a growing number of state marriage laws. 
295 G. EDWARD WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION:  PROFILES OF LEADING AMERICAN 
JUDGES xvi (2007) (describing the emergence of originalism as a claimed basis for re-
straint). 
296 Windsor v. United States, No. 12-2335-cv-(L) (2d Cir. Oct. 18, 2012); Massachusetts v. U.S. 
Dep’t Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 10–11 (1st Cir. 2012); Windsor v. United 
States, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Golinski v. U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 781 F. 
Supp. 2d 967 (N.D. Cal. 2011); Pedersen v. U.S. Office Pers. Mgmt. v. Bipartisan Legal 
Advisory Grp. of the U.S. H.R., No. 3:10-cv-1750 (VLB), 2012 WL 3113883 (D. Conn. 
2012). 
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norm of reaching only constitutional issues that are presented and 
must be decided.297 
The domain of marriage law is indeed assigned to the states.  For 
that reason, Congress, even at the height of its first reaction to the 
possibility of state authorized same-sex marriage, acknowledged the 
limits on its power over state marriage law (even while encroaching 
upon the domain of state law).298  Insofar as marriage law is a creature 
of state legislation and common law traditions,299 the Court, as does 
Congress, has reason to minimize forms of scrutiny that require it to 
supervise marriage law. 
The equality norm, applied across the board to state marriage law 
as a constitutional norm, would have the potential to highlight the 
absence of a Court jurisprudence on marriage.  Issues arise in con-
nection with un-gendering marriage that are surely better handled by 
states, free of the logic-chopping of the Court that tends to overlook 
the entity meanings of marriage.300  However much the Justices may 
express respect for the deep meanings that marriage carries for all 
citizens, the use of constitutional logic, based on individual rights ra-
ther than entity meanings, is unlikely to be a model of reasoning 
about marriage that carries the full set of moral meanings embraced 
within the culture.  Such reasoning can best arise from the states, ap-
plying their local processes for resolving sensitive issues about an in-
stitution over which opinion remains divided.  We know, as of this 
date, that seven jurisdictions have used those local processes to ex-
tend marriage rights, to shape the local format in ways sensitive to lo-
cal concerns,301 and to supervise the local clerks’ offices.  Statutes are 
enacted that follow the guidance of the state courts or of the weight 
 
297 The “avoidance canon” is explicitly about reading Congressional statutes, when possible, 
to avoid constitutional issues.  But the larger idea is to minimize Court intrusions on deci-
sion making by other bodies.  For a review of the literature and an argument that a doc-
trine meant to serve separation of powers may undermine the authority of the Executive 
Branch against Congress, see William K. Kelley, Avoiding Constitutional Issues as a Three-
Branch Problem, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 831, 880–81 (2001) (explaining that the federal 
courts can avoid a deep incursion on state law making by making a more modest constitu-
tional correction of outdated understandings). 
298 See supra note 104. 
299 For an example of an argument favoring equality principles, and thus the application of 
“heteronormative” rules to same-sex marriage, see Peter Nicolas, The Lavender Letter:  Ap-
plying the Law of Adultery to Same-Sex Couples and Same-Sex Conduct, 63 FLA. L. REV. 97, 99 
(2011).  See also Peter Nicolas, Common Law Same-Sex Marriage, 43 CONN. L. REV. 931 
(2011) (asserting that libertarian principles support the right of same-sex couples to have 
equal access to common law marriage). 
300 Mae Kuykendall, Marriage Jurisprudence (manuscript available from author). 
301 See, e.g., N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 10-b (2011) (detailing the religious exception in marriage 
bill). 
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of opinion in the state about terminology and the like.302  However 
contentious these processes have been, they arise from a set of state 
bodies that have greater connection to ground-level application of 
the rules. 
In the same symposium in which Dean Chemerinsky reached his 
favorable view of the federal litigation attacking the constitutionality 
of Proposition 8, Neal Devins explores the capacity of state courts to 
assess backlash consequences of their decisions, both within-state and 
nationwide.  Devins talks about the ways that “path-breaking state 
courts”303 may learn from one another in gauging backlash conse-
quences and “thereby engage in a national conversation about consti-
tutional rights.”304  The nature of the conversation has to do with the 
risks of pressing hard for the equality norm in marriage “when a de-
mocracy is in moral flux . . . .”305 
In focusing on courts,306 Devins, like Chemerinsky, slights the po-
tential of state legislatures using state sovereignty to effectuate the 
spread of access and equality norms.  The emphasis is on the capacity 
of courts to assess the political environment in deciding how bold to 
be, and on the factors that judges consider, including elections, pos-
sible referenda reversing a holding through a constitutional amend-
ment, and reputation.  The analysis proposes to look at judges as po-
litical actors, thus positioning Justices as Representatives.307 
Changing the emphasis to legislatures aligns Representatives with 
the work of Justices, and ameliorates the backlash against courts.  By 
now, eleven jurisdictions have enacted same-sex marriage through 
legislation, with ten proceeding without court pressure.308  One, Ver-
 
302 Press Release, Iowa Att’y Gen. Tom Miller, County Recorders must Comply with Supreme 
Court’s Varnum Decision (Apr. 21, 2009), http://www.state.ia.us/government/ag/latest_
news/releases/apr_2009/Marrige_Stmnt.html. 
303 Neal Devins, How State Supreme Courts Take Consequences into Account:  Toward a State-
Centered Understanding of State Constitutionalism, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1629, 1675 (2010). 
304 Id. 
305 Id. at 1683 (quoting a Vermont case by way of Cass Sunstein). 
306 Id. at 1632 (“State supreme court justices have jurisdiction over a single state, not the en-
tire nation.”). 
307 Id. at 1664 (citing Melinda Gann Hall, Justices as Representatives:  Elections and Judicial Poli-
tics in the American States, 23 AM. POL. Q. 485, 488 (1995) (listing studies showing politi-
cians fear voters)). 
308 A.B. 43, 2007!08 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2007) (vetoed); A.B. 849, 2005!06 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2005) 
(vetoed); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-20(4) (West 2011); D.C. CODE § 46-401(a) (West 
2011); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 650-A (West Supp. 2009) (repealed by 2009 Maine 
Ballot Quest 1); H.B. 438, 430th Gen. Assemb. (Md. 2012) (enacted, Ref. Question 6 ap-
proved);  N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:1-a (West 2011); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:1-31(a) (West 
2011) (vetoed by Governor Chris Christie); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 8 (West 2011); S.S.B. 
6239, 62d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2012) (enacted, Ref. 74 approved).  The Connecticut 
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mont, did so more than a decade after the system absorbed the cul-
ture shock of the courts’ mandating equal treatment for same-sex 
couples but allowing the “civil union” terminology in place of the 
word marriage.309  Legislatures that have accumulated experience 
with the consequences of innovation in marriage law would be in the 
best position as institutions—better than state courts or federal 
courts—to assess the pragmatic possibilities for reforming marriage 
law to the benefit of marriage law generally but with special signifi-
cance for gay couples.  The needs of same-sex couples can provide 
the impetus for a broader reformation of statutory marriage proce-
dure, bringing it from its roots in the late nineteenth century to 
modern day realities and supplying innovation powered by recogni-
tion of the role federalism has to play in softening the culture wars 
while spreading the norm of equality.  Insofar as existing state DO-
MAs stymie legislatures, because the state DOMA purports to void 
out-of-state marriages, federal courts could re-energize state legisla-
tures by invalidating such extensions of local voter preference into 
the sovereign power of states to create legal statuses.  Today, the state 
constitutional DOMAs preventing recognition disable legislative de-
liberation.  Were federal courts to end such blockage of federalist ex-
perimentation, both judges and legislatures could begin to reason 
about marriage as an entity, with the responsibility of shaping rules 
relevant to the needs of married couples resident in the state.  The 
primary marriage law of the state would have broader scope to ad-
vance moral discourse about marriage,310 and the secondary law deal-
ing with existing marriages could give a new purchase on marriage 
reality. 
Given its individual rights focus, the Supreme Court is on the 
horns of a dilemma.  The only means by which the Court could vin-
dicate an understanding of the marital unit by traditionalists, while 
also mandating same-sex marriage, is to dilute the individual rights 
approach that dominates its overall jurisprudence.  Given its juris-
prudence, and its remoteness from the writing of specific law to gov-
ern the marital estate, the Court, in effect, lacks institutional compe-
 
legislation was pending when the Connecticut Supreme Court held that denial of mar-
riage to same-sex couples was unconstitutional under Connecticut law.  Kerrigan v. 
Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 411!12 (Conn. 2008).  The Connecticut legisla-
ture quickly passed the legislation.  For an update on the status of gay marriage in the 
states, see Fetters, supra note 14.   
309 Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999) (mandating equal treatment of same-sex cou-
ples by the Vermont Court’s voluntary enactment of same-sex marriage in 2010).   
310 See Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformation of American Family, 83 MICH. L. 
REV. 1803 (1985). 
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tence to write constructively about an entity within its framework of 
individual rights jurisprudence.  If it rejects the individual rights 
claims, it damages its own jurisprudential framework, but if it accepts 
them, it harms the cultural meaning associated for many with a criti-
cal social unit.  Whatever resort the Court might reach within its 
methods and forms of expression is likely to be damaging to sensitive 
cultural and legal values. 
It is thus possible to question the wisdom of the Court’s taking an 
interpretive stance that imposes a solution favoring same-sex mar-
riage nationally, even while one hopes the Court can avoid an em-
phatic rejection of the relevance of norms of fairness and respect for 
same-sex marriages and for the individual rights affected within the 
developing political evolution of marriage and family law.311  Equality 
Federalism is the path. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Contested visions of the legal status of same-sex marriage assume 
either total national treatment or the normal operation of conflict-of-
law principles to produce legal variety.  The constitutional system in 
which marriages are given state authorization and recognition, how-
ever, is one with multiple norms as expressions of personal autono-
my, free expression, and state power in a federalist system.  These 
norms infuse marriage ceremony and portability in every dimension 
of time, place, and conceptual location.  The norms around which 
marriages gain legal status and cultural meaning are not in separate 
containers.  Each state has some vision of marriage as an entity that 
supports the state’s vision of its legal and family culture.  Vermont be-
lieves deeply in the equality of citizens and in the humane, dignitary 
value of marriage, while Virginia believes that gendered marriage is 
the foundation of Virginia culture.312  Broader constitutional values, 
derived from our constitutional structure and commitments, infuse 
the creation of marriages in both geographic locations.  These norms 
support marriage as a form of expression and of the exercise of indi-
vidual, identity-supporting rights.313  They also support the capacity of 
 
311 For this reason, many proponents of same-sex marriage hope for a resolution of the Prop 
8 case short of adjudication by the Supreme Court. 
312 Virginia’s preamble to its 2004 Affirmation of Marriage Act cites its obligation to defend 
marriage “as an institution essential to the common good.”  H.B. 751, Gen. Assemb., 2004 
Sess. (Va. 2004), available at http://leg1.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp504.exe?041+ful+HB751. 
313 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
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each state to create legal status supportive of broader constitutional 
values to be respected within a federalist system. 
This Article argues for recognizing the force of overlapping con-
stitutional norms in the legal treatment of the portability of same-sex 
marriages.  Separate visions fail to afford a merited stature to norma-
tive redundancy as a constitutional good.  Equality Federalism takes 
that conceptual step:  blending equality, state normative input, access 
to a fundamental state-provided affiliation status, federalism, and free 
expression. 
The proposal for Equality Federalism utilizes the concept of tech-
nology-enabled distance marriage to reveal how artificial prevailing 
assumptions about geography as an all-encompassing factor in mar-
riage law have become.  E-marriage, even if it remains in hypothetical 
form, is a progressive concept in a broad sense:  it challenges stale as-
sumptions and practices that serve little purpose.  Further, exploring 
the idea reinforces and deepens one’s grasp on the whole set of con-
stitutional values with which marriage law comports. 
By contrast, a nationally mandated rewriting of marriage laws to 
include same-sex couples serves just one of the norms:  equality.  
While advancing the constitutional commitment to equality, a na-
tional court mandate would put pressure on a neat demarcation of 
equality logic; to say that all couples must receive equal treatment is 
to embrace a theory of marriage as involving pairs, a theory that the 
Court lacks might struggle to explain as a well understood and ac-
cepted boundary to its logic of rights.  Adopting a theory of marriage 
is unlike anything the Court has done before about marriage as an 
entity; rather, the Court has had the luxury of relying on unstated as-
sumptions about the core meaning of marriage, without the need to 
rationalize what its limiting contours might be.314  If state courts apply 
 
314 In Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 539–53 (1961), Justice Harlan, dissenting, treats a claim 
that a ban on the use of contraceptives by a married couple is unconstitutional as “an in-
tolerable and unjustifiable invasion of privacy in the conduct of the most intimate con-
cerns of an individual’s personal life[,]” yet assumes that “homosexuality” is a categorical-
ly different phenomenon, which the state may ban.  Writing before any suggestion that 
marriage might expand to include a new category of intimacy protected by the Court as a 
recognition of the protectable liberty interests that he extolled in his dissent in Ullman, 
Harlan was able to assume a stable category that could contain individual rights without 
challenging, but rather reinforcing, its social meaning as a union for the permitted use of 
“the sexual powers.”  Id. at 546.  Similarly, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 2 (1966) rested on 
the rights of individuals but did not challenge the received meaning of marriage; indeed, 
Virginia’s criminalizing of the marriage was a form of recognizing that the status was mar-
riage.  Anti-miscegenation laws did not have the quality of challenging the existence of 
the concept but of attempting to stop such marriages from being brought into existence 
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equality logic to the claims of same-sex couples, these courts nonethe-
less remain a part of the structure of law-making within the state, ap-
plying a species of common-law logic within the definitional parame-
ters created by the legislatures of their state.  As Devins notes, state 
courts make law for one state to which they have strong ties to local 
opinion; one may add to that, they do it in a context that weds them 
to a system of local law-making over a domain assigned to the states.315  
Their embrace of equality logic, using state constitutional law, is 
more easily cabined as a form of input into a design controlled by the 
legislature with input by citizens in referenda.  It is readily observable 
that their holdings have initiated a state-based discourse about mar-
riage, exercising persuasive effects over legislatures and precipitating 
public debate.316  The individualistic logic of U.S. Supreme Court 
precedent on marriage,317 while a natural fit for its overall jurispru-
dence in the area of rights, is an awkward fit for a continuing juris-
prudence affecting marriage, and for democratic input into a cultural 
practice.  The states, and federalist logic, have a strong basis to claim 
the preeminent role in modernizing marriage law to fit evolving un-
derstandings of family life. 
In combination with the ending of Section 3 of DOMA,318 Equality 
Federalism would afford appropriate dignity to the state-based enact-
ments awarding marital status to same-sex couples, increase the cer-
emonial and practical value of their marriages to such couples, and 
allow for a gradual and less traumatic diffusion of equality norms in 
marriage.  Equality Federalism provides a third path to local expressive 
control over state marriage law and state court supervision of the 
evolving meanings associated with marriage in a changing culture.  It 
permits an allocation of roles among our federalist law-making bod-
 
and those who entered them from bringing their marriages into states that wished to ban 
them.  The Court could decide Loving without propounding a deep theory of marriage. 
315 Devins, supra note 303, at 1678–83. 
316 See Gay Marriage and Homosexuality, PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUBLIC LIFE,  
http://www.pewforum.org/Topics/Issues/Gay-Marriage-and-Homosexuality/ (last visited 
Mar. 9, 2012).  In the local democratic process, the process shows opinion swings, with 
reversals of steps by legislatures to allow gay marriage.  Maine voters repealed same-sex-
marriage legislation by referendum.  2009 Elections: Maine Voters Are Latest to Reject Gay 
Marriage, WALL ST. J., Nov. 5, 2009, at A4. 
317 See supra text accompanying notes 277–79, for a discussion of the poor fit of Supreme 
Court individual rights logic for the construction of a critical institution with entity mean-
ings.  See also GLENDON, supra note 16, at 157 (suggesting the Supreme Court lacks a prin-
cipled basis to limit its privacy jurisprudence and has resorted to “bald assertion” to limit 
it or expand it). 
318 As noted supra, Part 3 has been declared unconstitutional by more than one court.  
DOMA generally is the subject of a repeal bill in Congress.  Respect for Marriage Act, 
H.R. 1116, S. 598, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011). 
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ies, in which constitutional principles can be applied while the shap-
ing of a critical institution remains primarily within the domain of the 
states. 
When same-sex marriage first became an imagined possibility, 
there was anxiety about federalism’s power to allow one state to veto 
the marriage rules of every other state.  Even critics of the sweep of 
DOMA conceded that one state should not be able, as a host for mar-
riage tourists, to veto the marriage policy of all other states.319  Today, 
with the increasing spread of state-sanctioned same-sex marriage, this 
logic has lost force.  Counting all states that have an authorization for 
same-sex marriage, either in effect or in abeyance, U.S. states contain-
ing roughly one-third (less without California) of the national popu-
lation authorize same-sex marriage.320 
One of the co-sponsors of DOMA has recognized the alteration in 
facts and has disavowed its fit with federalism and thus the fit of the 
voiding norms applied to same-sex marriage.  Advocating the repeal 
of DOMA, he has written, “In effect, DOMA’s language reflects one-
way federalism:  It protects only those states that don’t want to accept 
a same-sex marriage granted by another state.”321 
The first reactions to same-sex marriage, reviewed in Section I, 
energized efforts to quarantine it within any context that might give it 
an expressive presence.  Much of that first reaction has dissipated, 
even as visions of uniformity persist.  The initial assumption that fed-
eralism was a means of blocking an unimaginable change has lost 
persuasive force.  Yet the apparatus of denial, placing a statutory ex-
clamation mark on geography as a barrier to marriage mobility, con-
structed in response to the first astonished glimpse of the future re-
mains insufficiently contested.  The genius of federalism lies in its fit 
with local initiative to advance local values and with the comity 
among the states that supports a common national life, respect for 
legal statuses widely granted by other states, and the diffusion of ex-
pressive meaning and forms of human connection across the national 
map.  Today, the percentage of the population that lives in a state 
that licenses same-sex marriages, allowing for uncertainty in some 
 
319 See Kramer, supra note 92, at 1999 (“Hawaii should not be able to dictate marriage law to 
the rest of the nation, nor can it do so.”). 
320 See Appendix C:  State Population & Percent of U.S. Population, http://www.law.msu.edu/e-
marriage/AppendixC.pdf (last visited Nov. 27, 2012).  These numbers are already in-
creasing with the recent electoral successes authorizing same-sex marriage in Maine, Mar-
yland, and Washington State.  See Fetters, supra note 14. 
321 Bob Barr, No defending the Defense of Marriage Act, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 5, 2009), 
http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oe-barr5-2009jan05,0,1855836. 
story. 
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states that are in legal transition, is approaching thirty-three percent.  
It is now part of our national culture, and is not an alien transplant. 
Wyoming gives a glimpse of the future of Equality Federalism.  It is 
one of the many states that restrict their marriage-authorizing law to 
opposite-sex couples.  Yet the Senate of Wyoming voted on March 4, 
2011, to reject House Bill 74, which would have denied recognition to 
same-sex marriage and civil unions contracted elsewhere.  In the 
floor debate in a heavily Republican Senate, Senators made repeated 
and uncompromising reference to the equality norm of the Wyoming 
Constitution,322 reflected in the state nickname, the Equality State.323  
Senators appealed both to the Wyoming and United States Constitu-
tions.  “This bill does nothing more than to strip away liberties that 
have been granted by other states,” said Representative Ruth Pet-
roff.324  “We go from being the Equality State to the Strip-Away-Liberty 
State.”325 
The Wyoming debate and outcome demonstrate that equality and 
other constitutional norms, as well as traditions of neighborliness, 
support Equality Federalism as a solution to the marriage wars. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
322 WYO. CONST. art. I, § 2. 
323 Aaron LeClair, Anti-gay Marriage Bill Defeated in Senate, LARAMIE BOOMERANG (Mar. 3, 
2011), http://www.laramieboomerang.com/articles/2011/03/03/news/doc4d6f23246ab 
30937837749.txt. 
324 Id. 
325 Id. 
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